

STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE



Journal of the American Intelligence Professional

Remembering 15 Years Ago

As the USSR Collapsed: A CIA Officer in Lithuania, August 1991

A View of How We Manage
**The Lost Art of Program
Management**

The Intelligence Process
**A Holistic Vision for the
Analytic Unit**

Winning With Intelligence
**Intelligence in War:
It Can Be Decisive**

Intelligence Education
**Studying and Teaching About
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the United Kingdom**

Operations in Another Time
**A US Naval Intelligence
Mission to China in the 1930s**



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In January 1991, Lithuanians gathered by the thousands to attend a mass funeral for citizens killed by occupying Soviet troops. By 17 September, Lithuania and the two other Baltic states, Estonia and Latvia, were full and free members of the United Nations.

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CSI's Mission

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To carry out this mission, CSI publishes *Studies in Intelligence*, as well as numerous books and monographs addressing historical, operational, doctrinal and theoretical aspects of the intelligence profession. It also administers the CIA Museum and maintains the Agency's Historical Intelligence Collection.

Contributions

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Unless otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the range of *Studies*' purview, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the awards. They will be judged primarily on substantive originality and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Members of the *Studies* Editorial Board are excluded from the competition.

The Editorial Board welcomes readers' nominations for awards.

As the USSR Collapsed: A CIA Officer in Lithuania

Michael J. Sulick

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In 70 hours,
70 years of
communism was
undone.
”

Throughout its history the CIA's Directorate of Operations (National Clandestine Service) has demonstrated the ability to mobilize quickly in response to world crises by quickly dispatching its officers overseas, sometimes as pioneers in new places or in difficult situations, to collect intelligence and to take advantage of opportunities to advance US national interests.

I was privileged to be such a pioneer when I was sent to Lithuania as the drama of the Soviet Union's collapse was entering its closing scenes. Many colleagues soon fanned out across the lands of what had been the Soviet empire to engage old adversaries and new-found friends. Some former adversaries rejected us outright; others listened but remained wary. Some embraced us, and we forged relationships that would prove critical in the war on terrorism.

—MJS

— 1 —

August 1991

At first, I didn't think it would happen; the president had, after all, cancelled my trip to Lithuania at the last minute.

Direct presidential involvement in a CIA officer's trip was unprecedented, but so too had been the tumultuous events that prompted the assignment. Hard-line Soviet leaders had orchestrated a coup d'état to remove the reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. That dramatic turn was followed by the even greater drama of average Soviet citizens rising en masse to successfully topple the coup leaders and restore Gorbachev, though much weakened, to office. In 70 hours, 70 years of communism in the Soviet Union was undone, the Soviet Union had come apart at the seams, and the decades-long Cold War essentially was ending.

On the intended day of my departure, 23 August, Milt Bearden, Chief of the Soviet and East European Division (SE) of the Directorate of Operations, called me into his office. Bearden, a tall Texan, had served in many crisis areas around the world. One of these, as CIA chief in Islamabad, was engineering support to the resistance against Soviet troops occupying Afghanistan. Bearden had watched the Soviet superpower admit defeat and leave Afghanistan in February 1989, a clear sign of the empire's implosion. Bearden then came home to head SE, just before communist

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The Path to the Restoration of Lithuanian Independence

In August 1991, the Soviet Union still regarded Lithuania and its Baltic neighbors, Estonia and Latvia, as members of the Soviet Union. All three had progressed much further toward a break with the Soviets and real independence than other Soviet republics since Gorbachev's liberal policies of the mid-1980s had encouraged nationalists to begin breaking with Moscow. In Lithuania, a new political force Sajudis (the Movement) emerged in June 1988 ostensibly to support the Soviet leader's reforms, but it also promoted a Lithuanian nationalist agenda. Sajudis demanded that the Soviet Union officially acknowledge the excesses of the Stalinist era, halt construction of a nuclear reactor in Lithuania, and disclose the secret protocols of the Soviet-Nazi Non-aggression Pact of 1939 that had granted the Soviets control of the Baltic states.

Encouraged by the successes in neighboring Poland of the Solidarity movement in 1988, Lithuanian nationalists began to drive events with lightening speed. In October 1988 Sajudis elected Vytautas Landsbergis, a dynamic professor of musicology, its chairman. In March 1989 Sajudis representatives won seats in the Congress of People's Deputies, the Soviet Union's highest legislative body, and began advocating Lithuanian national interests in the Kremlin. In May the Lithuanians proclaimed their sovereignty and declared their country's incorporation into the Soviet Union illegal. State, and even communist, organizations declared their separation from Moscow and began to function independently. On 23 August 1989, the 50th anniversary of the Soviet-Nazi Non-aggression Pact, about 2 million people from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia stood holding hands along a highway from Vilnius to Tallinn to form a human chain stretching over 350 miles. In December the Lithuanian Communist Party seceded from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In 1990, Landsbergis was elected Chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. On 11 March 1990, the newly elected parliament voted unanimously for independence.

The Kremlin reacted furiously, first trying to bully Lithuanians with military maneuvers and an economic blockade. The blockade forced Landsbergis to agree to a moratorium on independence while the governments of Lithuania and the Soviet Union entered negotiations. Under pressure from Soviet hardliners, the Gorbachev regime turned to force in January 1991 when Soviet troops seized Lithuanian government buildings in Vilnius. While storming the city's television center, Soviet troops killed 14 people and wounded hundreds. Undeterred, Lithuanians refused to budge on the declaration of independence, which stood until the aborted coup in Moscow ended attempts to restore Soviet control.

governments began falling, one after the other, in Eastern Europe.

In response, Bearden had moved quickly to forge relationships with these former Soviet Bloc adversaries, who would prove invaluable

during the Gulf War with Iraq in 1991. As the bastion of communism was about to fall in Moscow, Bearden was eager to continue engaging old enemies—and potential new friends—only this time on what had been Soviet territory.

As I entered Bearden's office, he eased back into his chair, propped his leather cowboy boots up on his oak desk, and broke the news: "Sorry, trip's off, young man," Bearden told me. Then he broke into a grin. "But look at it this way. It's not every day the president puts you on hold."

I obviously looked bewildered, so he explained:

"I was just at the White House this morning. I told Bob Gates [President George H. W. Bush's deputy national security advisor] about your trip, and he asked me to hold off for about a week. The president wants to get some ducks in order before recognizing Lithuania. It should take about a week. Just change your plans to next week and we'll try again."

Though I was packed and ready to leave that afternoon for Vilnius, orders were orders—especially when they came from the president himself. I learned later that the "ducks" were President Bush's effort to gauge the impact on Gorbachev and the Kremlin of a US decision to recognize Lithuanian sovereignty and resume normal diplomatic relations for the first time since they were suspended after the Soviet occupation of Lithuania in 1940.

The purpose of my trip was to establish contact with the fledgling Lithuanian intelligence services and begin the kind of dialogue about cooperation that Bearden had initiated with Lithuania's western neighbors. Bearden presumably thought I

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**Easy entry into
Lithuania was not
certain.**
”

was right for the job because I had recently completed a tour in Moscow and spoke Russian. And, like many operations officers posted in Headquarters, I was eager for a temporary mission abroad.

— 2 —

As Bearden had predicted, he gave me the green light, and in the last week of August 1991, just a week after the failure of the coup attempt in Moscow, I embarked on one of the most thrilling and rewarding trips of my CIA career.

The plan was to link up with a Lithuanian contact—I'll call him Vitas—who was traveling to Vilnius in late August and who had ties to then-president Landsbergis. Believing the president

would welcome my contact with his intelligence service, he had promised to advise the president about my secret trip. I was to meet Vitas in Warsaw, where he would brief me about border crossing requirements and the situation in Vilnius after the Moscow coup.

In the uncertain, fluid situation of the time, easy entry into Lithuania was not certain. In Headquarters, for example, we had conflicting information about something as basic as visa requirements. As the Soviets still regarded Lithuania as their territory and maintained a presence at crossing points, we thought I

might need a Soviet visa. Other information indicated that the Lithuanians were already in control of their borders, and I would be able to enter easily.

If I were to attempt to secure a Soviet visa, it would have been a challenge. Because of my long career in Soviet operations, including the tour in Moscow, I was well known to the KGB, which would have been less than thrilled about my traveling to the USSR's rebellious republic. In the event, we decided that I would leave for Warsaw without troubling the Russians for a visa.

As planned, I met Vitas, who told me the Lithuanians were looking forward to my arrival. Unfortunately, he was still receiving conflicting reports about the visa issue, even from his high-level contacts in Vilnius. We talked it over and decided that I would go overland, by car, on the assumption that, because land borders were likely to be more hectic and crowded, visa requirements would be more relaxed than at the airport in Vilnius.

A colleague in Warsaw drove me on the four-hour trip through northeastern Poland to the Lithuanian border. Like most land borders in communist countries, the crossing in the otherwise sleepy Lithuanian town of Lazdijai was a chaotic mess. Long lines of cars and trucks inched their way to passport control booths, the first outposts of the stifling bureaucracy that was the Soviet system.



The chaotic scene on the Lithuanian-Polish border on 28 August 1991.

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**I walked through . . .
the first US official to
enter a Soviet republic
after the coup.**

”

Since my colleague had diplomatic plates issued in Warsaw, he followed custom and sped past the line of cars and up to the red and white gate marking the border. To our dismay we learned why reports conflicted: There were two border stations, one controlled by Soviet border guards and a second by Lithuanians.

As luck would have it, the first checkpoint we reached was the Soviet one. A surly border guard leafed through my passport, obviously failing to find a Soviet visa stamp. I politely explained that I had been misinformed and was told that a Soviet visa was no longer necessary. I begged and cajoled, imitating the abject and subservient citizen of Russian lore before the almighty civil servant, but the border guard was unrelenting. Finally, I offered to buy a visa on the spot. The border guard took the hint but, bad luck again, I had encountered a Soviet official invulnerable to the internationally proven red tape cutter. He refused. “*Viza, viza, a nichego bolshe,*” he barked. “Visa, visa and nothing else.” We had no choice but to return to Warsaw and regroup.

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With no alternative and with fingers crossed, I took a flight the next morning to Vilnius. Seated next to me on the plane was a pleasant American woman of Lithuanian heritage from New York. Her parents were on the same flight, returning to their

homeland for the first time in 50 years to celebrate their golden wedding anniversary. We parted after landing, and I hurried down the ramp to the passport control area. I made a beeline for the yawning border guard in one of the booths, hoping he was too tired to argue about my lack of a visa. With a bored look on his face, he lazily flipped through my passport, and handed it back.

“You have no Soviet visa,” he noted, his finger tapping the passport.

“Well, I was told I didn’t need one. That damned American embassy in Warsaw. Wrong information again. I can’t believe it,” I shook my head.

“Really?” the Soviet answered, “You don’t need one?” The guard furrowed his brow and thought for a moment. Maybe there was some new directive, some memorandum passed around that he had missed. “Well, in that case, alright.” The Soviet shrugged his shoulders and pounded his stamp in my passport. My spirits lifted, I walked through the small gate into Lithuania and became the first US official to enter a Soviet republic after the coup.

Minutes later, my nerves were aroused again. I’d entered a second passport control line, this one

staffed by Lithuanians. For reasons not immediately apparent, it had come to a stop. CIA officers are always apprehensive at border crossings in communist countries, and I had come to think it had been too easy so far. Maybe the earlier guard had changed his mind. Maybe I was in a trap, the Soviets having lulled me into thinking I had escaped their notice. I could see some hubbub ahead of me. It seemed centered around an elderly couple that had been pulled off the line, with uniformed Lithuanians in animated discussion, apparently studying their passports.

I wondered what the problem was and hoped that after finally passing through the Soviet controls I wouldn’t be refused entry by Lithuanian border officials. In time, the line began moving again and the passports of other passengers, including mine, earned only cursory glances. With the elderly couple I spotted my seat mate from the airplane. They were all still off the line and talking with the guards. Assuming the elderly folks were her parents, I asked her if there was a problem.

“Not at all,” she laughed. “It’s just that my parents have Lithuanian passports from 50 years ago, when we were an independent country. These guys have never seen these passports before, and they’re amazed.” True. The Lithuanians, one by one, were studying the passports with obvious glee, turning to the couple, patting them on their backs and welcoming them home as heroes. I breathed a sigh of relief. The

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‘If it’s true,
I say three cheers for
the CIA!’
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— 5 —

scene was only the first of many such episodes I would witness in a country emerging from the shadows of dictatorship and experiencing its independence and rekindled pride in itself and its heritage.

— 4 —

On the other side of passport control I found Vitas, who had arranged a room for me at the Lietuva Hotel. A concrete behemoth typical of Soviet Inturist hotels, it was and still is the tallest building in Vilnius. In addition to arranging the room, Vitas had wangled an invitation for me to a dinner he was to attend in the Lietuva. The dinner’s hostess was to be the president’s wife, Grazina Landsbergis. Since I clearly didn’t want to reveal my CIA affiliation, I went with a cover story that I was a low-level State Department employee on an advance team for an anticipated visit to Vilnius by Secretary of State James Baker. Baker, of course, was welcome in Lithuania, as he was coming to announce US recognition of the Baltic republic’s recovered sovereignty and the resumption of a relationship that had dated back to July 1922, before its interruption in 1940.

Vitas explained my true identity to Mrs. Landsbergis, and she promised to protect my low profile and not fuss over me at the dinner. Still, I couldn’t hide my US government affiliation, and dinner guests soon began discussing the United States and the

Soviet Union. One guest brought up a rumor that the CIA had orchestrated the coup attempt against Gorbachev and proclaimed that it was a clever stratagem the wily Americans knew would backfire to discredit the hardliners once and for all.

Then Mrs. Landsbergis laughed and offered a toast. “Well I don’t know about that but, if it’s true, I say three cheers for the CIA!” All, me included, raised a glass in honor of the Agency I could not just then admit working for. I commented to a dinner partner on my left, a minister in the new government, that I was struck by the irony of former Soviet citizens toasting the CIA.

“You don’t understand,” he laughed. “For years Moscow’s propaganda portrayed the CIA as the devil, the main enemy’s primary instrument of evil. Soviets believe the propaganda is all lies, especially here in Lithuania, so the opposite must be true. The CIA must be a great organization.” I was to hear these sentiments throughout my trip. While the CIA was often criticized harshly in its own country, apparently our former adversaries thought otherwise.

The day after the dinner, in a room at the Hotel Draugyste, one of the oldest hotels in Vilnius, Vitas introduced me to Mecys Laurinkus, the chief of the new Lithuanian intelligence service, and Audrius Butkevicius, the new minister of defense. Laurinkus, or “Max,” as we came to call him, was a lawyer in his mid-30s chosen by the president to head the civilian service. Stocky and perennially cheerful, Max almost always had a smile on his face. Behind the smile, however, was an unshakable commitment to Lithuanian freedom. Max was born to an imprisoned mother in a Soviet labor camp. His family had fought against the Soviet occupation all their lives. Max would later be replaced, but he remained active in parliament, and our paths were to cross again a few years later when he was reappointed chief of the Lithuanian service and I was named to take over Bearden’s division.

Butkevicius was only 31 years old the day I met him. Short and wiry with a thin moustache, the minister looked more like a student protester than a top government official. Like Laurinkus, Butkevicius’ roots were in the dissident movement. Before independence he had been a clandestine organizer for Sajudis; his heritage also included military figures. His ancestors had fought in the Napoleonic Wars, and his grandfather had been a colonel in the Lithuanian Army in the 1930s. He was a psychotherapist by training, but

he was also a skilled mime. Butkevicius was a fervent supporter of close ties with the West and a strong minister, but in 1997 he would be convicted and jailed briefly for accepting bribes.

I told the two men that I had been sent by the CIA leadership to welcome Lithuania into the family of democracies. Most of all, we were prepared to help Lithuania build a strong intelligence service for its defense, one based on democratic principles and the rule of law.

Laurinkus and Butkevicius were immediately receptive, but both confessed to knowing little about intelligence. Laurinkus, who spoke some English and had visited friends in Massachusetts several times in the recent past, showed me two paperbacks. "This is all I know about intelligence. They are my guides but I think we need more," he laughed nervously.

Neither book would make CIA's recommended reading list. One was *CIA Diary* by Philip Agee, an exposé by an Agency-officer-turned-traitor who cooperated with Cuban intelligence to reveal the identities of CIA officers. The other was *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* by John Marks and Victor Marchetti, a harsh critique of the Agency published in 1974. Max had bought both in a Boston bookstore after learning he would be tapped to run the nation's spy service.

Suppressing sarcastic remarks about the books, I told Laurinkus and Butkevicius that we could do

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“These [*CIA Diary* and
*CIA and the Cult of
Intelligence*] are my
guides, but I think I
need more.’
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better. I promised that, once details were worked out, Milt Bearden would come to Vilnius to discuss cooperation and training assistance. I said he would bring experts who would remain in Vilnius to develop our relationship. From its experience in Eastern Europe, the CIA had already designed appropriate training programs and dispatched attorneys to outline the laws and regulations governing intelligence collection and parliamentary oversight in the United States and other Western democracies.

I invited Laurinkus and Butkevicius to dinner at my hotel that night. I also invited a number of their colleagues who were equally eager—the excitement they exuded about their independence was palpable—yet inexperienced in the intelligence game. They were enthusiastic about learning the job from the CIA. Thanks to the wildly fluctuating ruble, an artificial exchange rate for US currency allowed me to host the entire leadership of the Lithuanian intelligence service for about nine US dollars. We feasted on a tasty, but cholesterol-laden, native dish called *cepelinai*, or zeppelins, balloon-shaped clumps of dough stuffed with meat, curd cheese and mushrooms, and wrapped in a layer of bacon strips, just to add another dash of grease.

— 6 —

The next day, before an appointment with Laurinkus at the *Seimas*, the Lithuanian parliament, I took an early morning stroll around the city center to get a flavor of life in a country tasting freedom after years of oppression. Surprisingly, there was little evidence in downtown Vilnius of the turmoil affecting the Soviet Union. Shops were open and well-stocked, bureaucrats hustled to work, and young women strolled with their baby carriages through Lukiskiu Park.

There, however, in the center of the park, stood the most visible symbol of Lithuanian independence: a leaden base upon which a statue or monument had once stood. Anyone who has traveled in any corner of the Soviet Union would have immediately realized what was missing. Vladimir Lenin, founder of Soviet communism, was deified in hundreds of cities throughout the USSR by towering statues, busts, and paintings. Now conspicuous by its absence, Lenin's statue had been removed from the center of Vilnius just after the coup in Moscow collapsed, its vacant base serving to remind Soviets that their hegemony over Lithuania was finished.

As I walked on through downtown streets, I noticed other, more subtle, changes. Typical Soviet government red signs with the ponderously long names of state agencies or enterprises were gone, replaced by shorter

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‘Coup or no coup, the Soviets are finished here,’ they told me.

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— 7 —

titles in Lithuanian. The heavy metal plaques embossed with the Soviet hammer and sickle that had adorned the entrances to these buildings had also been removed, as the Lithuanians had moved quickly to strip their capital of traces of the communist regime. When I asked Lithuanians about the dramatic events in Moscow, many were blasé. “Coup or no coup, the Soviets were finished here,” they told me. “Now it’s up to the rest of the world to realize that.”

The scene that day at the Seimas was different. The parliament building was ringed by Lithuanian troops and tanks. Every avenue from the city was blocked by checkpoints and steel tank barricades, and hundreds of sandbags were piled high around the build-



Lenin’s statue on its way out of Vilnius’ central square (Photo © Wojtek Druszcz/Staff/AFP/Getty Images)

ing itself, as if the country was still in a state of siege. Some Lithuanians told me it was all largely for show; Lithuania wanted to ensure that Western media footage would convey to the world that the Soviets still threatened the country’s symbol of independence. Others, however, truly believed Soviet hardliners might yet launch an attack in a desperate effort to preserve their rapidly waning power.

Beyond the checkpoints and near the entrance to the Seimas, I saw scenes common to any legislative body in the West: small groups of deputies were huddled outside the Parliament, some in heated discussion; protesters from the Polish minority in Lithuania held placards and chanted about their abused rights; and senior citizens stood quietly with signs complaining about inadequate pensions.

Once inside, I found a modern and almost spotlessly clean interior, with gleaming hallways and brightly colored Scandinavian furniture. Laurinkus ushered me to the visitors gallery. Although I understood no Lithuanian, I could see that these were no Soviet-style proceedings, with ponderous speeches and unanimous approvals of pre-designated outcomes. Debate was spirited, and legislators clearly disagreed with each other. Apart from the sandbags and barricades outside, this seemed like a normal democracy at work.

Later in the afternoon, Laurinkus introduced me to new Lithuanian Vice President Karol Motieka, who would sponsor Bearden’s trip to Vilnius. Tall, thin, and soft-spoken, Motieka had the courtly manners of East European nobility. More than that, Motieka articulated rare virtues in post-Cold War politics: forgiveness and reconciliation. After years of repression, many in the former Soviet Bloc wanted to exact revenge on countrymen who had collaborated with the communists. New governments in Eastern Europe had already begun digging through the archives of communist security services to unmask thousands of informers. Whether the informants had cooperated with the communists out of ideological sympathy or the need to survive was irrelevant. Former dissidents now controlling governments wanted to ensure these collaborators were unmasked and never permitted to occupy any government post. Motieka realized that such bloodletting would only sharpen divisions in Lithuania and stir up emotions damaging to the country’s democratic aspirations. He preferred locking the files away forever and moving on as one nation.

Motieka proved to be a perfect host and constantly checked after my every need, although I told him I was fine and he had better things to do as vice president. He insisted I use his office whenever I needed to contact my colleagues in Warsaw. Before the

days of laptop computers and e-mail, my only communication was through open phone lines to Warsaw, which would then relay my reports to CIA headquarters. Sometimes it was even difficult to get through to Warsaw, but the vice president's phones almost always worked. My reports were fairly anodyne, since I had to double-talk the information that mainly concerned planning for Bearden's visit.

Sitting alone in the vice president's office was surrealistic for a CIA officer who had spent his entire career combating the Soviet Union. If I had been alone just months before in the office of the vice president of a Soviet republic, I would have thought I had struck an intelligence motherlode. As I sat behind Motieka's desk, documents strewn about, my only purpose was to phone Warsaw. If I had any interest in the documents, I could probably have just asked Motieka about them anyway.

One of the major issues I had to resolve regarding Bearden's trip was his transport into Vilnius. Milt, ever with a flair for the dramatic, preferred a triumphant arrival on an executive jet. Like the visa issue, there were conflicting reports about whether the Soviets or Lithuanians controlled air space over Vilnius. The arrival of a plane, unannounced to the Soviets, some feared, might result in a shutdown order. Since the local Soviet and the Lithuanian governments were not enjoying the best of relationships, I could never obtain accurate informa-

tion from my Vilnius contacts. Considering the consequences, I decided to err on the side of caution and advised Bearden to make the bumpy overland trip from Poland instead.

— 8 —

The day after I met Motieka, he brought me to what had been the headquarters of the KGB in the center of Vilnius. Protesters in Vilnius had stormed the building in August 1991 and driven the occupants out, destroying the Soviet's most feared domestic instrument of power.

Even vacant, the building served as a lightning rod for Lithuanians' rage against the Soviets. Its gruesome history dated back to 1899 when it was built as a czarist courthouse. The KGB's predecessor, the NKVD, made the building its local headquarters when Stalin occupied Lithuania in 1940. During the Nazi occupation that followed, the Gestapo used the building until 1944, when the Soviet Army swept through Lithuania and reinstalled the NKVD. One of the building's most famous inmates was former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who was arrested in Vilnius in 1940 and detained at the headquarters before transfer to another prison. Local historians estimate that during the Stalinist era about 15,000 Lithuanians passed through the NKVD headquarters and about 700 were executed there for anti-Soviet activities.

After the Stalinist years and until the Lithuanians drove the KGB out in August 1991, thousands more were jailed and tortured there.

The condition of this structure was perhaps the starkest sign of the end of Soviet power over Lithuania. Just inside the entrance stood a massive alabaster bust of Lenin that had been turned around to face a wall. Motieka and I walked through the building. Equipment of all types were scattered around the hallways, as were burlap sacks stuffed with shredded documents. KGB offices were littered with overturned safes and piles of documents and red file folders. Inside the safes were charred remnants of burned documents, among them crinkled papers that had survived as KGB officers fled the premises. Cords from secure telephones had been ripped from their moorings in the walls, and equipment had been bashed with hammers in desperate, last-minute attempts to destroy technical secrets as an angry crowd swelled outside. In one small office a large portrait of Felix Dzherzhinsky, the dreaded "Iron Felix," founder of the Cheka, the mother of Soviet intelligence services, was propped up in a corner, repeatedly slashed almost beyond recognition by someone's knife.

On the following day Motieka insisted I accompany him to Kaunas, a city about an hour west of Vilnius, where he would take formal possession of the local KGB building from officials of the now defunct Lithuanian KGB. I

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**He relished the fact
CIA could witness this
moment of triumph
over the KGB.**

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balked at first. If the KGB in Moscow learned of my presence at the event, they would not only learn of CIA's new relationship with Lithuania but would consider my presence at this humiliation an insult. Besides, I argued, CIA presence, if revealed, might even worry some Lithuanian citizens concerned that the country was substituting one big brother for another.

In the end, Motieka was unmoved, but he promised not to acknowledge my presence to anyone. When I indicated I didn't know Lithuanian, he laughed. "You can pretend to be one of my relatives from the US if anyone asks. Believe me, no one will notice." After the declaration of independence, many Americans of Lithuanian descent traveled to Vilnius to help the country establish democracy and were working in government offices. One Lithuanian-American, Valdas Adamkus, a former officer in the US Environmental Protection Agency, would become president in 1998. So Motieka's hastily devised story seemed plausible, if somewhat stretched.

The session was stiff, formal, and, thankfully, brief. No one gave me a second look as I sat in a corner of the room alongside somber KGB officials, who would have been shocked to learn the CIA was in their midst. Motieka glanced at me from time to time during the proceedings, a wry smile on his face. He clearly relished the fact that the CIA could witness this moment of triumph over the KGB.

As I climbed into the backseat of Motieka's car for the return trip to Vilnius, his driver muttered something to him in Lithuanian. Motieka said the driver told him that President Landsbergis was trying to reach him. Told the president was out for a half-hour, Motieka decided to start back without calling from Kaunas. On the outskirts of the city, he directed the driver to pull over and stop the car. I was stunned as I watched the vice president get out of the car by a phone booth, fumble in his pocket for change with one hand while waving with the other to people on the street who recognized him. He fished out a coin, stepped up to the phone, and began dialing the president.

After Motieka resumed our drive, I explained that in America we had something called "car phones," which could be used to make calls directly from an automobile. Motieka was shocked. "Really? Do you think it's possible to get something like that here?" I knew little about car phones but promised my gracious host that, if it were technically possible, the CIA would get him one.

— 9 —

Bearden was to arrive in two days, bringing with him a delegation that would remain behind to

work with the Lithuanian service. The timing was perfect. We had just learned that President Bush would announce official recognition of Lithuanian sovereignty on 2 September 1991 and that Secretary of State Baker would travel to Vilnius on the president's behalf.

I told Motieka that we wanted to separate the secretary of state's public visit to Vilnius from Bearden's low-profile one. Since there was no US embassy in Vilnius yet, I also asked Motieka about a facility in which our officers could live and work without drawing attention. Within a day the vice president arranged our move into a comfortable and spacious dacha outside the city in a secure and secluded area once reserved for communist party dignitaries. The irony of supplanting communist party tenants with CIA officers was not lost on anyone, and the villa set a precedent for arrangements in other outposts of the former Soviet empire.

Bearden and his team arrived as planned in a motorcade of large vans stocked with luggage, communications equipment and, of course, goodies to remind one of home, such as American snacks and videos. This time the border crossing was arranged without a hitch since, not long after my arrival, the few remaining Soviet border guards had given up checking for visas, as Lithuanians had increasingly exploited post-coup chaos in Moscow to wrest away Soviet control over even minor governmental functions.

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We hammered out the details of our cooperation between services.

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I rushed the team to its new quarters outside Vilnius. Communications were quickly set up, and Bearden penned the first official CIA message to Headquarters, advising of the team's safe arrival. I briefly outlined the next day's meetings for Milt and let the team get some sleep before what promised to be a landmark day in CIA history.

Motieka was actually nervous about the meetings with Bearden and wanted to ensure personally that every detail was carefully arranged. I tried to convince him that CIA officers were an informal lot and accustomed to living in far less comfortable conditions than the villa he had graciously arranged. Mustering all the diplomatic tact I could, I told Motieka, "Look, you have plenty to do as a vice president. You really should delegate a lot of this to your subordinates, or let me try to arrange some of the work myself."

Yet again I failed. Bearden and his delegation, dressed in their best dark suits, left with me the following morning for our first official meeting. With Laurinkus and Butkevicius we hammered out the details of our initial cooperation between services. Our hosts then took us to meet the vice president. Motieka told Bearden that he had gone to the dacha that morning with clean sheets and blankets just to be sure his guests were comfortable. He told us that Bearden's "valet" had been very appreciative and friendly. We looked at each other, puzzled, until one of our delegation said under his breath, "He must mean Bob.

We left him behind at the villa." Bob was SE's support chief, who had come along to make sure that the logistics and other support required would be in place for the team to function after Bearden and I returned home. Bob had to endure good-natured ribbing from Bearden and others for months as the monicker was spread around Headquarters.

We celebrated our new friendship that night at a banquet I organized for Motieka and the top officials of the intelligence service and defense ministry. The setting was perfect, a private room in the Stikliai Restaurant, which is housed in a restored 17th century building in the heart of the city's old town. At the time it was considered Vilnius' finest restaurant. As I watched Bearden and Motieka stand and raise their glasses to toast the future, I could see that the Cold War was, indeed, finally coming to an end.

— 10 —

We had only one event remaining before Bearden and I left Vilnius. It was to prove the most dramatic and emotional of my stay in Lithuania. Motieka arranged a tour of KGB Headquarters for Bearden. Only this time the visit would include a stop in the jail cells in the build-

ing's dungeon, which I had not seen during my first visit. Our guide in the dungeon was the new chairman of the Parliament's National Security Committee. A short, balding man, with lines of suffering etched in his face, he appeared to be in his mid-70s. We were surprised to learn that he was almost 20 years younger than that. His premature aging was the result of the 36 years he had spent in Soviet labor camps.

The tour was a grisly one as our guide showed us cells designed for torture. In one of them, prisoners were forced to stand hours on end on a slight incline built into the wall in order to avoid standing on a floor flooded with water. Tired and helpless prisoners would fall into the water nearly frozen by winter air that had been allowed to blow in from an open window. The empty cells still seemed faintly to echo the screams of tortured prisoners. The chairman showed us a cell in which he had spent six years. He told us that despite this kind of treatment, most dissidents never lost heart and devised methods to communicate with each other and with the outside world. As an example, he showed us tiny scraps of paper he had saved on which he had neatly written messages in script so infinitesimally small that we could barely decipher the letters.

We stopped in front of one cell where, unlike the others, the walls were completely lined with burlap. The chairman explained

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In the cell, I was certain my career, dedicated to fighting brutality . . . was not in vain.

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that some prisoners became so desperate that they gave up hope and attempted suicide by running head first into the concrete walls until they died. Since the KGB didn't want their victims dying before they were fully interrogated, the jailers padded the walls of some cells to keep prisoners from using this suicidal practice. The padded cells also served the secondary purpose of muffling the screams of tortured and beaten prisoners.

The chairman invited me to step inside the cell. I immediately felt a tightness in my chest, a momentary inability to breathe. I could not imagine the horror of spending a minute in the cell, let alone years. I couldn't stand it more than a few seconds and quickly retreated into the corridor.

The KGB headquarters is now the Museum of Genocide Victims, a reminder of man's inhumanity to man. The museum is the only one of its kind in the former Soviet Union. Some guides, like the committee chairman who led us through the dungeons, are former inmates. During the brief moment I spent in the cell, I felt certain that my career in CIA, dedicated to fighting the kind of brutality that took place in there, was not in vain. I was positive then that when I signed on in 1980, I had made the right decision.



A cell in the Museum of Genocide Victims in Vilnius. VIPs visiting the city are often brought to the museum. Looking into this cell is Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on such a tour in October 2005.

Intelligence in War: It Can Be Decisive

Gregory Elder

“
History
repeatedly
has demonstrated
that inferior forces
can win
when leaders are
armed with accurate
intelligence.
”

Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge.

—Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*¹

Ever present in military discussions are questions of force composition and force employment in winning battles. Several notable works, such as Stephen Biddle's *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*, have addressed such controversial force employment questions as: What weight should be given to employment vice that of technology or mass? Can mass win in technology-heavy environments? How effective can doctrine and tactics be in preparing forces to be used?² Other works, such as John Keegan's *Intelligence in War*, argue that blunt force is the primary variable in achieving victory: "Willpower always counts for more than foreknowledge."³

¹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 144.

² Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

Force and its employment are significant in driving outcomes in combat. However, it is operational and tactical intelligence, not necessarily numbers, technology, or tactics, that can have the most decisive impact on how forces are employed and how success is achieved in wartime operations. History repeatedly has demonstrated that numerically inferior forces, armed with less capable technologies, can win when leaders are armed with accurate intelligence they believe they can act upon. Such intelligence can be a force multiplier. Therefore, considering the value of force employment, technology, and mass without placing a corresponding value on intelligence is a mistake.

In this article I explore the role of tactical and operational intelligence in dictating force employment schemes and as a decisive element in five strategically significant battles—the First Battle of Bull Run (1861), Tannenberg (1914), Midway (1942), Inchon (1950), and the Israeli air strike initiating the Six-Day War in 1967—and I will demonstrate

³ John Keegan, *Intelligence and War: Knowledge of the Enemy From Napoleon to Al-Qaeda* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2003), 25.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.

Beauregard's fate rested in the hands of a few neophyte clandestine agents.

that it was neither technology nor material superiority that won the day, but accurate, timely, actionable intelligence, combined with leaders willing to treat intelligence as a primary factor in deciding outcomes. In each case, intelligence gave commanders the knowledge of the battlefield (battlespace awareness) and the understanding of their foe to focus their forces at the right place and time to win when, in all probability, they should have been defeated. Certainly ADM Chester Nimitz, faced with the job of reversing the losses at Pearl Harbor, would have disputed RADM Thomas A. Brooks' assertion that intelligence is a secondary factor in war, as would General P. T. Beauregard, who, in 1861, faced the grim possibility of losing the first major battle of the Civil War.⁴

The Battle of Bull Run: 21 July 1861

The battle may be most renowned for the last minute heroics of General "Stonewall" Jackson on Henry House Hill, which led to the rout of the Union army, but the Confederates were able to employ the forces needed to win at Bull Run because they

had created, months earlier, an intricate spy network in Washington, DC. By the time the fledgling Union Army had organized itself for its first major campaign into Virginia, its troop strengths, dispositions, and plans had long been compromised. Said Beauregard, commanding Confederate forces in northern Virginia, "I was almost as well advised of the strength of the hostile army in my front as its commander."⁵

In May 1861, just weeks after the announcement of the fall of Fort Sumter, a spy in the quartermaster office of the US War Department had begun recruiting a ring of Confederate sympathizers in the nation's capital. Among these were bankers, clerks, couriers, housewives, and Rose Greenhow, proprietor of a respectable salon frequented by senior government and military officials. While the network mobilized, a Union force of nearly 36,000 was organizing and training just across the Potomac River. Its commander, General Irvin McDowell, was under pressure from Lincoln to strike the Confederates at the earliest possible date.

While the Union Army was concentrated, Confederate forces were split, with 21,000 stationed at Manassas Junction under Beauregard, and 12,800 under General Joseph E. Johnston near Harper's Ferry. Combined, the Confederate troops still numbered fewer than the Federals, and divided, they stood little chance against a concerted Union offensive. Yet, authorities in Richmond, worried about a Federal incursion down the Shenandoah Valley by a force of 18,000 at Harpers Ferry, had told Beauregard he could unite the two armies only if an attack was imminent. Thus, a McDowell move toward Manassas would spark a race in which Johnston would have to rush to Beauregard's aid across piedmont terrain and with limited railroad access. His ability to win this race was possible only if he received timely, detailed, and believable intelligence indicating when, where, and with what forces McDowell would strike. Beauregard's fate rested in the hands of a few neophyte clandestine agents.

On 10 July the network demonstrated its worth, as Rose Greenhow sent word that "McDowell has certainly been ordered to advance on the sixteenth."⁶ This intelligence, however, proved insufficient to start the race. President Davis denied requests to authorize relocation of Johnston's army. Beauregard, fearing the worst, sent a plea to


⁴ Thomas A. Brooks, RADM (USN, Ret.), "Review of John Keegan's *Intelligence and War*," *Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly* (Winter 2004): 32.

⁵ *The Civil War: Spies, Scouts and Raiders* (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1985), 25.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 26.

Greenhow for intelligence recon- firming the date and planned movement of Union forces. On 16 July, she sent word that the Federal forces would move out that very day, marching from Arlington to Manassas, via Centreville, a distance of only 20 miles. This information immediately made its way to Richmond. Consequently, orders were dispatched that night directing Johnston to move south in haste and unite with Beauregard's forces on the Bull Run.

McDowell began his march on the 16th, as Greenhow had reported, crossed the Bull Run at Sudley Ford on the 21st, and attacked the Confederate left flank on Matthews Hill. Fighting raged throughout the day, and Beauregard's forces were driven back to Henry Hill. Defeat seemed imminent. Late in the afternoon, however, Johnston's reinforcements, having arrived via rail at Manassas Junction the night before, made their way to the battle and broke the Union right flank. What seemed a victory for the Federals rapidly deteriorated into a disorganized retreat. And while it was Jackson's brigade under Johnston's command that turned the tide of a hard fought battle, it was espionage that provided alternatives to Confederate political and military decisionmakers, allowing them to concentrate their forces and demonstrate that they could defeat the Union in a major engagement. Victory was not certain—defeat was avoided only as a result of the decision to reinforce Beauregard. In *What If?*,



Stephen Sears suggests that without a geographic point at which to regroup, the Confederate Army might have dissolved and the rebellion ended in its first year if the Union had won that day.⁷

Intelligence in this case gave the Confederates several advantages. First, with reliable information on the Union order of battle and strategy, they were able to split their smaller forces to defend the Shenandoah Valley and to maintain a check on McDowell's army. Second, because of the existence of timely indicators and warning, it was

inconceivable that the Federals could execute a surprise attack against the Confederates; agents were able to provide fresh, corroborated information on everything the Federals did. Finally, Beauregard knew the strength of his opponent and the route of attack and, therefore, had the ability to consolidate and position his forces on the most advantageous ground. This was all the more important as McDowell had a well-developed concept of operations and superior numbers. Yet force alone cannot win the day.

Battle of Tannenberg: 23–30 August 1914

The Battle of Tannenberg was one of the largest, yet least known, strategically decisive victories in modern warfare. Its outcome allowed the Germans to recover momentum after their loss at the Battle of the Marne on the Western Front, to save Prussia from the Russians, to defeat


⁷ Stephen Sears, "Battle of Bull Run, or the Rebellion of '61?" in Robert Cowley (ed.), *What If? The World's Foremost Military Historians Imagine What Might Have Been* (New York: Berkley Books, 2000), 241–45. For the most recent work on Greenhow, based on new-found records, see Ann Blackman, *Wild Rose: Rose O'Neale Greenhow, Civil War Spy* (New York: Random House, 2005).

three successive Russian armies, and to deal the first of several blows leading to the Treaty of Brest Litovsk and the Russian Revolution in 1917. Of the roughly 150,000 Russian soldiers who fought in the battle of Tannenberg, some 30,000 were killed or wounded and another 95,000 captured. The Germans suffered fewer than 20,000 casualties, captured more than 500 guns, and filled dozens of trains with captured equipment for transport to Germany.

After losing at Tannenberg, the Russian army could not muster enough offensive strength to re-enter Germany again until World War II. It was nothing short of a complete victory for Germany, and it came in large part because of the German Army's successful use of intelligence.

Modifying the Schlieffen Plan at the outset of the war, Germany sent only one army, the Eighth, to the Eastern Front to face the presumed, slow-to-mobilize Russian armies. Misperceiving how quickly the Russians could bring their forces to bear, the Eighth quickly found itself facing two Russian armies—the First moving west into Prussia, and the Second driving northwest from southern Prussia. While the German Eighth Army was comparable in size to each of the Russian armies, it could not face a combined assault.

The Russian First Army struck first and won a victory at the Battle of Gumbinnen on 20 August 1914. It did not seize



the initiative, however, choosing instead to wait until the Second Army could move north to catch the Germans in a pincer. This gave Helmuth von Moltke, the German Chief of Staff in Berlin, time to replace the commander of the Eighth Army, General Maximilian von Prittwitz, with Generals Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, and to regroup. Rather than concede Prussia to the Russians or potentially face another defeat at the hands of the First Army, Ludendorff looked south for an opening to attack the Russian Second Army. He authorized the movement of a corps from Gumbinnen south via railroad to attack the Second Army's left flank. He also considered marching the bulk of his remaining forces south to envelop the right flank—this, however, would leave northern Prussia exposed to the First Army. Shifting fronts would be risky.

While both side's staffs planned for the coming great battle, a

secret war was waged behind the scenes by cryptologists. Early in the days of radio communications, neither side was particularly astute in communications security, and both exposed their vulnerabilities over the airwaves. But the poorly educated and trained Russian cryptologists were unable even to master their simple cipher system and, in the case of the First Army, did not use a communications code. This led to frequent lapses in security and resulted in operators repeatedly resending messages, often uncoded, in plain language. The result was a windfall of intelligence for the Germans. Intercepting Russian communications, German cryptologists deduced troop strengths and movement schedules, picked up orders, and, most importantly, messages between the First and Second Armies that showed how poorly the two were coordinating their efforts.⁸ While the German staff can be credited with developing the concept of

operations that would lead to victory in the engagement, it was communications intelligence that provided a clear picture of the battlefield, or in today's parlance, the battlespace awareness.

As the single German corps under General Hermann von Francois began its attack against the exposed left flank of the Second Army on 27 August, two particularly important unencrypted communications transmitted by the Russian First and Second Armies were intercepted.⁹ The first, sent by General Paul von Rennenkampf, commander of the First Army, revealed the distance between the two armies and that Rennenkampf needed at least three days before his army could join the Second Army in attacking the Germans. This suggested to Ludendorff that he need not worry about First Army assistance to the Second or exploitation of the gap created by his own army's movement south. The second intercept, a communiqué from the Second Army, provided a complete description of its dispositions and planned route of attack to the north. As important as the first, this gave Ludendorff the foreknowledge he needed to achieve surprise and a

A windfall of [communications] intelligence showed the Germans how poorly the Russians were coordinating their efforts . . . and provided a clear picture of the battlefield.

concentration of force against an exposed adversary.

As the bulk of the German Eighth Army advanced on the right flank of the Russian's Second Army and the Russians' plight became apparent, German cryptologists began intercepting pleas for assistance, as well as orders from General Zhilinski, overall commander of Russian forces, directing the First Army to move northwest, away from Second Army—a clear sign that the Russian leaders did not have a clear understanding of German dispositions or just how precarious Second Army's situation was. This knowledge emboldened the Germans. With the two corps from Gumbinnen and Francois' corps to the south, the German forces swept around the Second Army and on 29 August completed the encirclement that would spell its demise.

By destroying Second Army with relatively little loss, Hindenburg and Ludendorff could turn north against the First Army and a newly formed army, the Tenth. These were defeated at the Battle of First and Second Masurian Lakes and effectively destroyed Russia's capacity for carrying out offensive operations against Germany.

Intelligence at Tannenberg did not win the battle, but it did play a decisive role in dictating the way the Germans employed their units against a force that was, overall, larger than theirs. German leaders had a thorough understanding of their adversary's capabilities, schedules, and concept of operations, and this knowledge allowed them to exploit Russian vulnerabilities and defeat them in detail. Thus, if "[O]nly numbers can annihilate," as suggested by Lord Nelson, the successful exploitation of intelligence in this case demonstrates that they need not be superior numbers.¹⁰

The Battle of Midway: 4-7 June 1942

Midway was one of the decisive battles of history. The loss of her fleet carrier force deprived Japan of the initiative; henceforward she was on the defensive—attempting to hold the great spread of the Southern Resources Area and contiguous regions she had so handily won.... Two basic factors led to the result: first and foremost, the American knowledge of

⁸ See Col. Frederick E. Jackson, "Tannenberg: The First Use of Signals Intelligence in Modern Warfare" as submitted to the United States Army War College (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2002), 1–37.

⁹ FirstWorldWar.com, <http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/tannenberg.htm>. Accessed 17 November 2004.

¹⁰ Vice Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson, quoted in Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, Third, Revised and Expanded Edition* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 155.

Foreknowledge of Japanese plans was vital. With it, the US command could compensate for the disproportionately large Japanese force.

the Japanese secret codes, which presented Nimitz with an accurate picture of Japanese intentions and dispositions.

—R. Earnest and Trevor Dupuy¹¹

As with battles on land, intelligence can drive the employment schemes necessary for a leader to win against superior odds at sea. Midway, a battle in which intelligence allowed the United States to spring a trap against what the Japanese had planned as their own ambush, resulted in an immediate shift in the balance of sea power in the Pacific. The Japanese Navy, which had a fleet of six carriers before the battle, lost four at Midway, and it lost the bulk of its trained pilots and hundreds of aircraft. While the United States would lose one carrier, it was left with five spread throughout the world. Thirteen more were under construction. Yamamoto believed that for Japan to win the war it would need to destroy the carriers early.¹² Due in large part to the foresight provided by US naval intelligence, he failed.

Following the victory at Pearl Harbor, Japanese strategists had

different conceptions about how to proceed in the war in the Pacific. However, James Doolittle's carrier strike on Tokyo in April 1942 gave impetus to the argument that what was needed was the destruction of America's carrier fleet. In considering the options, Yamamoto believed that the United States, whose naval order of battle in the Pacific after the Pearl Harbor strike was significantly less than that of Japan, would not risk a major fleet engagement for anything other than defense of a vital target. Midway fit this bill.¹³ Were the Japanese to take Midway, they would threaten not only the Hawaiian Islands, but they could use Midway as a springboard for attacks on the continental United States. As such, a direct attack against Midway would force the US hand. In this, Yamamoto was right.

Meanwhile, the United States was facing its own strategic dilemmas. Having lost so much of its fleet at Pearl Harbor, it had only limited options.

First, the United States was committed to a defensive war in the Pacific—they had to react to Japanese actions, and, second, since they were committed to defend the Hawaii-Australia line with inferior numbers and weapons, the only real chance

*for success was to concentrate their forces at the right place at the right time.*¹⁴

To succeed, therefore, foreknowledge of the Japanese plans was vital. And if the US command had it, it could compensate for the disproportionately large force that Japan could bring to bear.

And foreknowledge the US Navy had. Since World War I, the Navy had placed a good deal of effort into developing a strong communications intelligence capability. Its OP-20-G Navy Radio Intelligence Section had over the years garnered a number of successes, including breaking many of the Japanese Navy's codes. While diverted from conducting operational intelligence prior to Pearl Harbor, OP-20-G had reestablished its functional capabilities by March 1942 and was reporting daily on hundreds of Japanese naval intercepts.¹⁵ The Japanese, like the Russians before Tannenberg, committed the egregious error of having to resend messages because command elements used outdated code books—US cryptologists had the benefit of capturing transmissions in both old and new codes, thereby providing multiple opportunities to mine transmissions for useful intelligence. OP-20-G's successful reporting of Japanese naval movements prior

¹¹ R. Earnest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present, Fourth Edition* (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 1255–56.

¹² Mansanori Ito, with Roger Pineu, *The End of the Imperial Japanese Navy* (New York: Jove Books, 1956), 51.

¹³ Ibid., 52–53.

¹⁴ Henry F. Schorreck, *Battle of Midway: The Role of COMINT at the Battle of Midway* (SRH-230) (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy Historical Center, April 1999), 2.

¹⁵ Ibid., 3.

to the Battle of the Coral Sea, which ADM Nimitz had used to determine what forces to commit, bolstered its credibility.

Even as the Coral Sea engagement was being waged, intercepts strongly suggested a major Japanese combined, amphibious buildup. Naval intelligence determined in early May the composition of Japanese forces, where they were staging, and their operational schedules.¹⁶ The precise location of attack, however, was more difficult to surmise because the codes for Japanese geographic designators remained unknown. Nimitz believed the Japanese would strike Oahu; others felt the target was the US West Coast. OP-20-G, though, reasoned that the target was Midway. In order to validate their position, the cryptologists successfully used a ruse to get the Japanese to reveal their target.

The idea was to send a message, via the cable to Midway, to the Commanding Officer of the Naval Base instructing him to "...send a plain language message to Com 14 (Commandant 14th Naval District) stating in effect, that the distillation plant had suffered a serious casualty and that fresh water was urgently needed—to which Com 14 would reply, (also in plain

*language), that water barges would be sent, under tow, soonest.*¹⁷

Soon after that message was sent, a Japanese message was intercepted noting that "AF is short of water." OP-20-G was able to report to Admiral Nimitz that the objective was, indeed, Midway.

By the time the Japanese changed their cipher codes on 28 May, it was too late. Having been provided Yamamoto's strategy, order of battle, transit dates, and carrier strike point, Nimitz had what he needed to commit his forces to battle. Rather than fall into a Japanese trap, Nimitz could set one himself by concentrating his forces against an unsuspecting enemy. Deploying three carriers north of Midway to lie in wait, Nimitz had nearly evened the odds.

On 2 June 1942, with a good understanding of the general whereabouts of the Japanese fleet—a result of communications intercepts from the Japanese carriers—a US Navy patrol aircraft located and maintained regular contact with it.¹⁸ In the ensuing battle, US intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance allowed for the coup de main on 4 June when dive-bomber squadrons from the carriers caught the

Japanese completely by surprise, sinking the carriers *Akagi*, *Kaga*, and *Hiryu*. Having gained the advantage, US forces traded blows, sinking the *Hiryu*, while losing *Yorktown*. In addition to the lost four carriers, three Japanese battleships were damaged, two heavy cruisers sunk and three more damaged, and several destroyers and auxiliary ships were sunk.

*But, what if in mid-May 1942, a Japanese sailor, after transcribing a radio message he had just intercepted from Midway Island, had turned to his superior to ask, "Why are they broadcasting this message in the clear?"... A simple question, heightened alertness, and suddenly what historians have often described as the decisive US advantage in the close-run Battle of Midway might well have become the Japanese side's key to a great victory in the central Pacific, dramatically altering the course of the Second World War.*¹⁹

Keegan's analysis of the battle in *Intelligence and War* stresses that even with all the intelligence that Nimitz had, and while striking a sizable blow to the Japanese, it had nearly been a major US defeat:

[M]idway demonstrates that even possession of the best intelligence does not guarantee victory.... A little less intuition by McClusky of Bombing 6, a little more intellectual resolution

¹⁶ Frederick D. Parker, "A Priceless Advantage: U.S. Navy Communications Intelligence and the Battles of Coral Sea, Midway, and the Aleutians" in *United States Cryptologic History*, Series IV, Volume 5 (Ft. Meade, MD: National Security Agency, 1993), 45.

¹⁷ Schorreck, 7.

¹⁸ *Naval Doctrine Publication 2: Naval Intelligence*, at <http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/library/documents/NDPs/NDP2/NDP2003.ht>, Chapter 3 (hereafter NDP2), "Battle of Midway: The Attributes of Naval Intelligence."

¹⁹ Theodore F. Cook, Jr., "Our Midway Disaster," in Cowey, 318–19.

by Nagumo, and it would have been the carriers of TF 16 and 17, not those of Yamamoto's Mobile Force, which would have been left burning and bereft in the bright waters of the Pacific on 4 June 1942.²⁰

This conclusion misses the point. Battle is always risky and can be swayed one way or another by sheer chance. Yet the US Navy would never have had the opportunity at Midway to avoid the Japanese trap and to concentrate its forces in a surprise attack against an adversary with numerical superiority had it not been for operational and tactical intelligence of the kind it received. "Armed with the support of excellent communications intelligence and of his superiors in Washington, CINCPAC was able to satisfy all three of Clausewitz's 'principles of warfare': decision, concentration, and offensive action."²¹ Foreknowledge, not willpower, was the most decisive factor at Midway.

Inchon Landing: 15 September 1950

The first three examples illustrate how intelligence can help lead to victory through clandestine intelligence operations designed to provide indications and warning information of impending attacks or operations. Another way is through the support intelligence gives to planning, when it provides

At Inchon, two questions had to be answered: (1) Where should the landing occur? and (2) What forces could the enemy bring to bear?

information on the adversary's capabilities and vulnerabilities—in today's terminology "intelligence preparation of the battlespace."

"Intelligence reduces the unknowns that planners must face and forms the basis for both deliberate and crisis action planning," the Naval Doctrinal Publication points out.²² In the case of the amphibious assault at Inchon, an attack that led to the collapse of the North Korean army and the taking of some 125,000 prisoners, intelligence gathering and planning allowed US forces to overcome geographic disadvantages and take the enemy by surprise.

On 25 June 1950 four columns of North Korean infantry and tanks under the command of Marshal Choe Yong Gun surprised the world by driving south and pushing South Korean and contingents of US forces to the southeast corner of the Korean peninsula. While winning a series of tactical successes, the North was unable to gain its strategic objective—command of all Korea—and was faced with the proposition of using all its remaining forces against the last allied forces holding the Pusan perimeter. Through August and into Sep-

tember, the North threw 13 infantry and two armored divisions (98,000 men) at the Allies, necessitating the commitment of all UN reserves. And while the North suffered horrendous casualties, its tenacious attacks and acceptance of losses suggested a stronger force than they had.

General MacArthur, the supreme allied commander in Korea, considered a major counterstroke to catch Choe's forces in a net. This would involve a two-pronged attack in which an amphibious landing would be made on the west coast. The amphibious assault was designed to sever Choe's lines of communication and retreat and would be coupled with a break-out from the Pusan perimeter. Two questions, however, had to be answered: (1) Where should the landing occur? and (2) What forces could the enemy bring to bear when it began? The intelligence community set about answering these questions.

After a prototypical Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, General Douglas MacArthur decided that naval forces could dramatically alter the course of the war by seizing Inchon, a major port on Korea's Yellow Sea coast. Possession of Inchon would enable the allies to recapture a key air base, and mount a major

²⁰ Keegan, 220.

²¹ Parker, 65.

²² NDP2, "Support to Planning."

*ground offensive on Seoul which would cut off North Korean forces in the south.*²³

Inchon, however, was not ideal. The 45-mile-long approach from the open ocean to the landing area would be complicated by tides—which caused the water's depth in the landing area to recede to dangerously low depths—and the proximity of several small islands occupied by North Korean forces. To be successful, the Allies would need to clear the islands, intelligence would need to be collected on water depths, and enemy troop strengths in the surrounding area ascertained. In addition, a forward reconnaissance element would need to be in place to provide eyes and ears to the Marines assigned to the assault. The assignment fell to a Naval Intelligence officer attached to the ROK Navy, LT Eugene Clark.

Clark, a veteran of the OSS, recruited local fishermen and partisans for his team. Deployed on the 26th of August, he and his team silenced opposition on most of the islands by 8 September and began a thorough reconnaissance of approaches and Inchon itself.²⁴ Particularly crucial to success was the assessment of the depths and advice to planners on where and when to strike. Clark and a companion measured tides and found that the mud flats initially selected

for the attack were not suitable to withstand the weight of fully armed marines. This critical piece of what today would be known as measurements and signatures intelligence (MASINT) averted what could have been a disaster, as the landing plans were modified to account for the findings. Clark and his men also held key positions up to the morning of the attack and lit beacons to guide the lead elements of the assault force.

While Clark was providing on-site intelligence, planners were aided by imagery and human intelligence. Aerial photographs and reports from former inhabitants were used in shaping the operational plans for the amphibious task force commander, RADM James Doyle and his staff. Taken with Clark's information, "intelligence helped Admiral Doyle select the best water approach, set the time for the amphibious assaults, and identify the North Korean Army line of communication as a critical vulnerability."²⁵ Additionally, the intelligence estimates suggested that the North did not have forces enough in the area to offer significant resistance to the landing or to the recapture of Seoul.²⁶

With a full understanding of what he faced, MacArthur told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he could con-

duct a successful amphibious operation. Meanwhile, he and his staff developed a concept of operations that would allow for concentration of force, and surprise, against a most vulnerable enemy point.

*This comprehensive planning bore fruit on 15 September, when the allied amphibious task force launched its initial assault from the sea. By the 19th, the 1st Marine Division seized the air base at Kimpo and began the assault on Seoul. U.S. Army troops pushed out from the Inchon beachhead and on the 27th linked up with their comrades advancing north from the Pusan perimeter. Two days later, the Marines captured Seoul. Thus, by skillfully incorporating intelligence into operational planning, in a little more than two weeks, allied forces were able to oust the invaders from the Republic of Korea.*²⁷

The role of intelligence in the Inchon landing is significant if for no other reason than it shows how central it is to planning a victorious campaign. Intelligence at Inchon was not happenstance, like the discovery of Lee's lost orders before Antietam, but a conscious and necessary task assigned by leadership; before MacArthur could determine how to employ his forces, he first had to know whether he could attack or not and where he could attack if it was possible. By emphasizing intelligence, MacArthur conducted a masterful offensive and avoided an American Gallipoli.

²³ Ibid., "Support to Planning—The Inchon Landing."

²⁴ Peter Harclerode, *Fighting Dirty: The Inside Story of Covert Operations from Ho Chi Minh to Osama Bin Laden* (London: Cassell & Co., 2001), 171–73.

²⁵ NDP2, "Support to Planning—The Inchon Landing."

²⁶ Carl H. Builder et al., *Command Concepts: A Theory Derived from the Practice of Command and Control* (MR-775-ORS) (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1999), 8.

²⁷ NDP2, "Support to Planning—The Inchon Landing."

**The Six-Day War:
5 June 1967**

Israeli intelligence was outstanding, having pinpointed the location of every Egyptian squadron, revealed the layout of every air base, and mastered every detail of Egyptian Air Force operational procedure.... During the course of the morning, the Israelis struck 18 of Egypt's Air Force bases, cratering runways, blowing up aircraft, and destroying support facilities. The Egyptians lost over 300 of their 420 combat aircraft, and 100 of their 350 qualified combat pilots.

—Kenneth Pollack²⁸

Israeli intelligence was, indeed, outstanding in the Six-Day War. It demonstrated how strategic intelligence can be used in conjunction with operational intelligence to provide senior decisionmakers information necessary to make well-informed national security decisions and to give leaders opportunities to mitigate the numerical superiority of an adversary. Yet, just as Israeli intelligence in this case can be viewed as an example of how intelligence operations should be conducted, Egypt's poor intelligence opened the door to its own defeat.

²⁸ Kenneth M. Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness," (PhD Dissertation Submitted to the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1996), 201.

It was not enough to know Arab strategy on the grand scale; Yariv wanted to know everything about every Arab unit down to the menus served in the sergeants' mess.

In 1967, Israel faced a monumental security task: defense of the nation against several Arab armed forces that, when combined, held an advantages of two to one in manpower, two to one in tanks, seven to one in artillery, three to one in aircraft, and four to one in warships. On its southern border, Israel had roughly 70,000 troops in the Sinai against Egypt's 100,000; 700 tanks against 950; and it had to distribute its 200 aircraft across all fronts while facing Egypt's concentrated 430.²⁹

Nor could Israel count on technological superiority to overcome the odds. Israeli intelligence, for example, had scored a coup by obtaining a MiG-21 fighter from an Iraqi defector, and it had determined that Egypt's MiGs were better than all but their Mirage aircraft. Egyptian artillery was superior, and their T-55 tanks were more capable than the majority of Israel's tanks.³⁰ And while Israeli forces were better trained, had superior leadership, and had a far more flexible doctrine, Egypt's army could boast that the majority of its soldiers were combat veterans.

²⁹ Kenneth M. Pollack, *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991* (Lincoln: Nebraska University Press, 2002), 59.

³⁰ Ibid., 59–61.

Israel faced a similar situation to its north, against Syria and Lebanon, and to its east, against Jordan. Finally, Israel faced a hostile international community; the United States was an ally but eager to avoid any spark that could ignite a conflict with Egypt's ally, the Soviet Union.

Events began spinning into war in November 1966, with the signing of an Egyptian and Syrian alliance, and led to an Egyptian threat to use force on 18 May 1967. Egypt had mobilized its military and announced combat readiness in the Sinai, followed on the 23rd by a closure of the Straits of Tiran, blockading the Israeli port of Eliat.

Israel took these acts, particularly the blockade, to be cause for war. Further, Israeli intelligence was able to verify that Egypt had plans for an attack, code named Asad, on Eliat and other targets in the Negev on the 27th. This revelation was passed to the United States, which placed sufficient pressure on the Soviet Union and Egypt to force a cancellation of the attack.³¹ But all other diplomatic efforts failed, and the Israelis confronted the decision of (1) preempting their enemies' first

³¹ Oren B. Michael, "Did Israel Want the Six-Day War?" *Azure* (Spring, 1999).

strikes; (2) allowing themselves to be hit first by a numerically stronger adversary; or (3) continuing an unacceptable status quo. Israel chose to attack first.

A preemptive strike against the Arabs had always been a major part of the Israeli concept of operations, but it was their military intelligence, under the command of the bright and aggressive Aharon Yariv, that proved decisive.

'Know your enemy' was not, Yariv told his heads of departments, merely a figure of speech; it had to be taken literally. It was not enough to know Arab strategy on the grand scale; Yariv wanted to know everything about every Arab unit down to the menus served in the sergeants' mess.³²

And, quite literally, Israeli intelligence had a clearer picture of the Egyptian order of battle and capabilities than did Egypt's own commanders.

In the two-years before the Six-Day War, Yariv not only set about knowing the whereabouts of every Arab air base, but also having each inspected. Israeli intelligence officers, often working as chefs or coopting Egyptian soldiers, provided a complete picture of the EAF, including:

Israeli intelligence had a clearer picture of the Egyptian order of battle and capabilities than did Egypt's own commanders.

- the whereabouts of every aircraft and name/information on the pilot;
- the name, background, status, and schedule of every base commander;
- schedules and turnovers of Egyptian radar controllers;
- reveille and morning schedules for the pilots and ground crews;
- the complete Egyptian battle codes and communications networks; and
- when senior air officials would be absent from their commands, and unable to direct operations.³³

From this information, Israeli intelligence developed a precise targeting package. It knew when the EAF would be most vulnerable—when the aircraft would be most exposed; when the pilots would be slowest in getting to their aircraft for flight operations; and when leadership would be unable to provide direction. With comparable intelligence on Egypt's land forces and effectiveness, Yariv believed that Israel could not conceivably lose the war. "So finely tuned was his intelligence apparatus that he was able to

predict an outcome which was to astonish the world when it was all over."³⁴

Coupled with military operational intelligence, the Israeli Mossad—its state intelligence agency—had developed relationships with foreign governments and intelligence agencies that provided new and corroborated strategic and tactical intelligence before the war. The relationship with the United States, in particular, served a critical role before the preemptive strike by making clear to both the CIA and Pentagon that war was inevitable and getting tacit buy-in on the plan. "The United States understood Israel's reasoning and did not object to the preemptive attack. Amit's (head of the Mossad) achievement in secret diplomacy was built upon the international intelligence links which the Mossad had worked so hard to foster for years."³⁵

Knowing that the United States would not condemn the attack and armed with an exceptionally well-developed plan, Israeli leaders authorized the use of force, thus seizing the initiative from their adversaries.

³² Stewart Steven, *The Spymasters of Israel: The Definitive Look at the World's Best Intelligence Service* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980), 229.

³³ Ibid., 229–31.

³⁴ Ibid., 223.

³⁵ Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, *Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co., 1990), 161–62.

The preemptive air strike proved decisive. The attack caught the Egyptian Air Force with its commander, General Mahmud, out of contact with his forces. "In his absence, the EAF was paralyzed. Without specific authorization, the vast majority of Egypt's air force officers, from air sector commanders all the way down to pilots, were unwilling to take even the most obvious emergency procedures."³⁶ Only eight MiGs got into the air to defend their airfields; every one was shot down. The airfields that were undamaged in the initial strikes managed to get only 20 aircraft into the air, all of which were either shot down or crashed when they could find no undamaged airstrips to which to return. All told, three-quarters of the EAF was destroyed in the first hours of the war. Intelligence had paved the way for the Israeli Air Force to win one of the most lopsided victories in history.

But credit for Israel's success cannot be explained by its intelligence alone; indicators and warning should have prepared the Egyptians for what was to come. As Kenneth Pollack contends, "There was a colossal failure on the part of Cairo's intelligence services to provide the Egyptian military with the information required to fight Israel." He notes that Egyptian intelligence:

- was biased to the political climate and, therefore, did not

provide clear and decisive analysis on whether Israel was going to attack;

- issued reports to commanders that changed daily and were often contradictory;
- provided no credible intelligence on Israel's order of battle, effectiveness, doctrine, or planned strategy;
- had no intelligence on where Israeli forces were and, to the extent that it had information, fell victim to Israel's denial and deception campaign; and
- did not understand the concept of flexibility stressed by the Israeli military in conducting joint and independent operations.³⁷

As a result of these failings, even had Egypt's military been better trained and led, it was at a significant disadvantage from the outset. Once combat began, Egyptian forces had no understanding of where Israel would strike, with what force, in what manner, with what tactics or effect, over what duration, or with what objective—in short, they were blind.

Conclusion

Kimmel stood by the window of his office at the submarine base, his jaw set in stony anguish. As he watched the disaster across the harbor unfold with terrible fury, a .50-caliber machine gun bullet crashed through the glass. It

brushed the admiral before it clanged to the floor. It cut his white jacket and raised a welt on his chest. "It would have been merciful had it killed me."

—*RADM Edwin Layton*³⁸

The great military victory we achieved in Desert Storm and the minimal losses sustained by U.S. and Coalition forces can be directly attributed to the excellent intelligence picture we had on the Iraqis.

—*General H. Norman Schwarzkopf III, U.S. Army*³⁹

Battle is a physical activity and requires force. And yet, to speak of force without associating a corresponding value to intelligence is akin to speaking of a boxer without eyes or a brain. Additionally, "employment of force" is hollow without an understanding of where, in what conditions and geography, and against whom to employ force. Success in the physical act of battle requires well-trained soldiers who are properly equipped, led by strong leadership willing to use force against a clear objective, employing it correctly, and sacrificing when necessary. But it also requires foresight, analysis, eyes and ears, and the development of a playbook on how to win—it takes intelligence. Therefore, just as Keegan correctly states that "Knowledge of what the enemy can do and of

³⁶ Pollack, *The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness*, 201.

³⁷ Ibid., 200.

³⁸ Edwin T. Layton, *And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets* (New York: Random House, 1987), 315.

³⁹ NDP2, Chapter 3.

what he intends is never enough to ensure security,” so too, having superior forces equipped with better technology is no insurance for victory when opposing an enemy that invests in intelligence.⁴⁰ Absolute power does not win absolutely.

None of the battles described were won by intelligence alone—victory was achieved by the application of force. However, in each case, the victor could only employ the forces necessary to achieve victory through the advantage of foreknowledge. What would have happened, for instance, had Jackson not reached Bull Run in time to “stand like a Stonewall”? How would Germany have fared had it been faced with defeat on the Eastern Front just one month after the initiation of hostilities in 1914? How would Nimitz have handled the Japanese attack on Midway had he not known in advance of the trap? How successful would the Inchon landings have been if intelligence had not warned of the mud flats on the approaches to the proposed landing sites? And, how much longer

Success in battle requires foresight, analysis, eyes and ears, and the development of a play-book on how to win—it takes intelligence.

and precarious would the 1967 war have been had Israel’s intelligence not warned of the impending Arab attack, or had it not expended so much effort in knowing every detail of its adversaries force composition?

Intelligence “failures,” too, tell of the significance intelligence plays. Pearl Harbor, Tet, or, for that matter, the attacks of September 11th, do not diminish the importance of intelligence but rather demonstrate the impact of not placing sufficient emphasis on it. Britain’s failed intelligence and misunderstanding regarding Japan’s military capabilities prior to 1942, for example, doomed its army of some 146,000 in Singapore to a crushing defeat at the hands of only 35,000.⁴¹ History abounds with such examples.

As in the past, intelligence will continue to play a vital role in future conflicts. As General Hugh Shelton, former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, noted in 2000: “Successful employment of modern weapons systems, new operational concepts, and innovative combat techniques—particularly those involving forces that are lighter, faster, more agile, and more lethal—also depends on rapid, precise, accurate, and detailed intelligence.”⁴² It behooves the planner, the operator, political and military leadership, and members of the Intelligence Community to understand this and not relegate intelligence to a secondary status as authors such as John Keegan suggest. The strongest boxer cannot defeat the foe he hasn’t studied or cannot see.

⁴⁰ Keegan, 348.

⁴¹ John Hughs-Wilson, *Military Intelligence Blunders* (New York: Carrol & Graf Publishers, 1999), 102.

⁴² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations* (JP 2-01), (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 2003), V-14.

A US Naval Intelligence Mission to China in the 1930s

Dennis L. Noble

“
Worton’s mission
offers a rare
insight into the
methods used
to collect military
intelligence before
World War II.

”

In 1969, an “old military China hand,” Maj. Gen. William A. Worton, USMC, described an intelligence operation he undertook from 1935 to 1936 during an oral history interview by Benis M. Frank of the US Marine Corps Historical Center in Washington, DC. General Worton felt the operation was so sensitive that he restricted the opening of the transcript until 10 years after his death. His mission was to recruit and run agents from Shanghai into Japan for the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).¹

There are few accounts of US military intelligence operations against Japan before World War II, and especially ones emanating from China. General Worton’s mission offers a rare insight into the methods used to collect military intelligence before World War II. The material concerning the mission to China comes largely from General Worton’s memory, and he realized the danger in this: “I am attempting to reconstruct from memory events that transpired...years ago. Information indicates reports submitted by me to the Chief of ONI and to the Commandant of the Marine

Corps...are no longer available...I will do the best I can from memory.”²

—DLN

Franklin D. Roosevelt’s election in 1932 marked a revival in naval affairs. As an assistant secretary of the navy under President Woodrow Wilson and an avid yachtsman, Roosevelt’s sympathies lay with the Navy, and this attitude affected the upper echelons of the service. Jeffrey M. Dorwart writes that “nowhere was this infectious attitude more evident than in the Navy’s intelligence office.”³ On 4 June 1934, Captain William D. Puleston became director of naval intelligence (DNI). A “popular, articulate, and aggressive” officer, Puleston was an “ideal planner, a student of world history and for-

² Unless otherwise noted, all material and quotes by Worton are from the transcript of an interview conducted in Washington, DC, on 3 and 4 February 1969. The transcript is located in the Marine Corps Museum, Washington, DC. In accordance with the general’s wishes, the transcript was declassified (opened) on 28 August 1983. The US Marine Corps Oral History program also holds a separate and detailed transcript of General Worton’s entire military career.

³ Jeffrey M. Dorwart, *Conflict of Duty: The US Navy’s Intelligence Dilemma, 1919–1945* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983), 59.

¹ This article originally appeared in classified *Studies in Intelligence* 43, no. 2 (1999).

“
You know what we
want. Go out and do it.
That’s all.
”

eign affairs.” His abilities and drive led to ONI’s “greatest years,” and the “office’s most direct period of influence over naval policy.”⁴ At that time, ONI became enmeshed in what Dorwart terms an “intelligence dilemma.” That is, ONI’s security operations “led to secret... domestic operations, and snooping...that might violate the constitutional obligations and freedom that every naval officer had pledged to uphold and defend.” Puleston, feeling both this “dilemma” and the infusion of new life into the Navy, thought ONI should try to serve the fleet in outlying areas. In the 1930’s, Japan was the obvious target.⁵

Zeroing in on Japan

In 1935, Major Worton reported for duty with ONI’s Far East Section. He had impressive credentials for the assignment. He was born on 4 January 1897 in Boston, and he attended Boston Latin School, Harvard, and Boston University Law School. He entered the Marines on 29 March 1917 and sailed for France in January 1918. Worton fought in the Aisne-Marne offensive and was gassed at Bouresches. He also suffered other serious wounds. Before his assignment to ONI, except for two years in Santa Domingo, Worton served all his foreign duty in China (1922–26, 1927–29, and 1931–35), and he was a graduate of the US Department of State’s Chinese language course in

Beijing. Marine Brig. Gen. Smedley D. Butler commended Worton on his intelligence work in China when Butler commanded the 4th Marines there during 1927–29.⁶

Soon after reporting to ONI, Worton attended the frequent conferences Captain Puleston scheduled. The DNI asked for suggestions from the Far East Section about how ONI could operate against Japan. Worton suggested that the Fleet Intelligence Officer use an assignment ashore at Hong Kong or in the International Settlement at Shanghai. The assistant would recruit and develop a network of agents who could operate in and out of Japan to report on Japanese fleet movements. Worton believed the best locations for the agents would be in the Japanese cities of Nagasaki, Sasebo, and Shimonoseki. Worton suggested that to be successful the agents had to be Chinese because he doubted “that any other person could operate in the area.” He also recommended recruiting Danish personnel from the Dan-

⁶ Butler’s comments are in “Marine Corps 3rd Brigade Under Smedley D. Butler, USMC,” page 22, “ZK File,” Box 799, Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, Record Group 45, National Archives. Biographical material on Worton was in an attachment to a letter from Benis M. Frank, Head, Oral History Section, US Marine Corps History and Museum Division, to Dennis L. Noble, 27 August 1984.

ish Telegraph Company as operators, because the company used lines running from Shanghai and Tianjin to Nagasaki and Shimonoseki. Years later, Worton recalled that Captain Puleston then “looked straight at me and...said, ‘I think you should go ...[to Shanghai] and establish [the network].’”

Puleston had already launched operations against the Japanese, and Worton’s plan to run agents from China into Japan would dovetail nicely with those operations. For example, ONI had an active coastwatcher system along China’s coast and an espionage network that included a member of the Asiatic Primate Expedition and a Harvard exchange professor at the Imperial University in Tokyo. Puleston, however, did not care to use agents in Hong Kong because ONI would then have to share the information with the British, an idea that Puleston rejected.⁷

Lack of Enthusiasm

Worton later recalled that he “didn’t think too highly” of Puleston’s suggestion that he be the first to run agents from China into Japan. Worton felt he had already been away from troop command too long, and the new assignment would hurt his chances for promotion. Worton became concerned enough about Puleston’s suggestions that he requested a meeting with USMC

⁴ Ibid., 60.

⁵ Ibid., 60–63.

⁷ Dorwart, *Conflict of Duty*, 63.

“

**Good God Almighty,
what are you going
over there for?**

”

Commandant Maj. Gen. John H. Russell.

At the meeting, Worton felt General Russell was “not enthusiastic” about the assignment, because officers at USMC Headquarters still remembered the case of Maj. Earl H. Ellis. Ellis, with the knowledge of the then Commandant, Maj. Gen. John A. Lejeune, took an extended leave of absence in May 1921 to visit the Japanese-held Marshall and Caroline Islands to gather information about possible amphibious assaults in the Pacific. Ellis travelled as a businessman, but “unofficially, he made a quixotic personal reconnaissance of the islands.”⁸ Ellis died in May 1923 in the Palau Island group under conditions suggesting the Japanese may have killed him. It is no wonder, then, that General Russell showed little enthusiasm for sending another officer against Japan some 12 years later.

General Russell and Captain Puleston met over the next few days to discuss the assignment. Russell then met with Worton again and left it up to the major as to whether he wanted to volunteer. Worton decided to undertake the operation.

Fuzzy Orders

Puleston informed Worton that he would be working directly for ONI, with CDR Ellis M. Zachar-

ias as his immediate superior and that all orders would be verbal, issued directly from Puleston. The only people in China who would know of his mission would be Col. John C. Beaumont, commander of the 4th Marines in Shanghai, and CDR Thomas M. Shock, naval attaché in Beijing. “I was to cooperate with Shock and to confer with Shock as far as practical,” recalled Worton. “You can see...I was going to be in the middle.”⁹

The lack of clear-cut orders made the assignment “confusing.” Eventually, Worton felt his mission was to “determine the feasibility of operating an ONI undercover agency in Shanghai ...and to study and screen prospective agents.” Worton repeatedly tried to obtain written orders from ONI. At one point, Zacharias informed him that it was better “not to have them, then you can’t lose anything.... [Y]ou know what we want, go out and do it, that’s all.” This meant that Worton was on his own, especially if anything went wrong. He must have had a moment’s reflection when General Russell informed him that “If you make a mistake, we’ll have to dis-

own you, we will not admit to having...a person doing such a thing.”

Establishing Cover

With these “encouraging” words, Worton and ONI set about arranging cover for the mission. Worton was to travel to China as a disgruntled officer leaving the Corps to establish a business in the International Settlement in Shanghai. To avoid any chance of possible detection by Japanese agents, Worton believed it would be best to travel to China via Europe and the Suez Canal.

To enhance his cover as an ex-officer looking for a new life, Worton’s wife, Nellie, would accompany him. Worton recalled that when he came home and told Nellie that they would be sailing for France, she blurted, “Good God Almighty, what are you going over there for?” Worton could not completely reveal why he was returning to Shanghai, but Nellie “bravely made the trip and for almost a year ... [had to live] a lonesome life.”

In late summer 1935, the Wortons set out for China. The major carried three passports: one identified him as an attaché at Beijing; another as William Arthur Worton, a government employee on official business; and the third identified him as Archibald Robertson.¹⁰

In Shanghai, Worton arranged a room in the American Club, because it provided some security and another room at the

⁹ Puleston’s official request for Worton is in: Puleston to Major General Commandant of the US Marine Corps, 9 January 1935, Division of Naval Intelligence, Security-Classified Letters Sent “Day Files,” 1929–1945, Box D28, Record Group 38, National Archives.

⁸ Allan R. Millet, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the US Marine Corps* (New York: The Free Press, 1982), 326.

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Metropol Hotel. He also obtained a desk in an office where he could act out the role of a person studying to practice law before United States courts in China.

A Fortunate Friendship

Worton next traveled to Nanjing, where he met with a Chinese friend, Dai Li. Worton realized that he could not carry out his mission without the help of the Chinese. He “had to trust somebody,” and, because Dai Li “knew the war was coming,” he felt this was the person in whom he should place his trust. Worton had first met Dai when Chinese students came to play basketball with the Marine legation guard in Peking.

The friendship was a fortunate one for Worton, as Dai Li was one of the most important figures in Chiang Kai-shek’s retinue. In 1925, Dai was a young officer in Chiang’s military police. By 1927, Dai provided the list of communists to arrest and kill. Chiang eventually made Dai the head of the Chinese Secret Service. The secret policeman’s ruthlessness became legendary. Andre Malraux, the French writer, supposedly based one of the characters in his book *The Human Condition* on Dai.¹¹

Dai preferred to remain in the background, and he did not interfere directly with purely political matters. There was no need for interference, because by the time he achieved the directorship of the Chinese Secret Service, he was one of the most powerful men in China. Dai’s career lasted 25 years. Shortly after the war ended, he died when his airplane exploded near Nanjing. One writer has noted that Dai was a “colossus who set out to give Chiang’s China something like the first total and coordinated Secret Service that she had known in modern times.” In short, Worton could not have had a better ally to recruit Chinese agents to penetrate Japan.¹²

Dai agreed to steer potential agents, Chinese and European, to Worton. There was no doubt in Worton’s mind that most of these agents also reported to Dai, but he believed that this was a fair trade-off.

¹² All quoted material concerning Tai Li is from: Richard Deacon, *A History of the Chinese Secret Service* (London: Frederick Muller, 1974), 263–65. For a different picture of Tai Li than that presented by Deacon or Worton, see: Oliver J. Caldwell, *A Secret War: Americans in China, 1944–1945* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972).

On-the-Job Espionage

With his Chinese contact in place, Worton set about recruiting and preparing dossiers on agents. Worton had to learn the business of spying through on-the-job training, as there was no formal training for Marine officers in intelligence gathering. Before leaving for China, Worton read everything he could find on spies and spying. Eventually, the major prepared dossiers on more than 30 people who might help ONI, both Chinese and Westerners. Probably the best known was the Jesuit, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, a paleontologist who would be famous primarily for his involvement in the discovery of Peking Man. Other than Father Teilhard de Chardin, Worton felt that money motivated most agents.

Worton’s Agents

The recruitment and use of the Austrian artist Fritz Schief is one example of Worton’s work. Worton invited Schief, sent by Dai, to lunch at the American Club at least a half-dozen times. “He was a man looking for a dollar,” recalled Worton. Over lunch one day, Worton proposed that Schief use his abilities as an artist and set up an art school in Sasebo. The Austrian agreed, and he received \$200 for the trip to Japan.

Schief left for Sasebo in December 1935. Before departing, Worton impressed on him that his mission was to report on the movements of the Japanese fleet. The DNI felt that it was

¹⁰ “I took ... [the] name [of Robertson] because it has some family background, and I didn’t think anybody would know about [it].” Worton, 17.

¹¹ See also Frederic Wakeman Jr., *Spy-master: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003)

more important to know where the Japanese fleet was at all times than to know “whether the Japanese fleet had an 18-inch gun or a 16-inch gun. [Puleston] said...if we can’t shoot better then they did, then we’d better get whipped anyway.”

The Austrian painter-spy remained in Japan for only a month. After returning to Shanghai, Schief reported verbally to Worton that he was “pessimistic” and thought it was “impossible...to work there or do anything.” In February, however, Worton dispatched a Chinese agent, Chen Zhendian to Sasebo and Nagasaki for three weeks. Chen believed that he had the opportunity to provide information on the Japanese fleet for ONI.

Worton recruited another Austrian, Franzi von Sternburg. Sernburg “would make a dollar anytime he could...and you had to use some of these people sometimes as blinds.” Worton sent Sternburg to Japan while he dispatched two Chinese agents. Sternburg went in one direction and the Chinese agents in the other. The purpose was that “if anybody was picked up it [would be] Sternburg.”

When Worton’s agents were ready with their reports, he would meet them in the bar of the American Club, as if they had just happened to bump into one another. Then, after a few minutes of talk, Worton would invite the agent to his room to receive his verbal report. Worton would then encode the report into a business code

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and transmit it by cable to a friend in Scituate, Massachusetts. The friend knew in a general way what Worton was doing, “but he didn’t know just all about it.” The friend would then pass the cable on to Zacharias.

Worton’s greatest concern about detection came not from the Japanese, but from old acquaintances, both in and out of the Marine Corps. People who had known Worton questioned him about his activities in China, apparently not accepting his cover story. “Jealousies at that time were... pretty common in our Corps, and, if an officer went on a special assignment, well, [there] probably was a little jealousy in the fact that I had been picked for the assignment. I don’t know. But I always felt that in Shanghai my brother officers...looked askance and wondered...what in the world I was doing out there, and why I was there.” For example, at a civilian function in Shanghai, one Marine Corps officer’s wife asked Nellie Worton exactly what she and her husband were doing in Shanghai. Nellie replied that she did not know, but “I know him well enough not to ask him...[and] I should think you would know that much.”

Mission’s End

In February 1936, Shock met Worton in Shanghai and informed him that Capt. Charles C. Brown, another Marine Chinese language officer, would be joining him in Shanghai. Worton was to brief Brown, turn over his agents, and then leave for the United States. Approximately three months later, the Wortons boarded an American Mail Line steamer en route the United States. Worton recalled that, when the ship touched at Yokohama, he “didn’t leave my room all the time...the ship was in Japan.... I was glad to see us get out of there.”

The Wortons arrived on the West Coast of the United States in June 1936 and then traveled to Washington, DC. The next month was spent in debriefing at ONI, the final part of Worton’s mission to China.

On 27 August 1936, Captain Puleston wrote a confidential letter to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in which he wanted to point out to “Selection Boards...[that] they be aware of [Worton’s] duty” during his period as an agent of ONI. Puleston commended Worton for his “fluency in the Chinese language, familiarity with the Far East, tact, judgment, initiative and discretion ... and his competence, zeal, and loyalty.”¹³ Puleston clearly felt that

¹³ Puleston’s letter is reproduced in Worton’s formerly classified transcript as page 99.

Major Worton had performed his mission.

Evaluation

In retrospect, General Worton believed his undercover mission accomplished three things. It “opened the eyes of the Navy to the fact that we had in the Marine Corps men who were capable of making decisions affecting the Navy.” Worton felt his contacts with Tai Li paved the way for Tai’s assistance to the American war effort in China, such as helping to establish a weather station in Mongolia. Further, Tai in 1946 helped to free some Marines who were prisoners of the communists in Qinhuangdao. Most important, “We learned what not to do.”¹⁴ Worton also agreed with CDR Shock that in the future it would be bet-

¹⁴ Worton also found that the Danish telegraph operators would not work as agents because they were afraid that the “company would get in trouble and the Japanese... would take over their company.” Worton, 26.

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[T]his type of duty is
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lonesome, frustrating,
and hazardous
occupation.

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ter to have an officer in China in an official function, such as an assistant attaché, and operating covertly. This would help avoid embarrassing situations and the need to continually explain oneself.

The lack of records prevents an evaluation of the effectiveness of the intelligence on the Japanese fleet gathered by Worton’s agents. The archivist in the National Archives Naval and Old Army Branch, Richard A. von Doenhoff, was unable to locate any material on General Worton’s mission other than a letter from Captain Puleston requesting Worton’s assignment to a special project for ONI, and he believes the reports were destroyed.¹⁵ General Worton’s oral history does not illuminate the amount and specific exam-

ples of the intelligence gathered. What this mission to China does illustrate is an officer’s native intelligence and abilities in a difficult and potentially dangerous assignment. The mission also provides a glimpse of the early intelligence-gathering methods used by ONI in China.

Unlike the spy of fiction and Hollywood, Worton felt that operating alone and under the guise of a private citizen was not pleasant: “[T]his type of duty is not glorious. It is a lonesome, frustrating, and hazardous occupation.... I spent frustrating hours alone, thinking, thinking, thinking, and wondering.”¹⁶

¹⁵ Letter, Von Doenhoff to Dennis L. Noble, 21 May 1984 and conversation, Von Doenhoff and Noble.

¹⁶ Worton served in the Marine Corps through WW II. After he retired, he served for a year as chief of the Los Angeles Police Department.

The Lost Art of Program Management in the Intelligence Community

Edmund H. Nowinski and Robert J. Kohler

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Every
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This article picks up a conversation on the subject of management of national reconnaissance that has been conducted in this journal and in National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) journal National Reconnaissance: Journal of the Discipline and Practice since Studies published a critique by Mr. Kohler in 2002 (Volume 46, Number 2) entitled “The Decline of the National Reconnaissance Office.” NRO Deputy Director Dennis Fitzgerald’s reply appeared in a later issue. Last year the conversation resumed in National Reconnaissance (2005-U1) with Mr. Kohler’s “Recapturing What Made the NRO Great: Updated Observations on ‘The Decline of the National Reconnaissance Office.’” Mr. Fitzgerald’s counterpoint appeared in the same issue. A number of the points Mr. Kohler made in “Update” are addressed here as well.

Since leaving federal service, Messrs. Nowinski and Kohler have continued to work on development issues in private industry, including some used to illustrate points in this article. Mr. Nowinski was the program manager at Boeing for the Future Imagery Architecture program until 2005, when the federal contract with Boeing was restructured and a significant portion of the work was transferred to Lockheed Martin. Mr. Kohler was a consultant for Boeing on the project.

The authors thank Gary Zeigler, retired vice president of Lockheed Martin, and James Frey, retired president of TASC, Inc., for many helpful suggestions and comments on drafts of this paper.

Consider some of the great achievements of the past.

During World War II, the Manhattan Project was completed in 30 months; the first photographic reconnaissance satellite (CORONA) achieved its first launch within 12 months of contractor selection; the Apollo Program put a man on the moon in less than eight years; and the first near-real-time imaging system was launched in a little more than five years after a contractor was selected. Compare these accomplishments to more recent

efforts on the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) Program, the Space-Based Infrared (SBIRS) Program, and other classified programs. Today, major space programs typically take 10 or more years to achieve their first launch and seriously exceed planned costs.

During the past decade, a good deal of attention has been given to these problems, and specifically to the issue of inadequate program management of both white and black (classified) space

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations.

The founders and pioneers of the NRO—from intelligence, academia, the military and industry—met the Cold War challenge with the boldness, persistence, teamwork and sheer enthusiasm that have been the secrets of its success ever since. Your NRO trailblazers have told me that their sense of urgency, excitement, and commitment to Mission was so high that they could hardly wait to get to work each day. They dreamed the impossible. They dared the impossible. And they did the impossible—day in and day out.

—George Tenet at the National Reconnaissance Office
40th Anniversary Gala, 27 September 2000.

programs. Several studies (notably the Young Panel¹), many journal articles, and numerous congressional committees have lamented our inability to effectively manage such complex programs. It is a fact that every major space program in acquisition today is suffering from cost overruns and is behind schedule. The difficulties encountered on the FIA program, including a completion delay of several years and a multi-billion dollar cost growth, is just one example of this situation.

While much criticism has been directed at national security space acquisition, from our perspective, we see hardly any major acquisition in the Intelligence Community that is managed well. With a few exceptions in CIA, no organization in the Intelligence Community (IC) effectively manages complex and complicated acquisitions. That costs are overrun may be bad enough, but even more serious are years-long delays in delivery of capabilities that are now badly needed or the complete failure to deliver such capabilities.

¹ A. Thomas Young, et al., *Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs*, May 2003 (available at www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs).

In this article we will review the problems we believe are leading to inadequate program management in the Department of Defense (DOD) and the IC. We will also suggest that the community needs to get “back to basics” on a number of fronts in order to recover its ability to successfully manage projects that are essential to the delivery of new capabilities in collection, analytical tools, automation, and better integration and interaction of IC components.

The Fundamental Issues

We find it ironic that the Intelligence Community, and in particular the NRO, is in such a dire situation only 20 years after it was seen as the leader in managing large projects. In 1986, the Presidential Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the Packard Commission) undertook a study of incipient problems in DOD’s management of the development of large-scale systems. A key theme of that commission’s report was that NRO was the model for management of such projects in the national security apparatus. The report said the NRO struck a near optimum balance of systems engineering, rational budgeting, aggressive personnel development, and organizational accountability.² How

did things deteriorate so badly in just two decades—a relatively short period in the world of systems development?

Studies over the past five years have tried to answer this question. While each of these efforts—ranging from the Young Panel in 2003 and 2004 to a recently-completed Rand Study—have focused on different elements of the problem, they have reached similar conclusions about its underlying nature.³ In general, we concur in the overall findings of these studies, which we list below as fundamental issues:

Budget – Program costs for all major space programs have been and continue to be seriously underestimated, leading to disastrous results during the development process. These underestimations are the result of an overarching desire of program proponents to obtain congressional appropriations, a drive by industry to win cost-driven proposals (at any cost!!), and the inexperience of government and industrial program teams.

Workforce – Commercial and other national security demands (and opportunities) for skilled

² David Packard, William Perry, et al., in *A Quest for Excellence, President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management*, June 1986. (Available at www.ndu.edu/library/pbrc.)

³ Leslie Lewis et al., *Acquisition Program Management Assessment of Selected Defense and Intelligence Community Programs* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2005).

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engineers, scientists, and analysts, coupled with limited incentives, have seriously eroded the number of workers available and relevant to given projects. These people are the base from which competent program managers for IC and national space programs emerged in the past. While the overall technical workforce in the country is adequate, many of the best and brightest are no longer motivated to seek careers in the national security arena. The lack of serious long-term succession planning and career development throughout both the government and industrial elements of the community has significantly compounded this problem.

Systems Engineering – Inadequate budget allocations for systems engineering and the lack of experienced leaders in systems engineering in government and industry have substantially impeded critical front-end system engineering trades, studies, and planning on most major new developments. These shortcomings have resulted in unanticipated design and test issues late in development cycles, leading to extraordinary effects on costs and schedules.

Program Manager Authority – As the Young Panel pointed out, “government capabilities to lead and manage the space acquisition process have seriously eroded.”⁴ Some of this can be traced to the ill-advised Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) policy of the

past decade in which significant personnel reductions took place in government positions (part of the putative peace dividend) and responsibilities transferred to the industrial sector. Congressional intrusions into the specifics of individual programs have also had a major effect. The weakened ability of program managers to move quickly to resolve technical issues has further added to ill-effects on costs and schedules.

Industry Motivation – Contractor teams across the aerospace industry are strongly motivated to succeed. However, more and more frequently cost has become a major element—if not *the* major element—of that success. Likewise, cost-dominated fee structures have become the rule. Both of these factors have forced contractor teams to adopt overly optimistic perspectives on the state of their respective program developments. This too often results in simplistic and technically corrupt reporting and oversight processes.

Parts Quality – The rapid and unexpected decline in the commercial communications space market following the DotCom collapse late in the 1990s has had a significant impact on the quality of parts design in developing systems, which often goes unrecognized, again, until late in the

development cycles. The government’s (and prime contractor’s) lack of attention and budget allocation to maintaining critical space technologies, including parts and processes, appears to us to be largely unabated.

Modest progress has been made over the past two years on some of these program management issues, but it has largely been a matter of “three steps forward and two steps back,” and in many cases, the situation has continued to deteriorate.

For reasons that are unclear to us, the IC and the national space community simply cannot find the wherewithal to come together and truly attack these issues robustly and in durable fashion. For example, in early 2005, Rep. Terry Everett, Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, noted that: “Despite the fact that numerous problems have been identified within the acquisition process, the Air Force continues to initiate space programs that accept extreme levels of technology risk.”⁵ Months later, a comprehensive Lexington Institute study on the space sector and military goals, concluded that: “Every one of the next-generation constellations being developed has encountered unanticipated cost growth, schedule slippage, and technical difficulties. The problems are so pervasive that they raise doubts

⁴ Young, et al., 3.

⁵ “Space Acquisition Reform,” *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 30 May 2005.

about whether government and industry can successfully execute military plans for space.”⁶

Further, a Rand study, focused on FIA and SBIRS-High and completed in late 2005 for the NRO, investigated a number of structural issues affecting these troubled programs and found that, among other things, “the lack of well-articulated technical requirements has plagued both programs.” This was due in part to the “loss of institutional knowledge and process management expertise” as well as “the increased politicization of the IC and the DOD community.”⁷

Recognizing these continuing issues, Undersecretary of the Air Force Ron Sega at the October 2005 Conference on Strategic Space said that it is “time to get back to basics.”⁸ The question is what are the basics as they apply to these fundamental issues and is there a way back?

Back to Basics

The corrective actions implied in the above review of problem areas have small chance of success if even more basic environmental issues are not considered.

⁶ Loren B. Thompson, *Can the Space Sector Meet Military Goals in Space?* (Washington, DC: Lexington Institute, 2005) Available at www.lexingtoninstitute.org/docs/662.pdf.

⁷ Leslie Lewis et al.

⁸ Lou Rains, “Sega Pushes Back-to-Basics Approach to Cure Military Space Acquisition Woes,” *CAISRJournal.com*, 21 October 2005.

“ The question is what are the ‘basics’ and is there a way back? ”

Many of these issues are not under the control of the program(s) directly but, they nevertheless influence performance. In the following, we will discuss four such issues:

- the art of program management;
- the impact of the organization in which a program resides;
- the “people” influences on the program manager;
- the requirements process.

As we consider these environmental issues, we will refer to the “old days” of NRO program management, not out of nostalgia, but because we believe there are lessons to be learned from an era—and an environment—that fostered successful program management.

The Art of Program Management

Effective program management relies on many factors, among them the following six:

- acquisition readiness,
- management of critical technology,
- government and contractor teambuilding,

- risk reduction,
- program initiation discipline, and
- oversight.

Increasingly, we believe, the drive to get new programs started has overtaken the need to get programs done right. Even worse, up-front system engineering to assess the community’s needs, to evaluate alternatives, and to make trade-offs in performance, cost, and schedules are more often than not simply not done. In part, this is the result of the present inability of the government to do systems engineering analysis independently, the overwhelming desire to get new programs going, and excessive influence of contractors in pushing parochial solutions in both the administration and Congress. As a result, programs are poorly constructed. A recent example of this failing is the Space Radar (SR) program that fixed on a technical solution and architecture well before all the alternatives had been explored. Fortunately, Congress recognized this and has consistently refused over the past several years to fund the acquisition program.

In the “old days,” we (i.e., the government) contracted for and led the development of the technologies critical to a program’s success. We often selected the winner and turned that winner over to prime contractors for implementation. Furthermore, we often carried more than one supplier for these critical technologies through

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The drive to get new programs started has overtaken the need to get programs done right.

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the preliminary design review phase to ensure we got the best solutions, not only technically, but in terms of achievability. The government no longer does this and typically leaves the management of critical technologies to the primes. There are, in our view, two reasons for this:

- The government, in the main, no longer has staffs sufficiently experienced to manage such programs.
- The government now prefers to allocate such responsibilities to prime contractors and relieve itself, as much as possible, of accountability for the performance of programs. This erosion of government responsibility is a legacy of the TSPR concept noted above.

But there is, in our view, a more insidious problem at work here. In general, contractors are not good at managing other contractors, particularly other contractors' technology developments. In many cases, the prime and the technology subcontractors are competitors, and, as a result, "proprietary rights," long-standing rivalries, and other competitive issues get in the way. Even in trying to manage other contractors who are not competitors, prime contractors often fail, as they tend not to have technical experts to truly oversee the products of subcontractors. Thus, subcontractor and supplier mismanagement has contributed significantly to problems on many of today's major programs.

In the "old days," contractors often accused us (government program managers) of being the *real* primes on programs. In a sense, this was true: We did directly manage critical technology developments, and we took responsibility for their success.

As these technologies matured into subsystems for implementation, we maintained government "managers" who worked with counterparts at the prime to oversee these activities. While we certainly expected prime contractors to do their jobs, the overall programs were ours to manage (including subcontractors and suppliers), and a program's success or failure was our responsibility.

Another important element of success is building teamwork between contractors and government. No business can be run effectively when important partners act like adversaries. Today, we hear statements from the government such as, "we need to hold the contractors feet to the fire," "we paid the contractor to do this, it's not the government's responsibility," "we need to enforce the contract," and "we'll get them at award fee time." Likewise, we hear contractors saying things like, "the award fee was unfair" and "we don't understand the government's priori-

ties." These statements may feel good to those making them at the time, but they reflect a hands-off approach in government to program management, and the threatening tone of "holding the contractor responsible" is counterproductive. In the end, the government is responsible for program success and performance: if the contractor is not performing, then it is the government's responsibility to work with contractors to "fix" problems so they can perform. Often, this can be as simple as establishing an environment in which teams can work together toward common objectives.

The government's current approach to awarding fees is frequently counterproductive, particularly when awards are used as weapons rather than as incentives. Anyone in authority who thinks an award fee of 72.3 percent communicates anything is kidding himself. In the "old days" we had a simple policy: if a contractor did essentially what we wanted, he got 100 percent. If the contractor did not do what we wanted, he got 50 percent and a warning. If the warning was ignored, he was penalized with an award fee of zero until the situation was remedied. In the final analysis, however, if the contractor did essentially what the government wanted and the program still failed, the government was just as accountable as the contractor. The contractor should not be punished for bad government management.

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**Missing today is
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In this regard, the importance of competent and experienced government program officers cannot be underestimated. A combination of a really competent government program office and a really competent contractor program management team would be ideal, but this rarely happens. The fact is that a really competent government program office can make a mediocre contractor team perform above its apparent capability. The reverse, however, is not true.

Inattention to risk reduction is a major flaw in today's environment. Risk reduction takes time and money, which, in the rush to get new programs approved, many organizations do not want to undertake. In the “old days”, in the process of leading up to the nation's first near-real-time imaging satellite, the risk reduction effort took approximately five years and \$1 billion (in today's dollars) plus the evaluation of several alternative technical approaches. Even after acquisition had begun, multiple contractor efforts were maintained in several critical technologies to insure the highest confidence in the selection. As noted earlier, the distinction was that we made the selection for the critical technologies (not the prime), and we accepted responsibility for that selection.

One thing missing today in our view is a disciplined process for initiating programs. Bureaucratic milestones, review steps, independent review teams, and acquisition manuals seem to

have replaced the disciplined process we used to use. We had—in a bit of an oversimplification—eight steps in our process:

- An overarching need was identified and, from this need, the program office generated a high-level set of requirements and an initial concept of operations (CONOPS).
- Potential technologies to satisfy the need were identified.
- The government contracted directly to develop the critical technologies.
- System studies were performed by the government, potential acquisition contractors, and support contractors in order to get ideas on architectural approaches. The government selected the approach it judged best, based on performance, cost, and schedule trade-offs.
- Critical technologies and alternatives were selected.
- The system performance specification was generated.
- The program office decided what cost and schedule it would commit to, based on contractor inputs, independent cost estimates (ICE), and experience.
- The program office determined how the program teams would be aligned (who was prime and subcontractor(s), who was an associate, etc.)

This eight-step process allowed us to continually make trade-offs in performance and schedule and cost. In the end, the performance expected of a program was embodied in the System Performance Document. This performance promise then had to be put in the context of cost and schedule commitments. We built margins into our schedules and cost commitments to insure that teams had reasonable chances of success, with reasonable risk.

Schedule and cost commitments—we considered them promises—were derived from contractor inputs, ICEs, and, most important, our experience. No single input drove our commitments more clearly than our experience and what we believed could be accomplished. The important point here is that schedule and cost margins were included in our program estimates, not only to protect against unforeseen events and issues, but also to give program managers the ability to protect performance promises as well. With today's emphasis on cost as the driving issue, schedule and performance are guaranteed to suffer.

An additional thought on program fiscal management is in order. It is an oversimplification to say everything will be all right if we give the program manager adequate fiscal margin. Equally

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The problem is that today's oversight is less competent than it was in the old days.

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important is who controls what in the program budget and how resources are allocated. Increasingly, Congress, the DNI staff, DOD and others control sub-line-item budgets. This results in program managers having no real margin, i.e., no ability to shift baseline dollars without some “overseer’s” approval. This process not only further weakens the program manager’s authority, but it also hampers his ability to manage a program effectively and efficiently.

Finally, there is the issue of oversight and its impact on the program manager. One of the things that has been said about the reasons for the successes we enjoyed in the “old days” was the lack of oversight. In a quantitative sense this is true, however, in a qualitative sense, it is not. It is certainly true that there is more oversight today than in the old days. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the DNI staff, and Congress (six committees) all exert oversight over IC programs. The problem is that today’s oversight is less competent than it was in the old days. In our day, the administration expected the D/NRO to manage programs, and it held the director accountable. The director, in turn, held the directors of Programs A, B, and C accountable for their programs. Congress interacted with top NRO leadership but almost never with the NRO program managers. The program managers were allowed to do their jobs, i.e., manage programs. Today, a significant part of a program manager’s time is

devoted to interacting with, responding to, and catering to overseers. One might observe that the more oversight IC program managers have been the “beneficiaries” of, the worse the management of IC programs has become, and as IC programs worsen, more oversight is required. This is a spiral from which we believe IC program managers need to be extracted.

Oversight in and of itself is neither good nor bad. It can be very good if it helps (provides resources, technical solutions and advice, ideas, etc.), but it can really be bad if the overseers have agendas of their own that work against the success of programs. This, in our judgment, was certainly the case in FIA where some overseers were unhappy with the contractor selection and, unfortunately, were happy to see a contractor fail. In the end, however, the program manager should not have to spend a significant percentage of his or her time responding to overseers. Management should protect them from this encroachment on their time and resources.

Of all the above factors, the most important may well be the fostering of strong and effective government/contractor teams. A key ingredient of our success in Program B was our ability to build this kind of teamwork. We

wanted the contractor to succeed, and we structured business deals to foster success. Contracts were negotiated with contractor’s business models in mind and accounted for. Further, all the contractors (primes, subcontractors, associates) were expected to be part of a team and often helped each other solve problems. Some of the tools we used to help the contractors succeed were:

- Offsite meetings with the government/contractor team to build relationships, share experiences and motivate the team.
- Government briefings to work forces across the country on the importance of programs they were working on.
- Government-directed cash awards for exceptional performance to individual contractor employees (allowable as a direct charge to the contract).
- Government/contractor working lunches and dinners, allowed as direct charges to the contract.
- Unilateral addition of 5 percent to contracts after negotiations were completed to give program managers additional margin.
- Minimization of the participation of Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) and System Engineering and Technical Assistance (SETA) contractors to those individuals who could make real technical contributions to programs.

- Use of award fees as incentives, not as whips.

It is important that every participant in a program have some “skin in the game.” Today, the proliferation of FFRDCs and SETAs—often more numerous than involved government program offices—has created large contingents of people who have no real stake in a process in which they participate and which they criticize.

We should point out that in Program B—and, to a large extent, in Program A as well—there was great stability in the program office during major portions of our acquisition. It is hard to build a team when the program manager changes every year (as was the case with SBIRS) and/or a significant part of the program office staff changes every year, as is the case with most programs today. Stability of government and contractor teams is critical.

The Organizational Impact on the Program Manager

The culture of the organization in which the program manager (and the program office) resides is critical. In most IC program organizations today, leaders emphasize spending on new initiatives rather than on funding programs already in acquisition. As a result, the latter are deliberately underfunded because if they were properly funded little or no money would be left for new programs. Resultant delays in

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The culture of the organization in which the program manager (and the program office) resides is critical.
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these acquisitions in turn lead to greater expense than if the acquisitions had been funded correctly to begin with. The irony is that the more acquisitions are delayed, the more acquisition costs climb, and the more hampered is the ability to start something new. This cycle is resulting in the IC developing fewer new capabilities and, in the end, delivering old technologies that have been under “stretched out” development for years due to lack of adequate funding. Something has to give.

Also crucial are other elements in the culture of program management organizations, including:

Pride in work. In the Program B days, we were extremely proud of our record in successfully managing programs. While we liked to “win” new programs in competition with Program A (as they did against Program B), our belief was that, if we did our work well, we would be assigned new programs. And that is how it actually worked. “Excellence in all we do” became our motto and we were proud of it. During a congressional hearing one year, a staffer wanted to cut one of our programs, but a member said, “leave them alone, they do what they say.” It was the best compliment we could have received.

Sense of being part of a larger enterprise. In the Program B days, we were part of CIA. As such, we saw ourselves as part of a larger enterprise of intelligence officers, not just acquisition “pukes.” Many of the engineers and analysts that comprised Program B came from the analytical side of the CIA, bringing with them understanding of fundamental intelligence needs. This larger context gave us a bigger reason for being. We didn’t just deliver collection devices; we delivered collection devices that produced information of critical importance to our colleagues in the Directorate of Intelligence. The NRO today is largely detached from the “bigger enterprise.” It is, strictly speaking, neither DOD nor IC. It is no longer part of an intelligence agency but rather an organization that builds classified collection systems for somebody else’s use. This disconnect keeps program managers and their staffs from gaining full, end-to-end, views of the intelligence cycle.

Creativity and an innovative atmosphere. Successful organizations know how to foster and reward creativity and innovation. There is no IC organization today that is really good at this, in our judgment. There are many reasons. The requirements process beats creativity and innovation out of programs. The budget process no longer encourages it, and the culture of the IC has become increasingly risk averse. When it comes to programs and program management this is particularly harmful. Truly creative and innovative programs are destined to have some

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**Successful businesses
emphasize
their product lines,
not their
infrastructures.**

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problems. While poor program performance should not be the rule, a modest level of failure must be tolerated if we are to encourage creative solutions to many of today's IC challenges. What is particularly detrimental to people willing to undertake management of such programs today is that many of their overseers have never managed such programs and would not know how to if they tried.

Clear priorities. Successful organizations have clear priorities and act on them, and fiscal and human resources are aligned with the priorities. Today, few IC organizations (and particularly the NRO) manage by priorities. Again, the FIA example is relevant. The program was, arguably, the NRO's number one priority, yet it was not treated as such, in our view. It was not adequately funded; funding was year-to-year and barely closed every year. And while some good people worked on FIA in the NRO program office, NRO management never took the steps to insure that the best people they had were assigned to the program. For example, FIA never had a first-class system engineering team assigned to the program, and deputy program managers came and went after only months on the assignment. But this is typical in a community (largely DOD-based) that prefers movement of people over stability and accountability.

Product lines have priority over staff. Successful businesses emphasize their product lines, not their infrastructures. They focus on how the product is to be

made and minimize the “overhead” needed to support the product lines. The NRO is the easiest of the IC elements to assess in this regard, as it has only one task: managing the development, delivery, and operation of satellites to collect information. In this context, program managers are the “product line” managers. Yet today, the infrastructure (staff) of the NRO is larger than the components that manage programs. The budget staff is bigger than any single program office, and the security staff is bigger than it was when the NRO was a black organization. One can question if the high ratio of administrative personnel (security, contracts, finance, etc.) to engineers that CIA provides to NRO is the right one. Compounding the imbalance we see has been the growth in the number of people involved from FFRDCs and SETAs, as we noted above.

As we pointed out earlier, the impact on program managers of the imbalance can be serious. There are many more people who can “interfere,” and the manager has lost control over the full range of resources needed to do the job. In short, their accountability and authority have been degraded. Moreover, the situation sends a message that staff is more important than the line business. No commercial venture could afford such an approach and stay in business for long. In the “old days,” we were proud of the fact that the NRO staff was small, less than 140 people.

Dependence on excessively large support staffs has another insidious effect in our view: It has become significantly more difficult for government personnel to get the experience they need to fully develop program management skills. Instead of doing the work themselves, they have become overly reliant on support staffs. The NRO would be better served by significantly reducing staff sizes and FFRDC and SETA participation.

If at First You Don't Succeed . . .

And if anybody today thinks that the exhilarating early days of the CORONA program were not also nerve-wracking, frustrating, and occasionally heart-breaking, imagine the persistence it took to endure 12 successive launch failures. What could go wrong did. One launch was aborted when a humidity sensor reported 100 percent. Inspection revealed that a member of the crew, four mice, had relieved itself on the sensor. That was one of the first leaks to plague the NRO.

—George J. Tenet at the NRO
40th Anniversary Gala

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A cadre of experienced and capable people is, arguably, the most important ingredient in a successful program.

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In sum, questions that organizational managers need to consider with respect to their programs include:

- Is the organization structured to foster program success?
- Does the organization's staff see its job as helping or controlling the program manager?
- Are adequate resources allocated to the program manager (dollars and people) or has the organization overcommitted itself?
- Are organizational processes enabling or stifling?
- Can decisions be made rapidly when speed is needed?
- Is accountability and responsibility clear?

On the question of human resources, high-risk, highly complex technology programs need top-notch government teams to manage and execute them. One can ask how many such programs the NRO (or any acquisition organization) can successfully execute at any one time. In the NRO, as presently structured, the answer is probably no more than one or two. When an organization agrees to do more than it is institutionally capable of, good talent is spread too thin and nothing gets done well. Program managers in such organizations are usually destined to fail.

The Human Element

A cadre of experienced and capable people managing programs is, arguably, the most important ingredient in a successful program. This may sound like a platitude, but it is an area that we think does not get adequate attention. In our judgment, this is principally because the work of building a top-notch cadre is hard, i.e., it requires difficult personnel decisions and takes time. Instead, the community has stopped giving people needed program-management experience in favor of providing “soft” training and certification programs. No training or certification program is going to replace real experience—the school of hard knocks—in the development of a first-class program manager.

We also question whether in today's environment, people can be motivated to become first-line program managers. At a very personal level, people are motivated by many things, but certainly important among these are knowing that:

- good performance will be rewarded and a good career assured.

- career paths are available and knowing how to advance along those paths.

- exceptional performance will be rewarded but also knowing that failure in a very risky enterprise will not be punished.

- the organization takes care of its people, that it has good succession planning so that people know that opportunities to get to the top exist and that management is actively working to help them get there (job assignments, training/education, rotations, etc.).

In the Program B days, there was an unofficial, but nonetheless rigorous, career development program. It went something like this:

Step 1 – Individuals started as engineers in a Development Segment, using and developing their technical skills.

Step 2 – In this process they were most likely to be assigned to more than one segment to broaden their technical base and knowledge.

Step 3 – The demonstration of good technical and communication skills got people promoted to Segment Manager (responsible for delivering something that worked).

Step 4 – Demonstration of good technical skills, plus ability to work effectively with other people and organizations and the ability to see the big picture, led to pro-

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**In the Program B days,
there was an
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career development
program.**

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motion to Chief Systems Engineer (CSE). Leadership skills were especially important here.

Step 5 – The really good CSEs were assigned to program management positions at the earliest opportunity.

Obviously this whole process took time, often many years, but, by the time an individual advanced to the program management level, he had extensive experience with technical, cost and schedule issues, had solved difficult interface problems, worked constructively with others, and demonstrated solid leadership capabilities. Such people were ready to be program managers.

People simply cannot have two-to-four-year tours in an acquisition organization and have anybody believe they are prepared to take on big acquisition responsibilities.

Finally, considerable attention (as noted above) has been paid to the lack of system engineering capability in this business. This is a very serious, not easily rectified, problem. More training and certification will not produce good system engineers, although added training will improve good ones. As we've suggested above, development of a first-rate system engineer takes time, a variety of experiences, patience, and judicious mentoring. We suggest that really good system engineers have the following characteristics:

- They have solid technical foundations and have effectively practiced their technical skills

early in their careers. In our experience we have found no technical discipline that seems especially well-suited to producing good system engineers.

- They are good communicators, able to communicate up, down and across a program (organization).
- They can see the big picture, understand the vision (goals, objectives, priorities) of a program (organization), and help program management achieve that vision.
- They are able to sort out what is important from that which is not. The good system engineer drives risk, performance, schedule, and cost trades across the enterprise and seeks the best value solution regardless of contracts, requirements, specifications or politics.
- They work aggressively across technologies that may actually not be in their fields; they do not try to do the jobs of segment managers; and they avoid unnecessary details.
- They keep customers informed.
- They constantly look for issues to be addressed and resolved,

and, when they find them, they force rapid resolution.

- They are willing to work programs from beginning to end. It is lots of fun to work the up-front system engineering—developing the architecture, allocating the requirements, cutting ICDs (interface control documents), etc.—but the payoff of a good system engineer is in the longer-term requirements validation, readiness and transition activities, all of which are not nearly as much fun but are equally critical to success.

The Tyranny of the Requirements Process

Do the best you can in the shortest possible time.

The above were the simple watchwords of our program managers and engineers as they worked on CORONA, the nation's first photographic satellite system; it was issued in an era in which it was expected that the U-2 would have a limited life for use above the USSR and that something would be needed to fill the gap. The time from contract go-ahead to the first, albeit unsuccessful, launch was 12 months.

The requirements document for the nation's first near real-time digital imaging system was a page-and-a-half memo from the United States Intelligence Board, written from the point of view of what could be done, and the system was delivered in five years.

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The highly successful programs were driven by urgent mission needs established at the national level.

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The requirements for the follow-on to CORONA were outlined in a one-page memo from the DCI to the D/NRO. This system was delivered in four years.

The requirements for the follow-on to the first near-real-time imaging system were a set of viewgraphs and a short paper prepared by the chairman of COMIREX (DCI Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation) that described the desired performance of the system. This system was delivered in five years.

Each of the highly successful programs we identified above were driven by urgent mission needs established at the national level. The acquisition offices did not invent the missions; they created the solutions. As a result, they started with broad support in the executive and legislative branches and tended to attract the other attributes of good management we set out in this paper. Whether the mission was to beat the Germans to the atomic bomb, evaluate the status of Soviet missile development, or meet President Kennedy's challenge to land a man on the moon in a decade, the successful programs of the past shared a national commitment to success.

Programs that are driven by the desire of acquisition organizations and contractors to grow, achieve technology advancement for its own sake, or to support the industrial base invariably start without the broad support they need to succeed. For example, the

FIA program, despite having gone through a three-year DOD and IC requirements process, never had universal support.

All NRO systems of the 60s, 70s and 80s were developed under similar, very simple requirements processes and had national level support. All these systems not only performed well, but they also satisfied needs that even today's requirements processes would not have envisioned. It is not obvious to us that today's tortuous requirements processes produces systems any better, relatively speaking, than those of yesterday. In fact, it can be argued that the present requirements process hampers rational program development. The process today requires so many interested parties to "buy in" that the really important national needs get lost and/or marginalized in a myriad of *desires* that have to be reconciled to get everybody on-board. The result is that there are too many "critical" requirements, which drastically limit a program manager's ability to balance performance, costs, and schedules.

Once a high-level need has been established, success requires an effective program requirements process. Experience tells us that

it is very important that the top-level system requirements be defined before a prime implementing contractor is selected and that they be as specific *and* as simple as possible. The Apollo program, CORONA, and the first near-real-time imaging program all met these criteria.

In recent years a different philosophy has been promulgated, one in which the government decides at an abstract level what it wants, and then selects a contractor team to work as a partner to define specific requirements and implementation. This may make sense in theory, in that it makes the capabilities of the contractor team available to the government to accomplish the trades necessary to design the optimum solution and then build it. This approach has been tried on NSA's Trailblazer, IC Map, and NSA's Geoscout program. On each of these programs, a concept was defined to support the selection of the contractors and, once selected, the primes were charged with developing the specific requirements and structuring acquisition schedules in conjunction with the government.

However, none of these programs is viewed as being particularly successful. Using this approach, the contractors often end up trying to respond to an overwhelming set of diverse interests from within the government, resulting in overly complex and poorly coordinated development requirements. Translating mission needs, or high-level abstract concepts

into specific acquisition requirements requires different types of people than those who do the design, development, and deployment phases.

But the problem does not stop there. In the program management world, “paper” has become king and the driving requirement on the programs. Today, nearly every decision, be it about requirements, design or technical features, or schedules, must be reviewed on paper by FFRDCs, SETAs, committees, and *any person* who lays claim to an interest. This requirement has established a counterproductive environment, as we pointed out earlier, in which many more people can say no and nobody has the authority to override the negatives. What’s more, the requirement to complete all such documentation before the next step is undertaken is unnecessary and causes significant schedule delays.

Specifications and specification validation has gotten out of control. Programs insist that all subsystems meet their specifications—and prove that they do—even if there is margin at the system level to tolerate an out-of-spec condition. Verification has become an onerous and, again, counterproductive process. The purpose of test programs has evolved from “does the system work” to “have we verified every last requirement.” We suggest that answering the former question is far less costly and quicker than answering the second and, with modest attention to critical linkages, is

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more effective in the long run. The “verification of the specs” test program provides no value-added to programs except to satisfy the inflated paper process.

Acquisition reform of the past few years has focused on how we can be smarter in procuring systems. The more pertinent question, in our view, is *how can we manage programs smarter?* The real problem is that today’s acquisition process has created an environment in which very few people are willing to take even worthwhile risks in program management. People have forgotten that the space business (even today) is inherently risky. If we are required to eliminate all risk in launching systems, then we will launch no systems.

Lastly, perhaps what is missing today is the right balance between community needs, technology advancement, program cost, and community-wide buy-in. In many ways, in the old days, we were lucky. Nobody doubted the need for collection, especially real-time imaging, from space. People argued over how to accomplish such missions but not the basic need for them. So it was relatively easy to align the administration and Congress around a strategy and funding. Many programs in trouble today lack this balance. Many people

were opposed to FIA (or the contractor selection) from the outset for a variety of reasons, so it was constantly under review and attack. SR lacked technical coherence, architectural integrity, and suffered from weak support within the IC. Such an imbalance causes more oversight, criticism at every step, and turns the program manager’s job into a nightmare.

Ideas

We believe that unless a process for improving program management is started soon, programs will just continue to take longer and cost considerably more than necessary, and the IC will fall farther and farther behind in delivering needed new capabilities. This problem will take time to correct, and action is needed now.

We know many people in and out of government are concerned about this issue and many ideas about what should be done exist and need to be considered. To aid in creating a framework for discussion and action we offer the following ideas for consideration.

Establish a professional acquisition corps in the IC. Acquisition is a skill that should be treated with the same respect and discipline as apply to intelligence analysts and DO operatives. People cannot keep moving into and out of the acquisition field and hope to develop the needed skills. In the days of Programs A and B people stayed in the business and, as a result, by training and experience

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became true acquisition professionals. One can argue whether the careers of such people should be managed by their agencies or at the DNI level; we prefer managing them at the agency level, but a process should be established to allow acquisition professionals to move between agencies, not only as the needs dictate, but to give them diverse and relevant experience as well.

How the NRO is staffed needs to be studied. To provide for the longevity needed to develop sound acquisition professionals, the Air Force model of people serving two- to four-year tours in the NRO should be discarded. In contrast, CIA people in the NRO should have the opportunity to spend their careers in acquisition and provide a stable acquisition corps. The current staffing model is just the reverse of what is needed: We need a higher proportion of CIA people in program management and technical jobs, where longevity counts. Those who cycle in and out over two-to-four year periods can more readily serve in the support organization, where longevity and continuity are not as important.

Remove all IC agencies from the JROC (Joint Requirements Oversight Council) process. The DNI should consider establishing a high-level body (much like the old COMIREX and SIGINT Committees) to adjudicate IC and DOD needs to be addressed by major system acquisitions. In 2004, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board recommended the recreation of an EXCOM for the NRO; this deserves consideration.

The D/NRO should commission an independent study of the program management processes, procedures, documentation requirements, and infrastructure in order to find opportunities for simplification. This group should consist of current and past government and contractor personnel.

Effective system engineering must be reestablished as a critical capability in the IC. Every study of the NRO over the past few years has bemoaned the loss of systems engineering in industry and in government. This prob-

lem is one of the most serious root causes of poor program management, an issue that has become even more serious with the loss of any semblance of an “end-to-end” view and an “end-to-end” system responsibility. The DNI should establish an independent team to assess this issue across the IC and make recommendations for corrective actions.

The DNI should commission an independent study of the interfaces between the NRO, NSA, and NSA. This is a topic about which we could write another article. Suffice it to say here that, in our judgment, relationships between these organizations and how they interact are not as they should be, in part because the current interfaces are the result of history and perceived, possibly outdated, prerogatives. Effective interfaces need to be established in terms of what makes technical and fiscal sense today. Hopefully such a restructuring will make it easier for program managers to manage across organizations.

A Holistic Vision for the Analytic Unit

Richard Kerr, Thomas Wolfe, Rebecca Donegan, Aris Pappas

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**What is needed
is a vision,
from the bottom up,
of intelligence analysis
that focuses
on the
basic
analytic unit.**
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*In early 2003, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet asked Richard Kerr, former deputy director of central intelligence, to organize a small group—the authors of this article—to provide an overall assessment of the intelligence produced before the war in Iraq began that spring. After that report was finished in June 2003, the group produced two additional reports dealing with Iraq: a critique of the National Intelligence Estimate on Weapons of Mass Destruction and a report aimed at identifying systemic problems and issues in the Intelligence Community the group uncovered in working on the preceding two reports. The unclassified version of this last report was published in *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 3 in 2005.*

These reports were informed by interviews, documents, and other material, as well as by our background and experience as former managers of intelligence analysis. From these studies and from our own past observations and independent experience, we, under the sponsorship of then-Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production Mark Lowenthal, took a fresh look at the principal components of the intelligence process: requirements, collection, analysis, product, and dissemination. Although this report was prepared in May 2005 and changes have been taking place at many levels in the Intelligence Community, we continue to believe this vision remains relevant today.

—The Kerr Group

Beginning in the late 1970s, the US military entered an era sometimes referred to as a Revolution in Military Affairs. During this period, the military went through a fundamental reassessment of capabilities, force structure, and operations—a process that some argue is continuing to this day. In contrast, although the Intelligence Community also made a variety of changes following the end of the

Cold War, they were incremental in nature. They did not fully address longstanding issues, including analysis and products, nor did they tackle emerging problems creatively.

Over the past several years, proposals for improving intelligence have been many and varied. Most have emphasized the overall structure and management of the Intelligence Community, with

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The Holistic Analytic Unit

The advent of a Director of National Intelligence and changes mandated by commission reports on the performance of the Intelligence Community present unique opportunities to apply a new framework for intelligence analysis. Herewith is a vision for an approach that creates analytic units with a holistic view of their mission, responsibility, and capability. They will comprise physical units at their core and virtual units with presence throughout their areas of responsibility.

Implementation should begin with a single country and then expand region-wide. Once decided upon, changes should be made quickly, and high-level attention and enhanced resources will be key. The individual steps of the process should be undertaken simultaneously rather than serially.

Identify six to 12 countries or areas of particular importance to the US. Pick one or two, perhaps Iran and North Korea, as test cases. Create analytic units for the test case countries with the following characteristics:

- Internal expertise, mixed with strong abilities to identify and use knowledge not resident in the unit. Avoid the myth of “total resident knowledge”
- Very senior leadership, with rich resources in personnel and funding, to include significant amounts of external contract money, with contracts developed and approved within the unit
- Creativity the key
- Responsibility for the “whole.” Units should:
 - Perform research
 - Produce current intelligence and long-term estimates
 - Identify intelligence requirements
 - Establish collection priorities
 - Manage IC funding directed against the target
- Non-traditional staffing. Units should include or have close relationships, including formal contracts and informal contacts, with:
 - Experts without security clearances, including non-US citizens
 - Private sector firms and Federally Funded Research and Development Corporations for administration and substance
 - Universities and other seats of knowledge
- Inclusive structure
 - Self-contained assets for research assistance, contract management, conference organization, administration, and security
 - Embedded representatives from key organizations and customers
- Strong external presence to ensure that the unit is regarded as a central player in the preparation of dynamic assessments and the application of existing knowledge
 - Assign personnel to other principal organizations in the area of responsibility, including Defense, State, pertinent Federal and NGOs, academic and private entities
 - Institute regular conference calls, videoconferences, visits, and other interactions with country teams, chiefs of station, national laboratories, military commands, State desk officers, and collection agencies
 - Preside over programs sponsoring in-country research, academic exchanges, student programs, conferences, and other efforts
- New products and state-of-the-art dissemination systems should produce intelligence on a near-real-time basis keyed to customer interests and designed to provide reference material to support current issues
- Intelligence estimates should be short, validated outside the IC, and focused not on single-point outcomes but on the implications of change
- Strong, high-level review, accountability, and measurement of performance to ensure against backsliding

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**Fundamental are
robust, flexible
collection strategies
guided by analyst
input.**

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recommendations aimed at making top-down changes. This paper argues that what is needed is a vision, from the bottom up, of intelligence analysis that focuses on the working of the basic analytic unit. We examine the analytic process, note problems and issues, and make recommendations to enhance the Intelligence Community's analytic capabilities and products.

Requirements and Collection

Fundamental to the success of intelligence analysis are robust, flexible collection strategies guided by analyst input. In fact, too often today collection drives analysis rather than the other way around. This is due, at least in part, to the separation of collectors from analysts. Accordingly, collection priorities often do not reflect the true needs of the analysts working important issues.

Collection of information on difficult targets is a core mission of intelligence, and neither clandestine nor technical collection measures are up to the challenges of today. The key issues facing US national security over the next decades include the political, economic, and social strains in key countries and the ability of countries to develop and deliver destructive weapons. Experience in Iraq shows that technical, and even clandestine, reporting provided only superficial information on weapons programs, with little or no insight or understanding of

the inner workings and dynamics of the programs. In fact, it can be argued that information from these sources sometimes was as misleading as it was at times valuable.

Such issues raise questions about future investment priorities. It is inevitable there will be intense competition for resources among collection disciplines, and a careful review is needed of SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT relative to the resources devoted to them. In addition, the value-added and the relative merit of each source must be examined. The involvement of intelligence analysts in such a review will be key to its success.

A productive relationship between collectors and analysts must still be created, and when it is, it will be fundamental to establishing collection priorities and resource allocations. Currently, however, there is a significant gap between them. Too many analysts do not understand collection capabilities, and many are not even familiar with collection systems. To a significant extent this has resulted from the reduction over the past decade of the professional collection management cadre capable of integrating human, imagery, and signals intelligence capabili-

ties into coherent strategies and closely tied to the analysts. This development has been compounded by the separation of collection professionals from the analytic cadre who had been intimately involved in identifying and ranking collection gaps and developing collection strategies.

Although many analysts have contacts with collectors, it is not at a level that furthers their knowledge of collection capabilities or what collectors are collecting or not collecting. Moreover, analysts generally are not very adept at anticipating collection needs. They tend to be reactive, focusing on existing issues rather than identifying emerging issues or those likely to emerge down the road. In part this results from the absence of coherent research programs to help stimulate sound collection strategies. Many issues can be anticipated and collection requirements and strategies established before issues become the focus of policymakers' attention.

One response to the analyst/collection problem is to have collectors embedded in analytic units. Although this has been tried in various ways over the years, it has been haphazard and with only a collector or two for short periods. Although not all collection platforms are right for all issues, expert representatives from appropriate collection entities (NSA, NGA, OSC, etc.) should be permanently integrated, on a rotating basis, into key analytic units. Understanding that finite personnel

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Collectors must work intimately with analysts on developing strategies, filling gaps, and educating.

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resources would preclude this from being done for every analytic unit, it could be done for at least high profile issues, for example, Iran.

For targets and issues of lower priority, an embedded collection generalist could substitute for the several experts representing particular collection agencies/capabilities in high profile units. That individual should be familiar with all collection systems and not just the one in which his/her expertise resides. Moreover, regardless of the issue's priority, the collectors must work intimately with analysts on developing strategies and filling gaps, as well as on educating analysts on how system capabilities can or cannot contribute to the questions raised by the issues at hand.

Too often, however, collectors argue that dispersal of personnel to analytic units diminishes the benefits obtained from organizational purity, i.e., the interaction among personnel working the same issues. This argument may have some validity, but organizational purity cannot carry the day if the Intelligence Community is to avoid the weak and unimaginative collection strategies that prevailed in the lead-up to the Iraq war.

Source descriptions and reliability remain serious problems, and only a closer association of analysts and clandestine services will resolve them. With respect to US clandestine reporting in particular, more incisive analyst

involvement in establishing the reliability of sources is essential if analytic products are to reflect the actual quality of intelligence information and evidence.

Although collection itself is a problem, analysts often must rely on reporting whose sourcing is misleading and even unreliable. US clandestine reporting still too often uses different descriptions for the same source, leading analysts to believe they have corroborating information from more sources than is actually the case. More recently, obliquely worded caveats have been put on reissued reports that do not appear on earlier issuances of the same report, further confusing analysts in determining how much confidence they should place in the reporting.

Analysts and collectors need effective mechanisms for establishing collection strategies, vetting ideas, discussing issue priorities, and identifying emerging problems and likely customer interests and concerns. The Intelligence Community Hard Target Boards seem, for some countries, to fill this role. Recognizing that not all boards are equal, some manage to accomplish these important tasks across agencies. A board's effectiveness, however, seems to a large extent dependent on the

depth and breadth of expertise and leadership capabilities of the chairman, usually the issue manager. The Hard Target Board concept could be strengthened by ensuring that representation is at the right level and that participation is taken seriously. Finally, the chairman must indeed be respected in the community as the foremost expert in the substantive area and have the leadership skills to capably guide the participating agencies.

In addition, new approaches to information collection must be given high priority. A “soft” intelligence collection program should be developed. For example, there is need to better exploit information obtained from a country's elites—academics, politicians, businessmen, clergy, and the myriad other groups that make up a complicated society. In the case of Iraq, such information would have helped analysts better understand the context in which seemingly threatening developments were unfolding.

A system for collecting, reporting, and disseminating this type of information, similar to that used by the clandestine service, needs to be established, as well as an appropriate assessment process. The State Department, as well as the business and scientific communities, must be involved. This soft intelligence collection effort should not be accomplished separate from the basic analytic unit but should be a direct part of the unit's activities.

*The Analytic Unit:
Business Practices for a
High-quality Product*

Country and regional analytic units, because of their expertise, need to again lay claim to primary responsibility for all facets of their areas. They have historically been better at integrating disciplines and providing products with perspective and context than have single-issue entities. Moreover, this also would address the difficulty of dealing with the intersection of issues, where the Intelligence Community has not been particularly effective. Regional units are better positioned than single-issue units to anticipate the global impact of regional/intersecting issues, such as the global impact of economic growth in India and China.

Leadership of these units should reside in very senior personnel with well-established expertise. Senior and experienced leadership of regional units must be a high priority. Special salaries must be authorized for key personnel, and incentives for expertise and remaining in a particular substantive area must be better than the incentives to become, for example, a PDB briefer. That means a new reward system, substantial bonuses, and enough backup so that both senior and junior analysts have time to travel, attend conferences, and have opportunities for short assignments in target countries. Much greater emphasis needs to

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be placed on the management of analysis.

The unit's resources should be unconstrained, and creativity and high-quality analytic products must be the focus. In other words, much greater emphasis needs to be placed on the supervisor as a driver of analytic quality. Less attention should be given to the mechanics of the production process, such as fitting intelligence pieces into prescribed formats. High-quality, continuous mentoring of analysts is essential to ensure they have the capability and the confidence to reassess comfortable assumptions in the face of contrary evidence. To accomplish this, in addition to capable leadership, the unit must be intimately involved in requirements, priorities, and funding directed against the target.

At the same time, country and regional analytic units must overhaul their business practices, particularly with regard to outreach. They must engage in aggressive and extensive consultation with other intelligence organizations, collection entities, foreign liaison, military commands, academic experts, and chiefs of station, and ensure com-

prehensive exploitation of open source information. The means of consultation should include conference calls, extensive use of videoconferences, regular face-to-face meetings, frequent exchanges and communications via fax and e-mail, and other means that further the sharing of information and ideas among entities that provide value added to the analysis of priority issues. These activities cannot be casual or episodic, as is now too frequently the case, but must be routine and built into the daily and weekly business practices of each unit.

The objective is not only to create expertise inside the unit but also to educate analysts about where expertise and information reside outside the unit. The unit should not aim to become the repository of all expertise and knowledge. A major push should be undertaken to contract with the academic and private sectors for research and analysis on specific countries, regions and issues. A satellite company outside the classified environment should be established where foreign nationals could be housed to support translations, assist in research projects, and generally support unclassified analysis. Either as part of this organization or separate, it would be important to develop internet and open-source teams to search the net, sample or monitor bloggers, exploit academic and guild journals, and ensure knowledge of a country's political, social, and economic life. The country or regional analytic unit could profitably make use of one or several

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The Intelligence Community's use of single-issue centers has a downside for the analytic product.

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private-sector firms or even establish its own federally funded research and development corporation.

Routine administrative chores need to be reduced, with the focus on the business of intelligence—the production of quality analysis. Significant human resources, such as research assistants, contract personnel, conference organizers, and administrative and security officers, should be attached to the unit. External contract money should be made available with contracts developed and approved inside the unit.

Contextual Analysis

The press of writing for current products and addressing daily customer demands, in other words getting the job done, are the usual reasons cited for not pursuing new business practices and products more aggressively. In addition, the siphoning off of personnel and expertise to staff single-issue centers has further hampered the ability of regional and country analytic units to be the centers of primary responsibility for their areas. The advent of an increase in analytic personnel would seem to reduce the legitimacy of the first claim and mitigate the second problem, providing new personnel are directed to country and regional analytic units and not dispersed elsewhere.

The Intelligence Community's use of single-issue centers, offices of functional expertise, and cri-

sis-response task forces may satisfy a political or substantive need, but they have a downside for the analytic product. Entities such as those focused on weapons proliferation, drugs, economic crime, and particularly terrorism provide an important focus for analysis, policy development, and action. These issues are most effectively addressed, however, in a country or regional context.

An examination of pre-war intelligence on Iraq revealed systemic analytic problems that resulted from the separation of technical and regional analysis. Intelligence produced on the technical and cultural/political areas was largely distinct and separate, with little attempt to examine the impact of one on the other. In the end, technical analysis came to dominate. Thus, perspective and a comprehensive understanding of the Iraqi target per se were lacking.

Stripping expertise from regional offices to staff these entities, along with the continuing emphasis on current intelligence, diminishes the ability to provide perspective and context for issues and too often leads to analysis narrowly focused on only part of an issue. For example, a piece written by a func-

tional office on Iran's nuclear capabilities most likely would have little or no political context. Yet, such technical capabilities derive from the country's political policies, which are developed in a regional, if not an international context. Such narrowly focused analysis forces the policymaker to knit together separate products to provide context and perspective for the issues to be addressed. This is something most policymakers are unwilling or unable to accomplish and, if it is done, it usually results in support of an already established policy objective.

Moreover, fragmentation of intelligence issues creates coordination problems that lead to products that often become watered down to meet the demands of an ever-larger number of components. It also leads to duplication, confusion, and misuse of scarce resources. To wit, the violence in Iraq has been characterized as terrorism by a center and as an insurgency by the Iraq office. The same violence should not be separated into two baskets of responsibility, running the risk of analytic units providing confusing, if not conflicting, analysis to the policymaker.

Functional expertise should be collocated with regional expertise, if not wholly, then at least with some representative experts. Offices that focus solely on functional/technical issues are necessary to the analytic process, but their narrowly focused intelligence should be integrated

into pieces with the wider perspective produced by regional or country analytic units. Again, it was the focus on functional/technical intelligence absent the political/cultural/social context that proved so misleading in the Iraq situation.

The Analytic Product and Dissemination

Country and regional analytic units should have responsibility for all intelligence production, to include current intelligence, research, estimates, and policy support. They should have the staffing and support and aggressively work to establish themselves as experts or to have ready access to experts in all facets of all issues in their areas of responsibility. They should have the necessary resources, editorial capability, and authority to publish without a complicated review process. There should be flexibility in the types of products. Research pieces, even if not published, should be required because they build the depth of expertise that does not come from a focus on current intelligence. Estimates should be short, validated outside the Intelligence Community, and focused not on single-point outcomes but on the implications of changes in conditions or different outcomes.

Emphasis on in-depth research is essential to the development of country and regional expertise, which enables the analyst to provide perspective and context. Although some interviewees

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Country and regional analytic units should have responsibility for all intelligence production.
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claimed that more research is being accomplished than commonly believed, the preponderance of analyst activity continues to be current intelligence and policy support. In fact, some managers described analysts as “action junkies.” That is, locked into the current intelligence process, they know bits and pieces and can answer discrete questions, but they lack sophisticated contextual knowledge.

The fast-paced world of current intelligence leaves little time for careful examination of assumptions, alternatives to accepted lines of analysis, or discussion of sources and evidence. Moreover, quick, rapid-fire responses to policymaker queries often give the impression of certitude about analysis and sources that discourages thoughtful examination of the analytic line. This was one of the chief problems evidenced in the examination of the analysis on Iraq.

Quite apart from content, products intended for policymakers are too rigid in form, format, and function. Some products are required to be written even when there is nothing to say or when the intelligence fails to meet policy thresholds. This diminishes the quality and impact of the published product. If intelligence

does not rise to the presidential/VIP level of interest, then the analyst’s time might be better spent on deepening expertise. Lack of an intelligence input will not cause the policymaker to assume that he has been forgotten or that the analysts have disbanded.

Some different perspectives on analytic products need to be developed. A careful review of an approach originally developed by the CIA in the 1980s for a serial publication that focused on political instability would be useful. This publication used specific indicators to monitor subtle changes in the social, political, economic, and military climate in key countries. Produced by a unit dedicated to analytic methodologies and international issues, the quarterly was based on country analysts’ assessments of prospects for regime or major policy changes over particular periods of time. It provided regular, systematic assessments of recent developments affecting the stability of those countries. Both policymakers and collectors of intelligence found the indicators approach useful, the former for spotting trends and the latter for tasking assets. Such an approach, combined with a sophisticated set of polls—using those already underway or polls structured inside the country or regional units—would help identify social change and conflict. Combined with attendance at international conferences, in-country research, academic exchanges, or student programs, this type of intelligence could provide valuable insight supported by data.

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New forms for disseminating analysis need to be developed. In addition to printed publications, an official but less formal way of communicating with policymakers is warranted. One approach may be an e-mail type system or other means of electronic communication. Although not everyone should be allowed to e-mail policymakers, electronic systems would enable appropriate personnel to send timely, informal messages on important issues.

On a broader level, contracts should be let for the development, or at least a feasibility study, of a near-real-time system with online support to the customer. Such a system should merge current intelligence with direct reference to research products, and it must allow for quick response to customer questions. An intelligence professional should be available for major customers to provide assistance in tailoring the products to their needs.

Tradcrafft and Training

Tradcrafft training should play an important role in providing opportunities to examine and try new approaches to intelligence analysis, but rigid products and procedures are often resistant to new ideas. Programs focused specifically on critical thinking skills and analytic tools have recently been introduced into the Intelligence Community training curriculum. Although analysts generally praise the new training programs, they find many of

the lessons from courses in analysis, writing, and production difficult, if not impossible, to apply in the real world. Too often the training is rendered irrelevant by inflexible product formats, writing styles, and content requirements that cannot accommodate newer presentational concepts, sophisticated analytic thinking, and alternative analytic approaches. Moreover, some products are packaged or even written by editors whose primary interest is in making the analysis fit the current format. High-level managers, often not exposed to newer training courses, frequently claim that it is risky to apply lessons from training that change the products too radically. Finally, new concepts have traditionally been introduced at the working level with no attempt to hold managers accountable for their implementation or success.

Some training specialists and senior managers argue that methodologists and tradcrafft experts should be embedded with key analytic units as a way to promote analytic rigor. They believe that this approach would help mainstream the analytic techniques taught in the classroom and inculcate critical thinking skills into the day-to-day

work of the unit. The success of this approach, however, depends on convincing skeptical managers and analysts that such techniques are valuable tools that should be applied routinely to their issues.

Ever watchful for ways to enhance a unit's capabilities, scholars-in-residence have attained a certain cachet among many managers of analysis. These academics are seen as bringing substantive expertise, broader perspective on issues, and teaching skills, all of which should inform and enable analysts to produce better intelligence. In fact, the experience with these scholars has not been uniformly favorable. It is often difficult to find the right person who understands and can work within the intelligence environment and who is capable of producing actionable intelligence assessments rather than academic treatises. If the right fit can be found, the rewards can be enormously positive. Nonetheless, sending analysts to a university for a course or a semester can be an easier, less expensive, and more effective approach.

In the last analysis, the most important issue with respect to training is the sustainability of the analytic techniques and tradcrafft that are taught in the classroom. They must be reinforced in the work place, and first line supervisors must take the lead in doing so.

Final Thoughts

The intelligence world is one of ambiguity, nuance, and complexity. Dealing with these elements is difficult in the world intelligence serves, where success or failure is the uncomplicated measure by which the Intelligence Community is judged. Serious shortcomings in collection, inadequate use of outside expertise and knowledge, the lack of exploitation of open source intelligence, and the

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emphasis on current intelligence have been the result of well-intentioned attempts to do the best analytic job with the resources provided.

The US Intelligence Community is robust, highly capable, and

thoroughly motivated and represents an invaluable asset to the nation and its citizens. Nonetheless, the community must be sufficiently mature to both adapt to the changing circumstances and counteract the evolutionary processes that have conspired to threaten its reputation and its ability to successfully perform its mission. The alternative is unacceptable.

Studying and Teaching About Intelligence: The Approach in the United Kingdom

Michael S. Goodman

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The academic study
of intelligence
is a new
phenomenon.
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At the start of the first class of each introductory intelligence course I teach, I ask students what is the first thing that comes to mind when they think of intelligence. Invariably the answer is: “James Bond.” This is a sad state of affairs. Not only is James Bond fictional, but he is not a fair representation of intelligence. At the same time, however, the response is at least somewhat reassuring in that it shows some knowledge of intelligence work. When I then show students a picture of Sir Alec Guinness as le Carré’s George Smiley and ask if anyone knows who the figure is, I am usually greeted with a wall of silence, though occasionally someone has replied “isn’t that the person who played Obi-Wan Kenobi in *Star Wars*?”¹

While intelligence is not a new phenomenon, the academic study of intelligence is. Intelligence as an activity has existed in one form or another for centuries: in the United Kingdom the modern intelligence establishment can trace its roots to 1909. As an academic discipline, the subject

really only extends to the mid-1970s. Though there had been a plethora of books on intelligence—some good but mostly bad—it was not until the publication of J.C. Masterman’s and F.C. Winterbotham’s treatment of Ultra that intelligence as a serious subject of study began.² The three-decade growth of the academic study of intelligence has been coupled in recent years with a growing public awareness of intelligence.

The events of 9/11, judgments about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and the attacks on the London underground in July 2005 have ensured that intelligence is now taken as part and parcel of government. While intelligence was always something known to be tangible, in a sense it was a non-entity, a black hole of government, which all

¹ I am grateful to Jane Knight, the first Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis in the Cabinet Office, for her comments on an earlier draft. I am also grateful to John Tolson of the Ministry of Defense, Professor Len Scott and Dr. Joe Maiolo.

² This is the date given by Wesley Wark, “The Study of Espionage: Past, Present, Future?” in *Intelligence and National Security* 8, no.3 (July 1993): 1. The Ultra books referred to are: J.C. Masterman, *The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939–1945* (London: Yale University Press, 1972) and F.C. Winterbotham, *The Ultra Secret* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974). In the United States an equally important book was Roberta Wohlstetter’s *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962).

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The events of the 21st century have already defined intelligence as a new cornerstone of government.

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knew existed but which no one in the know could officially acknowledge. The key events of the early 21st century have already defined intelligence as a new cornerstone of government, used equally as a tool for offensive war-making and defensive national security planning. One consequence of this has been the large-scale growth of intelligence study and teaching academically, as reflected both in the number of courses being offered and in the jump in enrollment in such courses. As such, the public's desire to know more is reflected accurately in its academic existence.

This phenomenon has taken a relatively long time to come to fruition, for as the late Michael Handel—one of earliest pioneers of the discipline—recognized:

*The extensive allocation of national resources to all types of intelligence work and the increasingly important role played by the intelligence community in shaping our national security and foreign policies point to the need for furthering our understanding of the special problems and methods of intelligence work.*³

The teaching of intelligence in university courses is a timely addition to those taught in mainstream programs leading to degrees in politics and history. Yet a review of teaching practices in the United Kingdom

today suggests that intelligence studies is one of those odd disciplines that is comfortable in a variety of academic departments, but perhaps never truly at home in any of them.

In this article, I will consider intelligence as an academic subject in the United Kingdom. I will first look at the status of intelligence studies as a discipline and then consider how the subject is taught in institutions of higher education. In order to comprehend how intelligence is taught, therefore, it is first necessary to consider the subject, starting off with the seemingly simple question of “what is intelligence?”

It is possible, as D.C. Watt has done, to begin to define a historiography of intelligence studies.⁴ While this may be a purely academic exercise, it does reveal some interesting facts. The bulk of intelligence-related books published up until the mid-1970s was, generally speaking, composed of memoirs or accounts of different operations. The introduction of intelligence as an aca-

demic discipline resulted in the growth of more theoretical treatments. Whilst at times this may have created a far more abstract discussion than was actually necessary, it has ensured that a substantial theoretical basis now exists—something which early students of the subject called for in order to legitimize the discipline.⁵

Producing an exact definition of intelligence is a much-debated topic. Put simply, however, intelligence is many things—it is the agencies themselves, the business they conduct, and the information they seek—thus, intelligence refers both to a process and a product. To further understand how “intelligence” works, the standard procedure is to separate its constituent parts into the so-called “intelligence cycle.” From this it is possible to start to delve deeper into the subject, and in doing so it soon becomes apparent why intelligence studies nestles uneasily between different disciplines.

In one of the first academic treatments of the subject, Stafford Thomas detailed four approaches to studying intelligence: (1) the *historical/biographical approach*—within this category studies look at specific historical case-studies or chart chronological periods. As part of this, the work can either be memoir-based or archive-based; (2) the *functional*

⁴ D.C. Watt, “The Historiography of Intelligence in International Review” in L.C. Jenssen & O. Riste (eds.), *Intelligence in the Cold War: Organisation, Role and International Cooperation*. (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2001), 173–92.

³ Michael I. Handel, “The Study of Intelligence,” *Orbis* 26 (Winter 1983): 821.

⁵ See S. T. Thomas, “Assessing Current Intelligence Studies,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 2, no. 2 (1988): 239.

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**The study of
 intelligence can be
 historically based or it
 can be abstract.**
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approach—this category emphasizes activities and processes. It does not seek to explore historical examples but instead delves deeper into more abstract issues; (3) the *structural approach*—this considers the bigger picture, focusing on intelligence agencies and organizations; (4) the final method is the *political approach*—this concentrates exclusively on the political dimension of intelligence. In other words, the decisionmaking stage, policy-requirements stage, etc.⁶

Thomas' is a useful breakdown: through his four stages it is possible to identify the study both in its most esoteric form and its most empirical. In order to fully comprehend how these various routes into the subject affect its teaching, it is first necessary to look at how later writings have defined the subject. Wesley Wark, a Canadian intelligence scholar, went further than Thomas, breaking the subject into eight methodologies: (1) the *research project*—utilizing primary source archival evidence; (2) related to this is the *historical project*—essentially the production of case-study based accounts; (3) the *definitional project*—this is concerned with the foundation of intelligence studies; in other words, it attempts to define the subject; (4) related, but building on the definitional project, is the *fourth perspective*—that is, using case studies to test the theoretical deliberations; (5) *memoirs*—

⁶ Thomas, 236–38.

can be both the first treatment of a subject, or designed to offer first-hand perspectives; (6) *civil liberties project*—inherently these are not objective and are designed to reveal the surreptitious activities of intelligence agencies where they impinge on domestic life; (7) *investigative journalism*—typically these are on topics for which there are no historical archives available; finally, (8) *popular culture project*—this is perhaps the latest avenue of research and considers relatively obtuse topics such as the politics of James Bond.⁷

Wark's treatment reveals that within the broad remit of “intelligence studies,” there are a multitude of approaches that can be employed, and his approach implies that intelligence can be taught in a wide variety of ways. Accordingly, “the way intelligence is defined necessarily conditions approaches to research and writing about the subject.”⁸

Let us ponder this for a moment. We have already considered what intelligence is, but from the

⁷ Wark, 2–7.

⁸ L. Scott and P. Jackson, “The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice,” *Intelligence and National Security* 19 no. 2 (Summer 2004): 141.

above taxonomy we can begin to identify and place intelligence as an academic discipline. In doing so, it soon becomes apparent that there are differences in the way it has been approached on either side of the Atlantic.

In its purest form, the study of intelligence can either be predominantly historically case-study-based or it can be primarily abstract in nature. In the United States—which has a longer tradition than the United Kingdom for the teaching and study of intelligence—the subject has largely been located within political science departments. This has an obvious impact on the way the subject is defined—there is less emphasis on historical case-studies and a greater attention paid to theoretical deliberations; in particular, there is a desire to place intelligence within broader—often agency-based—studies. In the United Kingdom the subject has a far more historical grounding, with the major emphasis on empirical case-studies.⁹

The problem with both approaches—and indeed with intelligence studies as a whole—is that there is still a reluctance for non-intelligence scholars to embrace the subject. One of the founding fathers of the British approach explains:

⁹ For more see Scott and Jackson, 140 and 147.

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The teaching of intelligence has become of paramount importance in comprehending world politics.

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The root of the problem, is cognitive dissonance—the difficulty of adapting traditional notions of international relations and political history to take account of the information now available about the role of intelligence agencies.¹⁰

As esoteric as this may seem, it is important because it dictates how intelligence is taught within mainstream politics, international relations, and history departments.

The Teaching of Intelligence

Intelligence studies is therefore a comparatively new subject. With the growth of Islamic terrorism and related world events intelligence agencies have become far more visible in government.¹¹ The teaching of intelligence therefore becomes of paramount importance, not only for understanding historical events but also in comprehending contemporary world politics. The corollary of this is that “if scholars do not tell citizens what intelligence agencies have done for them in the past, why should the citizens expect intelligence agencies to be useful in the future?”¹² Given the furor over intelligence and Iraqi

WMD—without doubt the most vivid international expression of intelligence in the public domain—it is vital that the subject be better understood, something which is not happening at present.¹³

It is these voids that the teaching of intelligence can hope to fill: firstly through an examination of what intelligence has done in the past via a demystification of the so-called “missing dimension” of governmental affairs and then by providing a clear notion of what intelligence is and what it does now.¹⁴ Strengthening our understanding of intelligence—both at an academic and at a public level—is vital because, by extension, there will be a knock-on effect at the practitioner level.¹⁵ As one CIA paper has noted, “the intelligence agencies, with their peculiarly high requirements for

many different kinds of training, should be in the forefront of this movement.”¹⁶

In 1960 *Studies in Intelligence* published a fascinating article by P. J. Dorondo in which he detailed what he believed ought to have been the way intelligence was taught at universities.¹⁷ The article is extremely revealing, not only for the ways in which a practitioner imagined intelligence should be taught, but in the simple fact that it has taken 40 years for the United Kingdom to effectively catch up. Writing in 1960, Peter Dorondo commented on how “the role of intelligence is well recognized among officials of government, [but] public interest and academic concern have yet to be awakened.” That this has now happened does not negate Dorondo’s further observations, which are still relevant:

The awakening public concern with intelligence offers our universities and colleges an opportunity and a challenge—the opportunity to take advantage of a rising interest and to meet a clear need, and the challenge to meet it effectively and thereby ultimately contribute to improving US intelligence doctrine and competence.

This, therefore, was the birth of US intelligence teaching in higher education—primarily a

¹⁰ C. Andrew, “Intelligence, International Relations and ‘Under-Theorisation,’” *Intelligence and National Security* 19, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 174. See also G. K. Haines, “An Emerging New Field of Study: US Intelligence,” *Diplomatic History* 28, no. 3 (June 2004): 442.

¹¹ Andrew states that “Tony Blair has finally laid to rest the traditional taboo that British governments do not mention their intelligence services.” Andrew, 171.

¹² E. R. May, “Studying and Teaching Intelligence,” *Studies in Intelligence* 38, no. 5 (1995): 1.

¹³ Andrew, 181 and 182.

¹⁴ The quoted phrase is that of Alexander Cadogan, the distinguished career diplomat who headed the Board of Governors of BBC. For more see C. Andrew & D. Dilks (eds.), *The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century*. (London: University of Illinois Press, 1984).

¹⁵ Thomas, 239.

¹⁶ J. Fulcher, “Comes the Teaching Machine,” *Studies in Intelligence* 6, no. 1 (Winter 1962): A5.

¹⁷ P. J. Dorondo, “For College Courses in Intelligence,” *Studies in Intelligence* 4, no. 3 (Summer 1960).

means to educate students in order to improve US intelligence as a whole.

How was it envisaged that this would be achieved? Firstly, the course should begin in basic terms, identifying what it is we mean by “intelligence,” before proceeding to a consideration of how intelligence is the “foundation” for policy planning. Interestingly, the author believed that the history of intelligence was unnecessary and that the course should not cover the conduct of operations. Given the problems of classified information and the fact that US intelligence was still in its primacy at this stage, both of these suggestions were sensible. The teacher of such a course, it was recommended, should have “extensive and well-rounded intelligence experience.” Importantly, given the discussion above on the meaning of intelligence, such a course “would apply the teachings of many academic disciplines.”¹⁸

As ludicrous as such suggestions would have appeared to those in the United Kingdom at this time, they were acted upon in the United States.¹⁹ Writing 30 years later, former CIA officer Arthur Hulnick observed the evolution of such courses. The teaching of intelligence had indeed begun

within the US higher education system. The teachers of these courses were “academics who have either been connected with the intelligence system in some way, or who have received a boost by participating in the summer seminar series sponsored by the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence.”²⁰ This policy of indoctrinating academics working in the field was invaluable and continues to this day, where there are regular secondments of academics into the Intelligence Community.²¹ Intelligence studies in the United States is now an established discipline, not least in terms of teaching where there are a vast myriad of courses on offer.²²

A brief examination of these reveals that courses are either historical in scope, more definitional based, or (and this is the majority) wider examinations of intelligence within policymaking or foreign policy. Therefore, the

parameters Dorondo set down in 1960 have created precisely the sort of higher education setup that was hoped for, and indeed, some scholars are now suggesting that the interchange needs to go further.²³

How have such developments occurred within the United Kingdom? In the aftermath of the Iraq war Lord Butler published his *Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction*.²⁴ In this report Butler identified the analysis stage of the intelligence cycle as weak. In the aftermath, the Butler Implementation Group produced a report, detailing their recommendations for improving the British intelligence community. They advocated the creation of the post of “Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis (PHIA),” to sit as part of the normal Assessment Staff apparatus within the Cabinet Office. Although having various responsibilities, the new post had within its remit the task of “develop[ing] more substantial training than hitherto on a cross-Government basis for all analysts.”²⁵ As a component of this, PHIA has begun to breach the academia/Whitehall divide. This is a process, though now started, is very much still in its infancy.

¹⁸ Dorondo, A15–A16.

¹⁹ Until they were given a statutory basis in 1989 and 1994, the United Kingdom’s intelligence agencies officially did not exist. In the United States, by contrast, the existence of the CIA has always been acknowledged.

²⁰ A. S. Hulnick, “Learning About US Intelligence: Difficult But Not Impossible,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 5, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 96. For a review of how CIA officers themselves, including Professor Hulnick, have contributed to teaching in US universities see J. H. Hedley, “Twenty Years of Officers in Residence,” *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 4 (2005): 31–39.

²¹ For a fascinating illustration see G. F. Trevorton *Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

²² See, for instance, the list produced by the Association of Former Intelligence Officers on university-level intelligence courses: http://www.afio.com/sections/academic/AFIO_AEP_Participants.html.

²³ May, 5. May is another example of a historian who has worked within the CIA and wider Intelligence Community.

²⁴ HC 898, Lord Butler of Brockwell, *Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors*. (London: TSO, 2004),

²⁵ CM 6492, *Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implementation of its Conclusions*. (London: HMSO, 2005), 9, para. 26.

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**There are now five
university
departments
offering
postgraduate degrees
in intelligence.**
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In a sense, therefore, these are the British beginnings that the CIA was considering in 1960. Whether these will extend to the secondment of scholars to the intelligence community is debatable, but probably it is still a step too far. In the United Kingdom there is a different tradition of intelligence. The Official Secrets Act (which does not exist in the US) ensures that those with information generally do not talk, that is until papers are officially declassified.²⁶ Similarly the entire ethos and culture of government is different: in the United States the use of political appointees once the administration changes is relatively alien to the United Kingdom.

In addition, there has been a general belief among some practitioners that intelligence, as written and studied by those without experience of the intelligence community, is redundant.²⁷ While this perception is now beginning to change, it is still evident in some quarters. As a means to remedy this, many British courses include some guest lectures by former practitioners. These are invariably the most popular but are also necessary,

for as Hulnick states, it is harder to learn such things from outside the community.²⁸

Despite this, intelligence studies is one of the fastest growing disciplines in academia, which since the first degree-level program on intelligence began in 1990, has only lately exploded in volume. One scholar recently compiled a list of those UK universities offering courses on intelligence, and, although in need of an update, it is instructive in detailing the breadth and depth of the subject.²⁹ To illustrate how the subject is now being taught, let us consider these courses in slightly more depth.

There are now five university departments that offer postgraduate degrees in intelligence. The University of Salford appears to have been the first to embrace the discipline, offering an MA in “Intelligence and Security Studies.” This course, within the School of English, Sociology, Politics and Contemporary History is, as one might imagine, multidisciplinary. According to Salford’s Web site the MA “aims to provide students with a well-

founded understanding of intelligence and its impact on contemporary politics and international relations,” doing so through a consideration of the “theory, practice and history of intelligence.”³⁰ It would appear, therefore, that the emphasis is on placing intelligence within the study of international relations.

By contrast, the most recent MA program, also in “Intelligence and Security Studies” and offered within the Business School at Brunel University, offers a combination of “the rigorous study of intelligence and security policy studies with practical opportunities to develop intelligence skills through case studies and simulation exercises dealing with intelligence analysis.” The teaching is primarily definitional and historical, but with the added practical elements.³¹

Another approach is the MPhil in “Intelligence Studies” offered by the Department of American and Canadian Studies at the University of Birmingham. As an MPhil program, this has a larger research component than other courses, but the taught element is concerned with “(1) filling a vital gap in the traditional disciplines of ‘diplomatic history’ and ‘international relations’ and (2) enhancing the skills of current or future practitioners in foreign policy, government, business, and

²⁶ It is interesting in this connection to note that the new Freedom of Information Act, which surpasses the old 30-year rule, has exempted intelligence agencies. Not exempted, however, are the Defence Intelligence Staff and the assessment machinery in the Cabinet Office.

²⁷ This is certainly my experience amongst many older professionals, particularly those who worked in the collection agencies. Thomas also attests to this in the United States (227).

²⁸ Hulnick, 90.

²⁹ P. Maddrell, “Intelligence Studies at UK Universities.” Available at: <http://users.aber.ac.uk/rbh/iss/uk.html>.

³⁰ <http://www.espace.salford.ac.uk/politics/mairi.php>.

³¹ <http://www.brunel.ac.uk/courses/pg/cdat/a/i/intelligence+and+security+studies+ma/full+details/>.

other fields by giving them a unique insight into US policy-making in the 20th century.” This is taught through a multi-disciplinary approach, and overall it, therefore, appears to reflect — either intentionally or otherwise—the edict as typified in the United States.³²

The Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, offers four master’s programs: an MSc Econ in “Intelligence and Strategic Studies,” an MSc Econ in “Intelligence Studies and International History,” an MSc Econ in “Intelligence Studies (Research Training),” and and MA in “Intelligence.” The latter two are more research training-based courses. In particular, the MSc Econ in “Intelligence Studies (Research Training)” is important because it has been recognized by the Economic and Social Research Council (a government-backed research funding scheme) as a 1+2 award—this means that the government has recognized that there is a need for state-funded PhDs in intelligence.

In addition, the department is the only place to also offer an undergraduate degree in “International Politics and Intelligence.” The MSc Econ/MA programs cover intelligence from 1900 onwards, taught through “both an historical and a theoretical understanding of intelligence and security.” Furthermore

it seeks to examine “why states engaged in them [intelligence activities], how they contributed to policymaking and war-making or failed to do so, and how they influenced both national and international politics.” Descriptions of individual modules reveal that they are primarily concerned with “an understanding of the history of the development of intelligence as a factor in international relations,” perhaps not surprising given that it is an international politics department.³³

The fifth and final MA program is that taught within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. This MA, in “Intelligence and International Security,” is once more multi-disciplinary and seeks to “examine the nature, processes, roles and case studies of intelligence and their interaction with developments in international security.”³⁴ On a basic level, these courses are fairly similar—they all deal with general theoretical issues and explore the subject through a series of case studies. Yet more specifically there are differences. The Birmingham course considers the subject through a North American prism; the Salford and Aberystwyth courses appear to place emphasis on putting intelligence within a wider, international relations context; the Brunel degree puts

great importance on the analysis exercise; and, finally, the course at King’s, though beginning with a theoretical treatment, is principally case-study based. Such differences in how intelligence is taught in the United Kingdom are more pronounced when individual modules are considered.

At King’s, in addition to the MA core course, there are two further modules. The first is a history of the “Joint Intelligence Committee and British Intelligence.” This course does not include any prescriptive theoretical grounding but instead explores the nature, composition and evolution of modern British intelligence.³⁵ A second course on “Scientific and Technical Intelligence” seeks to offer a preliminary theoretical overview of the peculiarities of scientific intelligence and then considers the subject through case studies. Both courses place a large emphasis on the construction of an open-source intelligence exercise as a means of assessment.³⁶

By contrast, the School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham, offers an undergraduate course entitled “The Vigilant State.” This focuses on “the means employed by states to gather information and implement policy clandestinely.” In doing so it places “these issues in a broader political or governmental

³² <http://www.uscanada.bham.ac.uk/postgrad/intell.htm>.

³³ <http://www.aber.ac.uk/interpol/masters/index.html>.

³⁴ <http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/wsg/master/sprogrammes/maintel.html>.

³⁵ <http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/wsg/student/programmes/maoptions.html#jic>.

³⁶ <http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/wsg/student/programmes/maoptions.html#sctechintell>.

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**Courses tend to reflect
accurately the
departments they are
sited within.**
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context,” and consequently “this module is as much about how policymakers make use, or fail to make use, of these instruments as about the practice itself.”³⁷

In addition to its MSc Econ and MA core courses, Aberystwyth offers the undergraduate module “War, Strategy and Intelligence,” which places intelligence within the role of force in international relations. “Intelligence and International Security” looks at the evolution of intelligence as a factor in international relations, whereas “The Past and Present of US Intelligence” focuses on the history of US intelligence and how “it has promoted the political, military and other interests of the USA.” A further course, “Intelligence and American Military Power – 1917 to Present Day” examines “the role played by intelligence in maximizing American military power.”³⁸

In comparison to these rather contextual modules, other, more historical and empirical ones exist in other universities. The history faculty at Cambridge offers “The Rise of the Secret World: Governments and Intelligence Communities Since c.1900.” Instead of concentrating on the position of intelligence within domestic and international affairs, this looks at “the growth of modern intelligence

communities; the intelligence they have provided; their use and abuse by governments; and their influence on policy and events.”³⁹ In a similar vein, “The Secret State: Whitehall And The Cold War, 1945–70,” offered by the history department at Queen Mary, University of London, discusses “the substantial mutations to the central apparatus of government and the security procedures of the state which took place in response to the Cold War after 1945.”⁴⁰ Both courses, therefore, focus more on the machinery of government, placing intelligence within this context.

The final three modules are again different in perspective. “Britain's Secret History, 1908–1951,” offered by the Department of History, University of Sheffield, concentrates far more on internal subversion and surveillance, encouraging “reflection on the role and development of secret institutions in a free society, and the contrast between intelligence and security in democratic and totalitarian societies.” Overall it is concerned primarily with the activities of MI5 in the period under question.⁴¹ This course is

similar in content to “States, Security & Intelligence,” offered within the School of Social Science, Liverpool John Moores University. It is from this juncture that intelligence studies begins to branch off into more criminological topics.⁴² Finally, the School of History and Classics, University of Edinburgh, offers a module in “American Secret Intelligence 1898–2004,” which very simply is a history of US intelligence with a central focus on the role of institutions.⁴³ All these latter courses therefore are seemingly devoid of any central theoretical component.

What these multitude of degree courses and individual modules indicate is that intelligence studies has great breadth and depth, which is reflected in the nature of the subject and how it is studied within higher education. The courses tend to reflect accurately the departments they are sited within. Thus, courses offered through politics or international relations departments largely consider the role of intelligence in those contexts; whereas history department courses are far more case-study based, either centered around institutions, countries, or epochs. Courses within multi-disciplinary faculties, the Department of War Studies being a prime example, do not really fall into either category.

³⁷ http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/politics/courses/ug_courses_list.php?code=000543&mod_year=optional&mod-code=012706&page_var=mod_det.

³⁸ <http://www.aber.ac.uk/interpol/masters/index.html>.

³⁹ <http://www.hist.cam.ac.uk/undergraduate/part2/paper7.html>.

⁴⁰ <http://alpha.qmw.ac.uk/~codir/ThisYear/History.html.txt#HST-318>.

⁴¹ http://www.shef.ac.uk/history/current_students/undergraduate/modules/level_3/hst3023-4.html.

⁴² <http://activeweb.livjm.ac.uk/modcat/module.asp?module=SSCCR301>.

⁴³ <http://www.drps.ed.ac.uk/05-06/course.php?code=U01215>.

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The future of intelligence studies is bright, and the field can only continue to expand.

”

It is noteworthy that in terms of the actual teaching of these courses, some employ primarily a lecture-based approach; others are principally seminar-based. In general terms the difference is reflected in the level of the course: undergraduate courses are mainly lecture-led while master's ones are seminar-led. It is instructive to compare these with the initial ideas as set out by Dorondo, who stated that “lectures should be minimized in favour of reading, discussion, conferences and practical exercises.”⁴⁴

Overall, intelligence studies in the United Kingdom is a very healthy and rapidly expanding discipline, evident in the nature and increasing number of courses and modules offered. While it may not have as long a tradition as in the United States, it is certainly catching up quickly.

⁴⁴ Dorondo, A16.

According to American authors, for the subject to progress further cooperation with the agencies themselves is needed. This is still considerably behind the respective status in the United States, yet the first steps are beginning to be taken. The future of intelligence studies is bright, and the field can only continue to expand. As Michael Handel concluded:

Given the secrecy surrounding intelligence organizations and their work, and the understandable sensitivity of political leaders to the use and abuse of intelligence work, progress in this field will be slow, and most new knowledge will inevitably be based on historical case studies rather than

*on contemporary events. The extensive allocation of national resources to all types of intelligence work and the increasingly important role played by the intelligence community in shaping our national-security and foreign policies point to the need for furthering our understanding of the special problems and methods of intelligence work ... significant theoretical and conceptual progress in the study of intelligence has been made in recent years – but this is only the beginning of the road.*⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Handel, 820–21.

The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov

Joshua Rubenstein and Alexander Gribanov (eds.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005. 422 pages.

Reviewed by John Ehrman

Since the early 1990s, the opening of intelligence archives in the United States and Eastern Europe has done much to enhance our understanding of the operations of intelligence agencies during the cold war. A major exception to this trend, however, has been the files of the Soviet KGB. For a brief period following the collapse of the USSR in 1991, researchers gained limited access to the files. The most notable result was Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev's controversial book on Soviet espionage, *The Haunted Wood* (1999)¹—but the doors soon slammed shut, and much of what we know about the KGB still comes from memoirs or unorthodox sources, such as Vasiliy Mitrokhin's archive. Most of these materials, moreover, have dealt with the KGB's activity abroad and have not shed much light on the service's role in repression at home. But the publication of one small group of KGB documents, reports on the Soviet physicist and dissident Andrei Sakharov, are helping to close this gap. The documents contained in *The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov* were originally given to his widow, Elena Bonner, by the Russian Foreign Counterintelligence Service and supplemented by additional KGB documents from communist party and state archives. In publishing 146 of them, Joshua Rubenstein and Alexander Gribanov provide a long-overdue look at the inner world of the KGB and how it served the Soviet leadership.

An important point to understand from the start is that the book's title is somewhat misleading. The KGB's files on Sakharov and Bonner, some 583 volumes of raw reports compiled by the Fifth Directorate on surveillance and operations and from informants, were ordered destroyed in 1989.² What Rubenstein and Gribanov present, instead, are translations of 146 finished KGB memos and reports on Sakharov, often signed by the chairman of the KGB and submitted to the Central Committee or individual Soviet leaders, and have survived in other files and archives. Based on the nonstop monitoring of the dissident's activities, the documents provide a chronology of Sakharov's development as a dissident and the growth of the opposition movement in Russia. This is the story from the Soviet leadership's point of view, and it shows the combination of alarm and confusion in the Kremlin as leaders struggled to understand and limit the phenomenon. The documents are not easy reading, for they are in the formal, ponderous style of the communist bureaucracy, but they give an excellent insight into the minds and workings of the dictatorship.

¹ See the following review, reprinted from a classified issue of *Studies in Intelligence* (1998) or see James E. Nolan Jr., "American Ghosts in Soviet Files," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 12, no. 2 (June 1999): 227–30.

² For information on the destruction of the files, see Elena Bonner, "My Secret Past: The KGB File," *New York Review of Books*, June 25, 1992.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.

At the time of Sakharov's first public expression of dissent—the publication in the West in 1968 of his essay “Reflections on Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom”—the KGB did not know what to make of him. Sakharov was, after all, one of the Soviet Union's leading physicists, and he had been showered with honors. The KGB, not realizing that Sakharov's essay was the result of a gradual disillusionment with Soviet society rather than an impulsive act, at first hoped to bring him back to orthodoxy. “To prevent him from committing politically harmful acts, we believe it would make sense of one of the secretaries of the Central Committee to receive Sakharov and conduct an appropriate conversation with him,” recommended KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov in June 1968. (90)

The reluctance to condemn Sakharov, however, brought problems of its own, as the KGB noted that “government circles in the USA” might misread the Kremlin's silence as an endorsement of his views and wrongly assume that Soviet foreign policy was shifting. (94) In 1970, with Sakharov becoming more radical and building contacts with other dissidents, Andropov recommended the installation of listening devices in his apartment to “discover the contacts inciting him to commit hostile acts” and prevent “individuals hostile to the Soviet state” from exploiting his name. The monitoring, which eventually included physical surveillance, break-ins and thefts, and reporting by informers, continued until Sakharov's death in 1999. (99)³

The KGB, continually unable to comprehend Sakharov's dissent, could only view his actions through the prism of its Bolshevik and Chekist past. As a result, KGB officials not only saw him as the tool of foreign conspiracies but often managed to detect multiple plots working together. In December 1975, Andropov reported that “bourgeois propaganda is actively exploiting [Sakharov's statements] for purposes of subversive activities against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.” (207) Soviet anti-Semitism reinforced these themes, as when Andropov declared in 1973 that Sakharov and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn were “offering their services to reactionary imperialist and especially Zionist circles.” (166) Shortly after President Jimmy Carter sent a letter of support to Sakharov, Andropov claimed that “ideological centers and Zionist organizations have involved the new Carter administration” in Sakharov's subversion. (223) The KGB also often ascribed Sakharov's dissent to the malign influence of Elena Bonner. Her views, wrote Andropov in 1980, “not only are based on her hostile attitude toward the Soviet system but also conform to the recommendation of intelligence services in the USA.” (255)

Nonetheless, the KGB understood very clearly the threat that Sakharov and other dissidents posed to the Soviet system. Along with bafflement and paranoia, the reports make clear the leadership's fear that Sakharov's influence could grow among the Soviet people. In February 1973, after the journal *Literaturnaya Gazeta* printed the first official public criticism of Sakharov, Andropov told the Central Committee that the article had been a mistake. Such attacks, while ideologically correct, should not be repeated because they “encourage the antisocial activities of Sakharov” and increase the interest of “hostile elements inside the country” in what he had to say. (139)

³ Sakharov told the story of his gradual break with the Soviet system and his persecution by the KGB in Andrei Sakharov, *Memoirs*, trans. Richard Lourie (New York: Knopf, 1990).

The fear increased as Sakharov's stature in the West grew. Easing the pressure on Sakharov and other dissidents was unacceptable, wrote Andropov at the end of 1975, because any relaxation would lead to the creation of an "organized underground for purposes of overthrowing Soviet authority." (210) It was the fear that Sakharov would become a rallying point for opposition to the Soviet regime that led the Politburo to order his exile to Gorky in 1980 and, in 1986, caused KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov to keep opposing Sakharov's return to Moscow. (317)

Much of this will be familiar to anyone knowledgeable about Soviet politics or the history of the USSR's security services. Indeed, it is hardly news that the KGB viewed the world through a distorting lens of ideology, paranoia, and anti-Semitism. The greatest value of *The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov*, however, lies not in what it says about the past but, rather, about the future. Unlike the states of Central and Eastern Europe, the KGB and its successors did not go through radical cutbacks and purges in the decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Instead, many of the KGB's people and practices are still in place, and now, with Russia sliding into authoritarianism under the rule of a former KGB officer and his cronies, the security services are again increasing their power, prestige, and resources. With the publication of the Sakharov documents, we may have a chilling glimpse of events to be repeated and files yet to be compiled.

The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America—the Stalin Era

By Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev. New York: Random House, 1999.

Reviewed by William Nolte

[Alger] Hiss and [Whittaker] Chambers worked together as Soviet source and courier from late 1934 until the latter's defection from the underground in 1938.

Two generations of controversy can be compressed into that spare, declarative statement from *The Haunted Wood*, by Allen Weinstein and former KGB officer Alexander Vassiliev. Alger Hiss was a Soviet spy. Not “according to Whittaker Chambers.” Not “an alleged Soviet agent.” After more than five decades, Hiss's treason can now be stated simply as fact.

But truth is rarely so simple, especially in a case that has stirred so many emotions and is so intertwined with issues larger than the veracity of the two men, Hiss and Chambers, who stood at its center. In December 1998, National Public Radio reported that “recent revelations have convinced *some scholars* that Hiss was guilty.” [*Italics added.*] For 30 years, defenders of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg protested their innocence; now they protest their sentencing, with bare mention, in many instances, of the ground that has shifted under the issue.

The Soviet spy cases in the end transcended fact, becoming tests of faith. For Americans who came of age in the 1930s (as for many who came of age in the 1960s), the spy trials have been litmus tests for a range of issues: Nixon and McCarthy, to be sure; the Cold War and the nature of the Soviet Union as well. Even more viscerally, the Hiss case pointed to the cleavages in American history represented by the Depression, the New Deal, and even Vietnam. The last is not an anachronism, by the way, but a reflection of the degree to which the past is ever active, continually reviewed and refocused in our minds. “Which side are you on?” Woodie Guthrie asked, and an opinion on the Hiss case or any of the other trials of the 1940s and 1950s could answer that question across the spectrum of American public policy issues.

Allen Weinstein has studied this controversy for more than 20 years. When his history of the Hiss case, *Perjury*, appeared in 1978, it set off an extraordinary shock, contradicting the presumption which Weinstein had shared that Hiss was an innocent victim of the evil twins of mid-century American anti-communism, Joseph McCarthy and Richard Nixon. A revised, post-Venona edition of *Perjury* appeared in 1997.

This review originally appeared in Studies in Intelligence 42, no. 4 (1998), a classified issue. See the preceding review of The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov.

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The Haunted Wood results from an arrangement between its publisher, Random House, and Russia's Association of Retired Intelligence Officers. In exchange for payments to the latter, Russia's intelligence service allowed Weinstein and Vassiliev access to its records and those of its predecessor organizations. Readers "with an ideological ax to grind regarding Soviet espionage," the authors contend, will find "little comfort" in their work, which, they continue, "neither denounces nor defends Moscow's American espionage." This is true enough, but readers should not assume the result to be a false attempt at an "evenhanded" account. It is not Ted Turner's Cold War in print. To the contrary, it is an almost numbing account of the details—meetings, reports, payments—that point to the heart of the matter: Soviet espionage happened, on a large scale, and did so through the active involvement of American citizens, a disturbing number of whom held positions of public trust within the Federal government.

Chapter by chapter, Weinstein and Vassiliev recount this activity in a style reminiscent of Solzhenitsyn's painstaking approach to the Gulag Archipelago. At some level, we must deal with truth, including emotional and spiritual truth. But first we must confront the facts, facts which have been too long concealed by the "Which side are you on?" passions that have dominated the literature of Soviet espionage and the complicity of Americans in it. At that point, the discussion can move on, as, for example, the debate in the Rosenberg case has moved to important and interesting questions, such as the nature of their trial and the severity of their punishment. That discussion could not mature until the fraudulent debate on the fact of their involvement in espionage was largely resolved.

One of the questions *The Haunted Wood* raises, at least by implication, is that of the motives of the Soviet Union's American accomplices. Recent commentators have contrasted mercenaries like Aldrich Ames and John Walker with the "spies of conviction" of the 1940s. That contrast survives *The Haunted Wood* but not intact. Conviction may have been part of the amalgam of motivation, but so it seems were cultural chic and an element of ennui among some Americans of education and privilege, not to mention sheer self-importance and arrogance. Contrasts can be made between this generation of spies and the Walkers and Pollards, but comparisons exist as well. Every agent of conscience seems to have been matched by at least one or two of conventional wisdom (there being, of course, no enemies on the left), or by a dilettante slow to understand that espionage was not a dining-club game.

Weinstein and Vassiliev also provide important insights into Soviet motives. One element, of course, was the desire to steal American secrets, everything from nuclear information to aircraft plans to cosmetic formulas. ("Tractor drivers of the world, unite. You have nothing to lose but dry hands.") Perhaps more fascinating is the reminder that Soviet foreign espionage always had a domestic, state survival component. No outside group, no set of Royalist or Trotskyite (or neo-Trotskyite) exiles, could be too insignificant to attract the obsessive attention of Soviet leadership. Weinstein and Vassiliev reinforce the view that Soviet espionage took place not within a Western context that saw clear divisions between domestic and foreign affairs, but within a system that explicitly rejected such a division. One price of being a revolutionary regime is counterrevolutionary paranoia.

What, then, begins to emerge as the truth of Soviet Cold War espionage? That Joseph McCarthy was right all along? About the fact of Soviet espionage, yes. About its penetration into the US government at uncomfortably high levels, yes. But cruelly, heedlessly, and irresponsibly right, in ways that caused permanent damage to the anti-communist cause. One lesson is that when responsible leadership will not deal with difficult issues, other candidates wait in the wings. When Dean Acheson, rightly counted as one of the great figures in the history of American foreign policy, affirmed that he would never turn his back on Alger Hiss, he opened the door to McCarthy. (Dwight Eisenhower kept the door open by refusing to defend his friend and mentor George Marshall.) Could McCarthy have been deterred? It can be argued that he might simply have found another swamp to play in; it is difficult to imagine he could have found one so damaging to American public life.

For intelligence professionals, the ironies of the evolving historiography of the spy cases are extraordinary, among them that Allen Weinstein began his pursuit of the Hiss-Chambers story as something of an adversary; his Freedom of Information Act suit against the FBI, ultimately successful, was joined by the American Civil Liberties Union. Thus, at least in part, we owe public knowledge of the truth of the definitive fact of the Hiss-Chambers case to the ACLU. This provides its own lesson, namely that the judgments of secrecy in a democratic system can never be made only on the basis of the best interests of its national security services. In the American context, the balance between protecting sources and methods, on the one hand, and on the other ensuring public accountability for military, diplomatic, and even intelligence programs, will never be easily or perfectly made. But attempting those balances considering only costs of disclosure while failing to account for gains—in public trust, in the good name of the United States and its government, and so on—is guaranteed to produce both failure and cynicism, the latter being by far the more dangerous commodity.

Postmodernists will reject the very idea of truth, but new generations of historians may discover that its pursuit and even its imperfect image have value beyond the nihilism current in so much contemporary historical typing. When that generational change occurs, Allen Weinstein will be recognized as a hero of his profession, pursuing its highest standards with tenacity, integrity, and courage. Readers will find this a haunting book, evoking still-painful memories of controversies imbedded in basic moral issues, truth and loyalty prominent among them. In the end, it is truth that sets us free of the dualism that has clouded American discussion of these issues for so much of this century. For too long, the demagoguery of Joseph McCarthy has been used to argue the innocence of Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs. The truth, in the end, is more complex and even more interesting: McCarthy was a demagogue, and Hiss and his colleagues were traitors.

At the Dragon's Gate: With the OSS in the Far East

Charles Fenn. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004. 227 pages. Photos.

Reviewed by Troy Sacquety

Compared with OSS operations in Europe, those in East Asia have received little attention in published form. This gap in the literature is even truer for China. With a few notable exceptions, such as Maochun Yu's *The OSS in China*¹ and *OSS Special Operations in China* by Col. Francis Mills, Robert Mills, and John Brunner,² the field is nearly wide open and largely unexplored. Thus, any contribution is potentially valuable. *At the Dragon's Gate* is one attempt to add to the literature. On the surface, the author's credentials for supplying a valuable memoir are outstanding: he served in China as a US Marine Corps officer assigned to the OSS from 1943 to 1945, when OSS personnel only began to arrive in China in strength; he was involved in operations with the civilian-controlled Gordon-Bernard-Tan (GBT) network, including work with Ho Chi Minh in French Indochina; and finally, he was assigned to a smaller branch of OSS, Morale Operations (MO), whose job it was to conduct psychological warfare against the Japanese. The book does deliver some valuable insights, but, Fenn strains his credibility when he takes credit for involvement in an operation in which his participation cannot be verified. He also presents himself as a bigger player in China than could possibly have been the case.

The insights the book does provide must be carefully weighed and taken in context. One such contribution is Fenn's view of OSS command structure and hiring practices. Fenn admits that politically he was left of center, having worked for a communist newspaper before joining OSS. While this alone is not remarkable, it does seem to influence his opinion of OSS leadership. Throughout the book Fenn alludes to the tendency of the elite in the OSS to hire friends of their own social stature and background. In this case, the founder and head of the OSS, Gen. William Donovan—a lawyer—tended to hire people he knew he could work with. In many cases these hires were other lawyers, who in the emergencies of wartime service were given rank commensurate with their civilian pay. In Fenn's opinion—

¹ Maochun Yu, *OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).

² Col. Francis B. Mills, Robert Mills, and Dr. John W. Brunner, *OSS Special Operations in China* (Williamstown, NJ: Phillips Publications, 2002).

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undoubtedly true in some cases—this produced officers of like mindset who often had no familiarity with a foreign area and little idea of what they were doing. Once in the field, these officers brought with them the idea that their rank and privilege established that they knew how to run operations better than junior—but often more experienced—people. The result was wasted time and effort in furthering the scope of OSS operations, a potentially disastrous approach in as resource-starved an environment as China.³

That Fenn was assigned to the GBT network is also of interest. The network was headed by a Canadian civilian, Laurie Gordon. Gordon and his associates, former employees of Texaco, used their pre-war contacts to develop a civilian intelligence network that supplied information to many Allied groups. Fenn was sent to the GBT network as an OSS representative with the mission of bringing the group under OSS control. According to Fenn, he became an integral member of the organization, even though he did not succeed in his mission. Fenn does provide an interesting view of how this organization was run and of the personalities involved, but his later claims in the book cast doubt on his real role there.

The GBT network started to make contacts with the Viet Minh—under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh—in 1945. Fenn gives the impression that he was central to setting up the OSS relationship with Ho Chi Minh and that they shared a good relationship. That Fenn was enamored of Ho is not in doubt (he wrote a biography of the man),⁴ but his claim of centrality to the OSS relationship with Ho is. Fenn says he knew Major Allison Thomas, commanding officer of the DEER mission that worked with Ho Chi Minh. However, in Allison's report he mentioned on 2 June 1945 that GBT reports were sent to a "Lieutenant Fenn in Kunming, whom I didn't know."⁵ While this could be an understandable lapse of memory, another of Fenn's inclusions cannot be. Fenn claims to have led one of the immediate OSS post-war "mercy missions" designed to jump into Japanese-controlled prisoner of war camps for the purpose of informing the Japanese that the war was over and that they were not to harm Allied POWs. Fenn says that he led the mission—called ALBATROSS—to Canton. However, I contacted the acknowledged leader of the mission, who said he had never heard of Fenn. Records of ALBATROSS maintained in the National Archives do not support Fenn's claim either.

The bottom line is that Fenn's book is flawed and frustrating. Fenn might have provided valuable insights into OSS operations in China—particularly about the nebulous GBT network—but the apparent falsehoods make detailed research and fact-checking in OSS records a necessity before Fenn's work can be taken as authoritative.

³ A similar line of thought, a reaction of professional against those hired from outside and invested with senior rank, existed in Army intelligence during the war. See Mark Stout, "The Pond: Running Agents for State, War, and the CIA," *Studies in Intelligence* 48, no. 3 (2004): 69–82.

⁴ Charles Fenn, *Ho Chi Minh: A Biographic Introduction* (New York: Scribner, 1973).

⁵ Mills, *OSS Special Operations in China*, 369.

The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake

This section contains brief reviews of recent books of interest to intelligence professionals and to students of intelligence.

General and Current Intelligence Issues

John Robert Ferris. ***Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays*** (London: Routledge, 2005), 395 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

What good is intelligence? How does intelligence input to diplomatic decisions and military actions correlate with the outcomes? While these questions can't always be answered for contemporaneous issues and situations, University of Calgary history Professor John Ferris argues that the historical track record of intelligence provides patterns of use and indications of outcomes that suggest what may be anticipated and expected today and in the future. In the first six detailed and thoroughly documented chapters, he looks at that historical record in various periods. Each deals with a particular subject and time period to show the role of intelligence in major geopolitical issues and the subterranean bureaucratic and personal battles that led to the final policy. In the seventh, Ferris links the history with current reality.

The first chapter analyzes the influence of intelligence on British policy toward Russia and Central Asia in the late 19th century—the late Great Game period—when the future of Islamic states was already a major problem. Chapter 2 examines the evolution of British strategic intelligence between the World Wars as influenced by Robert Vansittart, who became permanent undersecretary of the Foreign Office, the man responsible for looking after MI6 for the prime minister. Vansittart used intelligence for political power. To make sure of its accuracy, he formed his own private intelligence service as a check on MI6. It is a fascinating story.

Chapter 3 appraises intelligence as used or misused by the major protagonists prior to WWII. In one example, Ferris shows how some statesmen and commanders underestimated Japan's offensive capacity, while others recognized it accurately enough only to have it ignored in the field. Chapter 4, The British 'Enigma,' does not discuss the Ultra intelligence, but rather how Britain constructed its own "Enigma device" to encrypt its military and diplomatic cables. Chapter 5 describes the military problems experienced

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.

between 1940 and 1942 mainly in the North African desert as new radio equipment became available. Chapter 6 looks at uncertainty and intelligence in military operations. It discusses a case study of the use and misuse of intelligence in the Pacific during WWII and considers how bold risk-taking, military genius, and serendipity are influenced by intelligence and vice versa.

The final chapter is a discussion of network centric warfare and the Revolution in Military Affairs, as affected by the “infosphere” created by C4ISR (command control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), and information operations. Ferris concludes that these complex concepts and techniques have indeed increased American’s military strengths but they have not reduced its weaknesses—a most dangerous situation. *Intelligence and Strategy* suggests that the role of intelligence in both diplomacy and military operations today is quicker paced, subject to greater confusion, is still vulnerable to false data or interpretation and the refusal of decisionmakers to accept well-documented truth. No revolution has occurred in these areas, and thus the human role is even more important. This is an important work.

Peter Jackson and Jennifer Siegel (eds.). *Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005), 285 pp., endnotes, index.

This book is exemplary proof that modern historians realize the importance of the role intelligence has played in world affairs. But it is also an indication of their struggle to come to grips with some of the basic elements of the profession. On the first point, authors from Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, have contributed articles on 19th-century crisis management in Austria and the origins of the military attaché, Russian intelligence and the Younghusband expedition to Tibet, the instructions of intelligence officers in pre-WWI Britain, the Royal Navy intelligence assessments of Japan in the interwar period, British attempts to hamper Soviet scientific development in the post-WWII era, and the role the *Stasi* played in the *Ostpolitik*-era of Germany.

On the second point, University of Wales Senior Lecturer Peter Jackson, in his valuable historical survey of the uses and limits of intelligence, asks “What is Intelligence and What is it For?” His answers to the first question illustrate the confusion in academia on this issue. He makes clear the tendency to insist on a single definition of the term *intelligence*, without recognizing the practical difficulties involved. Although he does not use this analogy—intelligence is comparable to the generic *medicine or medical*, each is a contextual term. When one is said to serve the medical profession, a contextual explanation is immediately required to understand just what is involved—a physician, a dentist, a scientist, etc. Similarly, when one is identified as an intelligence professional more questions are necessary to identify analysts and operators. When discussing what intelligence is for, there is no disagreement that it serves national policymaking and strives to be objective while minimizing uncertainty. In any case, the contributors are not hampered by the definitional dilemma any more than professional intelligence officers, and

their articles provide detailed and well-documented examples of how intelligence has influenced world affairs. The result is a valuable contribution to the history of the intelligence profession.

Hans Born, Loch K. Johnson, and Ian Leigh (eds.). ***Who Is Watching the Spies?: Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability*** (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005), 254 pp., end of chapter notes, index.

In Federalist #64, John Jay wrote:

There are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from the apprehensions of discovery...[and] who would rely on the secrecy of the president, but who would not confide in the senate, and still less in that of a large popular assembly.... In disposing of the power of making treaties... the president must act by the advice and consent of the senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence may suggest.”¹ (emphasis added)

Such were the conditions until the mid 1970s when Congress created the intelligence committees and began taking a more vigorous role in the intelligence affairs of the nation. Since 9/11 the calls for increased oversight and accountability have intensified in some quarters and *Who's Watching the Spies?* addresses this issue in chapters covering the views of eight democratic nations—the UK, USA, Canada, Norway, Poland, Argentina, South Africa, and Korea.

The collection of essays in this book is divided into four parts. The first considers parameters of intelligence accountability in general terms before and after 9/11. Parts two and three look at specific circumstances in the countries involved. Part four discusses the balancing of operational efficiency and democratic legitimacy. The authors are all academics, and those writing on a particular country are not necessarily teachers in or citizens of the subject nation.

Oversight is defined in the book as

... maintaining public accountability over the intelligence services, without the sense of taking over a government's responsibility for directing, tasking, and judging the priorities of the intelligence services. This process of accountability can only succeed if the overseers have the necessary legal authority and the will to exercise meaningful review. (5)

The experiences in each country vary widely. In the case of the United States, the country with the most experience in this area, author Loch Johnson finds Executive Branch oversight “anemic” and makes his case for increased

¹ Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, *The Federalist or The New Constitution*— #64, *The Powers of the Senate* (New York: The Heritage Press edition, 1945), 433.

congressional efforts. In the case of Poland, the nation with least experience in legislative oversight, the bureaucratic battles with former communists in government complicate attempts to establish effective procedures. At the other end of the scale, author Fredrik Sejersted notes that his country, Norway, has “no serious external or internal threats to national security...and the secret agencies are well-behaved.” (120) Thus it “should come as no surprise that Norway” has a model for legislative oversight that works well.

The experiences of each nation provide an interesting mosaic of desired goals and problems of implementation. The conclusions chapter includes a table listing the elements of “strong oversight” (237) developed by the authors, with assessments as to how well each nation currently measures up. It is a timely topic and worth the attention of all those who must deal with these issues everyday as well as the general public whose civil rights are affected when oversight is too robust or inadequate.

William J. Daugherty. *Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 298 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

There is a tendency among academics who have never served as intelligence officers to denounce covert action in principle. They argue that interference in another nation’s politics is just not right under any circumstances.² In his Foreword to *Executive Secrets*, Mark Bowden, author of *Blackhawk Down*, tells of a scholar he interviewed in Tehran who blamed the CIA for supporting the Shah, for engineering his overthrow, for bringing down the post-Shah provisional government, and for secretly arranging the takeover of the US embassy in 1979. When pressed about the contradictions, the scholar explained that it is “necessary to view the world through the clear lens of Islam to see the logic of these things.” Bill Daugherty, an academic who did serve as an intelligence officer and who spent 444 days as a hostage in Iran, gives us a more reasoned prospective on this controversial topic.³

One of Daugherty’s assignments as a CIA officer in the clandestine service, was on the Evaluation and Plans Staff of the Directorate of Operations (DO), where he monitored every covert action operation run against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Based on this experience and that of his other DO assignments, Daugherty set as his primary object for this book “to show definitively that covert action programs managed by the CIA since its inception

² See for example, Charles Ameringer, *U. S. Foreign Intelligence: The Secret Side of American History* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990); Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982); Loch K. Johnson, *America’s Secret Power: The CIA in A Democratic Society* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989); John Prados, *The President’s Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Secret Operations Since World War II* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1986).

³ Dr. Daugherty is an associate professor of government at Armstrong Atlantic State University in Savannah, Georgia.

have been at the express direction of the presidents of the United States. (xv) He writes to correct the impression, held by many Americans, that the CIA “runs a rogue foreign policy” beyond executive branch control. (xvi) In *Executive Secrets* he sets about correcting the record.

The first six chapters define and discuss the elements and role of covert action operations: Topics include some of the persistent myths—for example that Desert One was a covert action operation—that circulate in the media; the exemplary failures that have contributed to the negative public image of covert action; the process of initiation, approval, and review; and the relationship with the Congress. Chapters seven through 13 examine covert action policies and operations in each administration from Truman to Clinton. He shows that the level of activity varied more with international turmoil of the moment than with the party in power. The nature of the activity changed over the years as considerable effort had to be devoted to countering KGB deception operations and participating in counter-terrorist programs. Change will be part of the future too, he suggests, with the Internet playing an important role. Many well-known peacetime covert action cases are discussed—in Chile, Iran, Iraq, Cuba, Poland, Italy, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, to name a few. Where particular cases—Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty—are only mentioned in passing, references for full coverage are provided. For each case treated in depth, whether a success or failure or some of each, Daugherty describes the circumstances that led to the operation, while documenting in meticulous detail the various presidential directives and legal authorities involved.

In conclusion, Daugherty argues that no matter how well he has put the case for covert action, it will remain controversial, but it will nevertheless continue as an instrument of presidential policy when conventional methods short of war are unsuccessful. *Executive Secrets* provides ample justification for this position while illuminating this contentious topic with facts. This is a fine textbook and a valuable contribution.

Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon. ***The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting It Right*** (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005), 330 pp., endnotes, index.

The authors of *The Next Attack* served on the National Security Council during most of the 1990s. Benjamin had had little prior contact with the terrorism problem. Simon, on the other hand, served in the State Department in Middle Eastern security affairs. Both hold degrees from Harvard and Oxford. Their fundamental argument is that the invasion of Iraq was wrong and the motivating consequences of that action prove what Bin Laden had been predicting; only more terrorist acts against the United States and the Western nations will accomplish the Islamist goals of world domination. As an indication of what is likely to come, they cite the bombings in Madrid and London, which followed Usama bin Laden’s call for new recruits to deal with the US-sponsored infidels that are bent on wiping out Muslims. These two events, they argue, were carried out independently of al-Qa’ida and show the

capability of Islamist groups to act on their own. As they see it, Iraq has provided a new training ground that replaces the camps in Afghanistan, a situation that was foreseen by some and ignored by others. On the domestic front, they see the Department of Homeland Security as a collection of dysfunctional agencies bogged down in the minutia of bureaucratic battles that will take years to resolve before the department becomes something reliable in terms of protecting against another terrorist attack.

All but one chapter of the book are devoted to spelling out what is wrong with the current policies. As to a “strategy for getting it right,” they offer four, not exactly new, proposals. First, “stop terrorists from committing acts of violence by capturing them, disrupting their cells, or if necessary killing them.” Second, “keep the most dangerous weapons out of their hands.” Third, recognize “that there is no way to prevent all attacks; protect those facilities in the United States that, if struck, would cause catastrophic damage.” Fourth, “halt the creation of new terrorists by dealing, to the extent possible, with those grievances that are driving radicalization.” They expand on each of these points, but do not suggest any sure-fire methods of accomplishing them; nor do they appear to realize that the steps they recommend are precisely those now being attempted. Their comment that the intelligence services have not changed their Cold War operational methods is not only unhelpful, it is inaccurate. Similarly, the need to build a “true global coalition” (203) is not a new idea. Finally they conclude that “showing the Muslim world that the West does have a positive agenda to pursue with it and has the will to make improvements in the lives of Muslims, would dramatically change the environment in which the Islamists make their arguments. Conversely, if we pursue democratization through rhetoric and force,” (229) we risk failure. How this might be accomplished is a problem left to the decision makers.

The Next Attack provides a good summary of the problem but contributes little to the solution.

Scott Ritter. ***Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of the Intelligence Conspiracy to Undermine the UN and Overthrow Saddam Hussein*** (New York: Nation Books, 2005), 312 pp., endnotes, index.

In the Foreword, journalist Seymour Hersh points out that Scott Ritter got it right about WMD in Iraq. In the balance of the book, Ritter goes on to suggest that anyone with the same data he had would have reached the same conclusion. But, he states, “dissemination of accurate assessments was prevented by the US Government.” This was done to promote the “USA’s principal objective in Iraq after 1991...regime change.” He then alleges that the “CIA was designated as the principal implementer of this policy...through its manipulation of the work of the UN weapons inspectors and distortion of the facts about Iraq’s WMD programs.” (291) Ritter’s story of the problems experienced by the inspection team is interesting but not new. His depiction of the primacy of his role in the events is surprising and unlikely to be accepted by others familiar with the situation. His sources are mostly unnamed,

confidential intelligence officers, and this leaves one wondering whether conclusions about government policies are accurate or products of the smug certainty and ignorance of events above his pay grade. *Iraq Confidential* should be read with caution, keeping in mind that his charges about the CIA will generate an angry silence among those who cannot respond publicly.

Historical Works

Michael A. Turner. ***Historical Dictionary of United States Intelligence*** (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2006), 291 pp., bibliography, appendices.

Scarecrow Press's historical dictionary of intelligence series began rather well with the first volume on British intelligence by Nigel West (reviewed in *Studies in Intelligence* 50, no. 1: 91). The current work fails by any measure to compare favorably: it has just too many errors. It gets off to a poor start when Turner writes that George Washington organized "the first intelligence service" and the "Culper Spy Ring." There was intelligence collection during the War of Independence but no service devoted to that goal, and Benjamin Tallmadge set up the Culper network. The alphabetical entries begin similarly when Col. Rudolf Abel is identified as a GRU officer, a surprise no doubt to the KGB. To say that the "CIA and FBI became suspicious of Aldrich Ames in the mid-1980s" suggests strongly that Turner never read any of the several books on the case. Sadly the litany goes on and on: Edward Howard was not as stated, an employee of the CIA when he defected; the KH-11 is not still in use; Golitsyn did not name Kim Philby as a Soviet agent; the Japanese code designated PURPLE was for diplomatic, not military, communications; William Stephenson's MI6 designation was 2500, not *Intrepid*; Anthony Blunt did not recruit Burgess, Maclean, or Philby; the description of the *family jewels* as CIA illegal activities is incorrect; the FBI is not "legally prohibited" from engaging in foreign intelligence activities; and the VENONA decrypts do more than "suggest" the guilt of the Rosenbergs. This less than comprehensive list brings doubt upon the rest, though many are correct. The author and the publisher have left the fact-checking to the reader. Naughty.

Amy Knight. ***How The Cold War Began: The Gouzenko Affair and the Hunt for Soviet Spies*** (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 2005), 358 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

The defection of GRU code clerk Igor Gouzenko on 5 September 1945 in Canada, set in motion a series of counterintelligence investigations and arrests in that country, the United States, and the United Kingdom that eventually brought an end to the era of the communist-inspired ideological agents in the West. The Gouzenko case is not new to the public literature nor are the stories of the many Soviet agents exposed by the documents Gouzenko brought with him.⁴ When combined with the agents identified in the VENONA decrypts, it was evident that Soviet intelligence in America had been severely weakened.

Drawing from documents obtained under the Canadian freedom of information laws historian Amy Knight adds some new and relatively minor details to the Gouzenko story. While they do not change the substance of the case, they do describe more of Gouzenko's personal life after the defection. But this is not enough to justify the book and only gradually does the real reason Knight wrote it become apparent: Ms. Knight argues that the primary product of the Gouzenko defection was the damage done to innocent lives due to the "unrelenting witch-hunt for spies." (11, 295) This is a popular and loaded phrase, implying, as it does to many, that the putative spies, as with the mythical witches, did not exist. But even Ms. Knight identifies a number of Soviet agents caught by the RCMP, the FBI, and MI5. She goes on to ask rhetorically, whether "the harm that was done to the West by those who did spy, justified the widespread abuse of individual rights, the vast expenditures of public resources, and the shattering of so many innocent lives?" It is clear she prefers letting the spies spy.

A close reading of the book leads to some problems on these points. First, she provides little, if any, evidence of those accused unjustly—failure to prosecute does not qualify. Some of her examples include Alger Hiss, of whom she suggests there is still good reason to doubt his identification in the VENONA decrypts (338, fn 8), though she doesn't explain why. Then turning to Harry Dexter White, she admits that while he was "shown by VENONA decrypts to have met with Soviet agents (read intelligence officers) and passed information, there is no evidence that he was doing this with the intention of subverting American policies." (301) She fails to realize that the intent was evident in the act. To strengthen her argument she notes that her position "is convincingly demonstrated" in Bruce Craig's biography of White, *Treasonable Doubt*, while neglecting to mention that even Craig concluded White had committed "a species of espionage," a term of art that still defies definition.⁵

Ms. Knight adds other examples, the best known being Canadian diplomat Herbert Norman, a Cambridge University communist in the 1930s who lied about it to his government and eventually committed suicide in Cairo. In this case, she blames the convenient scapegoats of McCarthyism and a US Senate investigating committee for harassing him to death. This is a popular myth in Canada, but there is still no evidence that anything but his lies led to his suicide. As a last example, though many others are available, she states that "even having one's name listed in the address book of another suspected spy was tantamount to being guilty" (295); not inspiring reasoning. Another problem with the book is the author's reading of counterintelligence history. To suggest, as she does, that the United States had "conducted surveillance against the Soviets and their Communist contacts throughout the war," (5) is a gross exaggeration. It was spasmodic at best, despite informants with specific detail

⁴ Igor Gouzenko, *The Iron Curtain* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1952); Reg Whitaker, *Canada and the Cold War* (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 2003).

⁵ Bruce Craig, *Treasonable Doubt: The Harry Dexter White Spy Case* (Laurence: University Press of Kansas, 2004).

and other clues.⁶ Similarly, she shocks those familiar with the case by suggesting—without evidence—that Gouzenko may well have been a British agent for some time before he defected. (42)

One the other side of the accuracy coin, she is probably correct when, after counting the number of pages of documents removed by Nosenko as revealed in the archival record, she casts legitimate doubt on Gouzenko's story that he removed approximately 250 pages under his shirt on the night he defected, an observation so far overlooked. A prolonged period of extraction is indeed more likely.

In sum, while the case facts are accurate and well-documented, when conflated with the politics of the day, the conclusions reached amount to considered opinion, nothing more. The Cold War may well have begun with the Gouzenko defection and the espionage it revealed, but no evidence is presented that the treatment of Communist Party members was even a contributing factor. This is a weak case study.

Louis J. Freeh with Howard Means. ***My FBI: Bringing Down the Mafia, Investigating Bill Clinton, and Fighting the War on Terror*** (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2005), 336 pp., photos, index. (Available in abridged audio CD.)

FBI Director Louis Freeh dealt with aspects of some important events during his seven-year tenure—1 September 1993–25 June 2001—though few details are provided here. Domestically, there was the fallout from Waco and Ruby Ridge. Then came the *Unabomber* manhunt and arrest and the Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center bombings. Overseas there were a few problems caused by Usama bin Laden and various terrorists, including the bombing of the Khobar Towers, the Somalia embassy bombing, and the attack on the USS Cole. In the area of domestic counterintelligence, for which the bureau has a mandate, he says nothing in the title and little in the book. Less than a page for the CIA's Aldrich Ames, who is called the "chief of the Soviet Branch in the Directorate of Operations," and Harold Nicholson (236), just a few more for the FBI's Earl Pitts and Robert Hanssen. There is no mention in the latter case of the monumental delays and career damage caused to the CIA's Brian Kelley, when the FBI insisted on focusing on him as the mole. Nor does Freeh mention identifying Hanssen by accident. President Clinton is covered in two chapters plus parts of others, and the Mafia doesn't get much more attention. We get only a hint of the disastrous bureau computer problems, while learning a bit about Freeh himself, who seems to be a sterling character—just the right man for the job, although President Clinton did not share that opinion. (62) This book is FBI lite. *GOOGLE* will be more informative.

⁶ See Robert Lamphere, *The KGB-FBI War: A Special Agent's Story* (New York: Random House, 1986).

Intelligence Around the World

Rodger W. Claire. ***Raid On The Sun: Inside Israel's Secret Campaign that Denied Saddam the Bomb*** (New York: Broadway Books, 2004), 259 pp., end-notes, photos, index. (Available in abridged audio CD.)

After 4 years of planning, on 7 June 1981, eight F-16 fighters, each carrying two 2,000 pound delayed-action bombs, flew 683 miles—600 at an altitude of 600 feet—at a speed of 6 nm/minute to arrive at Iraq's OSIRAK nuclear reactor, while the Iraqi radar was, as usual, turned off because the operators had gone to dinner. Less than five minutes later, 14 of the bombs had struck the target and the planes turned homeward. Mission accomplished. Although all participants were sworn to secrecy, Prime Minister Menachem Begin quickly released an official statement admitting Israel had made the attack. World reaction was universally negative. UN Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick compared the attack to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (229) Privately, President Reagan commented that “boys will be boys.” (218)

Journalist Roger Claire fills in the details of *Operation Babylon* in an easy-reading style, though his grasp of administrative and technical detail sometimes falters. For example, there is no US agency called *the National Security Administration*, which substitutes for the National Security Council and National Reconnaissance Office (104 and 217), nor is the SA-6 a heat-seeking guided missile. (137) The contributions of France and Italy to Iraq's nuclear program are spelled out, and the role of the CIA in the operation is mentioned. In the strongest part of the book, Claire describes the pilot selection process, the technical problems involved in the attack—for example, how to fly an F-15 round-trip to Baghdad without refueling—and the step-by-step execution of the mission itself. His account is based on interviews with seven of the eight pilots, many of the planners, recently released classified Israeli documents on the operation—although none are cited—some anonymous interviews, and related open-source material. The eighth and youngest of the pilots, Ilan Ramon, was interviewed by phone while training as an astronaut in Texas. He was lost when space shuttle Columbia exploded.

Raid On The Sun won't be the final word for military historians, but even in its current form it is a fascinating account with implications for decisionmakers dealing with nonproliferation issues.

Maloy Krishna Dhar. ***Open Secrets: India's Intelligence Unveiled*** (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2005), 519 pp., no index.

“*Open Secrets*...for the first time” offers “insight into the...prime intelligence organization of India—the Intelligence Bureau (IB). In India any open writing...about the intelligence community is frowned upon as an act of betrayal against the establishment. Such revelations are aplenty in ‘free democracies’ in the western world, where intelligence is regularly brought under public scanner through legal and constitutional means.” (5) Whether

Maloy Dhar has got it exactly right is difficult to say since he provides no documentation. But the organizations and major events he describes and the people with whom he dealt in various countries can be easily checked. What he has offered for consideration is a professional intelligence officer's view of India's intelligence organizations based on his observations during a 29-year career. The central theme of the book is that legislative oversight of the organizations, which are subordinate only to the executive branch, has long been needed, and without it India's historical politicization of intelligence will not end.

Entry into the IB, India's security service, is normally through the Indian Police Service, where students are earmarked for intelligence duty. That is how Dhar began. He served in various Indian states and Canada, but most of his time was spent at headquarters, in New Delhi, on counterintelligence assignments—working the KGB desk, observing the Pakistani intelligence service, and monitoring the actions of Muslim and Hindu activist groups. Typical of his cases in his last years were the attempts to neutralize Pakistan's penetration of India's space program, something that had become a political scandal. He gradually made contacts with various government leaders, including Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and was from time-to-time tasked to overlook certain acts by government officials, help the prime minister during elections, and perform illegal surveillance and related operations against political opponents. Many of these illegal, if not unethical, acts are admitted in the book more as a mea culpa than the disgruntled outburst of a former employee. Dhar provides much detail about the intensive and continuous bureaucratic battles among India's foreign intelligence service—the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)—the Joint Intelligence Committee, and various other groups and government ministries. Aside from the on-the-job irritations this caused, Dhar uses these matters to illustrate the need for parliamentary oversight the lack of which he calls a “national shame.”

Dhar retired in 1995 after being passed over in 1994 for the top position in the IB, and he is critical of the man who got the job—D.C. Pathak. (See comments on Pathak's book below.) But this doesn't distract from the unique look *Open Secrets* provides into India's intelligence services. Thus it is a valuable contribution and background for the intelligence officer.

D. C. Pathak. ***Intelligence: A Security Weapon*** (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2003), 197 pp., photos, index.

This is the first book published by a former director of India's Intelligence Bureau, the organization responsible for domestic security. Educated as an organic chemist, the author first joined the Indian Police Service (IPS) and was subsequently selected for the IB, where he gradually rose to its top position. Unlike Maloy Dhar (above), who served under him briefly as a deputy and goes unmentioned in this book, Pathak has written a normative—how things should work—as opposed to a functional, description of how intelligence actually operates. His concepts are not radically different from those of services in other

democratic countries, but so little has been published in the West about India, it, like Dhar's book, is a valuable contribution. Pathak stresses his "philosophy of management," which should be understood by the professionals and the interested public alike. He views the intelligence organization as "an umbrella" under which the individual remains the focal point of concern and around which the "methodology of intelligence operations revolves." He hopes to convey the principle that intelligence is a noble profession on which the security of the nation depends. In describing what he calls his "philosophy of intelligence," Pathak covers the qualifications, recruitment, and work atmosphere of intelligence personnel, the need to accept anonymity while emphasizing specialization, creativity and innovation, the value of historical experience and the impact of the "age of knowledge" which now dominates the world in which we live.

On the topic of what he terms "strategic culture," he underscores the need for the "unfailing study of overt and covert plans of political adversaries" that leads to a "system of internal vigilance." He concludes with an assessment of the critical role of intelligence in the age of global terrorism. Here he acknowledges that while the United States and its allies are the principal enemies of the Islamists, India is also a target, with Pakistan's ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) requiring constant attention.

Intelligence: A Security Weapon, is a thoughtful book that provides an idealistic view of how the author hopes the Indian intelligence services practice their profession. It contrasts sharply with the views of Maloy Dhar. A reasonable conclusion is that India has a way to go before the influences of bureaucracy and political expediency no longer dominate.

Jung Chang and Jon Halliday. ***MAO: The Unknown Story*** (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005), 814 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

In 1999, London *Times* journalist, Philip Short, published a 782-page biography of Mao Zedong. What more could be said only six years later? There are at least three answers. First, the primary author of this book was born and attended university in China while Mao was in power. Second, the authors found new source material—from Chinese archives and personal interviews. Third, and perhaps most important, the personality portrait of Mao that emerges is strikingly different: "a portrait of tyranny, degeneracy, mass murder, and promiscuity...the greatest monster of them all—the Red Emperor of China."⁷ To this the authors point out Mao, the one-time library assistant, eccentric teacher, and bookstore manager, was also an opera lover, poet, and a ruthless politician who wanted the Chinese Communist Party to take over the world. But the most significant trait uncovered, and the dominant theme of the book, was Mao's self-centered lifelong pursuit of power, the steps he was willing to take to achieve and keep it, and his distaste for the peasant. Mao first expressed his views on this topic as a university student:

⁷ See review by Simon Sebag Montefiore, *The Sunday Times*, 29 May 2005.

Of course there are people and objects in the world, but they are there only for me.... People like me only have a duty to ourselves; we have no duty to other people.... Great heroes are magnificently powerful, stormy and invincible. Their power is like a hurricane...like a sex-maniac in heat and prowling for a lover...there is no way to stop them. (13–14)

An essential element in both acquiring power and keeping it was a reliable security service. The authors blend Mao's actions toward this end throughout the book, and they describe his mercurial relationship with Kang Sheng, Mao's *Felix Dzerzhinsky*.⁸

Following directly from his obsession for power, the authors reach the surprising conclusion that Mao was not a Marxist. Marxism was a means to power. Furthermore, contrary to the popular image of Mao as the savior of the peasants—and Mao was from a peasant family—he cared little for them. They were merely useful—alive or dead. He killed over 70 million, putting Stalin, his mentor, to shame. At one point as the Great Famine was claiming over 30 million lives, Mao suggested they could be trained to endure or eat leaves. He needed the food for foreign exchange and that is what he did with it. His absolute control, his treatment of close advisers and wives, and his control over the Party, was brutal and unrelenting until his death.

Mao is still on display in Tiananmen Square and, despite the truth about this “hero,” is likely to remain there so long as China has a communist government. For those who study China, its government and its politics, understanding Mao's legacy is essential. The book is a fine place to start.

Alexenia Dimitrova. *The Iron Fist: Inside the Archives of the Bulgarian Secret Police* (London: Artnik, 2005), 205 pp.

By the time the post-Soviet era government in Bulgaria opened the former State Security Service files to the public, 30-year-old journalist Alexenia Dimitrova knew she would apply for access. Her father had disappeared for months during the Soviet era and life had been restricted in many ways. One grew up knowing the security service played a role in these events, and Alexeniz Dimitrova decided to find out the details. *The Iron Fist* is the product of her efforts. In the first of its two parts, the book tells of uncovering a story of state repression that will surprise no one. What is new here are the details unearthed—numbers and names—and Dimitrova's perspective. She was shocked by the dominance of the Security Service, the concentration camps, the informers—some her friends—her father's dossier, the links of State Security to the KGB, the censorship of all publications, the bugged hotel rooms, the corruption of the clergy, and the harassment of dissidents.

⁸ For a biography of Kang Sheng see: John Byron and Robert Pack, *The Claws of the Dragon: Kang Sheng—The Evil Genius Behind Mao—And His Legacy of Terror in People's China* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992).

The second part of the book begins with the attempt on the pope's life in 1981 when the author was 18. Even in the repressive society of the day she learned of the charges of Bulgarian involvement "despite the fact that there was no real evidence." (161) Later, after her work in the Bulgarian archives, she studied in the United States and decided to use the Freedom of Information Act to see just what facts, if any, the CIA and FBI possessed that would either support or reject a Bulgarian role. She was surprised that she even got a reply but was not pleased with the parsimonious magnitude—20 redacted CIA documents, less from the bureau. Still, she was encouraged to continue her research using the public record, which she found contradicted the official position. Her conclusion, that Bulgaria was not involved, is not surprising, nor is the fact that it is a judgment call. She found no smoking gun but suspects key documents supporting her view were withheld. In the final chapters she explains how she expanded her study of espionage during the Cold War in Eastern and Western Europe and discovered Bulgaria played a role in the illegal acquisition of technical data from the West. This only leads her to conclude that the Western security services are as bad as those behind the Iron Curtain, and she is especially hard on the CIA, asserting, based on Western newspaper accounts, that it had targeted and jailed innocent Bulgarians for the purpose of trading them for Western agents held in the East. Here she allows journalistic emotion to rule over solid research.

In the final chapter Dimitrova reverts to an old, domestic Bulgarian case. Based on Bulgarian documents she found in the archives, she concludes that the first head of the Bulgarian communist government, Georgi Dimitrov, had been poisoned by mercury on the orders of Stalin. *The Iron Fist* gives an unusual Bulgarian glimpse of life behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War.



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